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What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?
Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld*
Abstract. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) offers a window into modern American
federalism—and modern American nationalism—in action. The ACA’s federalism is
defined not by separation between state and federal, but rather by a national structure that
invites state-led implementation. As it turns out, that structure was only a starting point
for a remarkably dynamic and adaptive implementation process that has generated new
state-federal arrangements. States move back and forth between different structural
models vis-à-vis the federal government; internal state politics produce different state
choices; states copy, compete, and cooperate with each other; and negotiation with federal
counterparts is a near constant. These characteristics have endured through the change in
presidential administration.
This Article presents the results of a study that tracked the details of the ACA’s federalismrelated implementation from 2012 to 2017. Among the questions that motivated the
project: Does the ACA actually effectuate “federalism,” and what are federalism’s key
attributes when entwined with national statutory implementation? A federal law on the
scale of the ACA presented a rare opportunity to investigate implementation from a
statute’s very beginning and to provide the concrete detail often wanting in federalism
scholarship.
The findings deconstruct assumptions about federalism made by theorists of all stripes,
from formalist to modern. Federalism’s commonly invoked attributes—including
autonomy, cooperation, experimentation, and variation—have not been dependent on any
particular architecture of either state-federal separation or entanglement, even though
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theorists typically call on “federalism” to produce them. Instead, these attributes have been
generated in ACA implementation across virtually every kind of governance model—that
is, regardless whether states expand Medicaid; get waivers; or operate their own insurance
exchanges or let the federal government do it for them. This makes it extraordinarily
challenging to measure which structural arrangements are most “federalist,” especially
because the various federalism attributes are not always present together.
The study also uncovers major theoretical difficulties when it comes to healthcare:
Without a clear conception of the U.S. healthcare system’s goals, how can we know which
structural arrangements serve it best, much less whether they are working? If healthcare
federalism is a mechanism to produce particular policy outcomes, we should determine
whether locating a particular facet of healthcare design in the states versus the federal
government positively affects, for example, healthcare cost, access, or quality. If, instead,
healthcare federalism serves structural aims regardless of policy ends—for instance,
reserving power to states in the interest of sovereignty or checks and balances—we should
examine whether it does in fact accomplish those goals, and we should justify why those
goals outweigh the moral concerns that animate health policy. The ACA did not cause this
conceptual confusion, but it retained and built on a fragmented healthcare landscape that
already was riddled with structural and moral compromises.
This does not mean that federalism is an empty concept or that it does not exist in the
ACA. Federalism scholars tend to argue for particular structural arrangements based on
prior goals and values. The ACA’s architecture challenges whether any of these goals and
values are unique to federalism or any particular expression of it. At the same time, the
ACA’s implementation is clearly a story about state leverage, intrastate democracy, and
state policy autonomy within, not apart from, a national statutory scheme. Its
implementation illustrates how federalism is a proxy for many ideas and challenges us to
ask what we are really fighting over, or seeking, when we invoke the concept in
healthcare and beyond.
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Introduction
Federalism is all the rage in health policy again. For the past eight years,
President Obama’s Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which
designated the states as its frontline implementers, has been cited as a
particularly prominent example of modern federalism.1 Indeed, the ACA has
been deemed a prototypical example of federalism in dozens of articles—many
of them not only about healthcare.2 With the new Administration, federalism
has stayed at the forefront of the healthcare policy conversation. The bills
proposed to replace the ACA, as well as the executive branch’s administrative
efforts, are heavy on state options and waiver opportunities.3 But every
Republican proposal likewise has kept the federal government squarely in the
picture, preserving many of the ACA’s distinctive national-level interventions
while also preserving the ACA’s state-centricity.4 At the same time, and despite
the laser focus on state-federal relations under the law, little detail has emerged
on how the ACA’s federalism actually operates in practice and what, if
anything, is noteworthy about it.
This Article builds on a research effort we conducted with colleagues at the
University of Pennsylvania that tracked the details of the ACA’s federalismrelated implementation from 2012 to 2017. The work was driven by many
questions. Central among them were: Does the ACA actually effectuate
“federalism,” and what are federalism’s key attributes when it is entwined with
national statutory implementation? How did the ACA’s federalism take shape,
1. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Essay, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State

Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 539-40
(2011) (describing some of the many modern federalism structures in the statute); see
also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
2. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV.
953, 969 (2016); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana
Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 118 (2015); Heather K. Gerken, Lecture, Windsor’s Mad
Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 598 (2015);
Michael S. Greve, Our Federalism Is Not Europe’s. It’s Becoming Argentina’s., 7 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 32 (2012); Orrin G. Hatch, King v. Burwell and the Rule of
Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 2, 10 (2015); Gillian E. Metzger, Essay, Agencies,
Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1772 (2015); Hannah J. Wiseman,
Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1686-87 (2014); Josh Bendor & Miles Farmer,
Note, Curing the Blind Spot in Administrative Law: A Federal Common Law Framework for
State Agencies Implementing Cooperative Federalism Statutes, 122 YALE L.J. 1280, 1287
(2013).
3. See, e.g., American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (as passed by House,
May 4, 2017); 163 CONG. REC. S5682-95 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2017) (SA 1030)); see also
Compare Proposals to Replace the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://perma.cc/S7GR-NBRW (archived Apr. 23, 2018).
4. See Compare Proposals to Replace the Affordable Care Act, supra note 3.
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and what was its purpose? A federal law on the scale of the ACA presented a
rare opportunity to investigate how modern federalism works from a statute’s
very beginning.
The deep description that we develop in this Article gives rise to an almost
unmanageable number of questions about federalism theory. It deconstructs
assumptions about federalism made by theorists of all stripes—not just
constitutional law-oriented federalists, who focus on formal separation, but
also those who call themselves the “new school” federalists, who acknowledge
and celebrate the importance of states’ role in the administration of modern
federal statutes.5 The findings also uncover a theoretical muddle when it comes
to healthcare law and policymaking: Without a clear conception of the U.S.
healthcare system’s goals, how can we know which structural arrangements
serve it best, much less whether they are working?
Our key descriptive findings are summarized in Part I. In brief, we find the
ACA’s federalism to be exceedingly dynamic and adaptive. The statute’s
framework has turned out to be only a starting point for a robust vertical and
horizontal process of intergovernmental bargaining, through which states and
the federal government implement the law through copying, negotiating, and
adapting. The statute’s structural architecture is also decidedly nonessentialist
from a federalism perspective6: That is, federalism’s commonly cited
attributes—including autonomy, cooperation, variation, and experimentation—have been generated across virtually every kind of state-federal
arrangement in the statute’s implementation. Those federalism benefits, in
other words, have not been dependent on any architecture of either statefederal separation or entanglement.
As one example, take Medicaid, the public insurance program for lowincome individuals. Some states expanded Medicaid eligibility precisely as the
5. Compare, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All

the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11-13 (2010) (describing the classic sovereignty
account of federalism) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down], with, e.g.,
Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
997, 1005 (2015) (arguing for a modern understanding of federalism that incorporates
national power) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism], Erin Ryan, Response
to Heather Gerken’s Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1147, 1152-53, 1159-60 (2015) (noting the importance of state-federal bargaining as the
critical element of modern federalism), and Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 130-36 (2004) (noting that federalism in practice occurs
through statutory doctrines such as preemption due to the Supreme Court’s broad
interpretation of Congress’s enumerated powers).
6. See Judith Resnik, Accommodations, Discounts, and Displacement: The Variability of Rights
as a Norm of Federalism(s), 17 JUS POLITICUM 208, 221, 225 (2017) (rejecting as an
“essentialist claim” “the presumption of the naturalness of federal or of state
exclusivity, as if certain kinds of activities were intrinsically only to be left to a
particular level”).
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ACA’s text laid out; others chose not to expand at all; still others negotiated
(and renegotiated) waivers to tailor Medicaid to their liking, in ways less than
ideal to the Obama Administration.7 All of these states experienced autonomy;
all of their choices generated policy localism and experimentation. Waiver
states arguably cooperated with the federal government and dissented
simultaneously. Were the waiver states more or less cooperative than other
expansion states? Were they more or less autonomous than states that did not
expand at all? In the end, it proved impossible to assign weights to the different
ways in which federalism attributes emerged and to the structural architectures that produced them because they emerged from virtually every possible
state-federal arrangement under the law.
This does not mean that we conclude that federalism is an empty concept
or that it does not exist in the ACA. Instead, we stake out a new place on
federalism’s messy spectrum. On one end, some scholars insist on an all-ornothing conception, one in which state power is derived from separation from
the federal government and the Constitution draws the critical lines.8 On
another point on the spectrum are those who see arrangements like the ACA
and say that federalism does not exist at all; they instead see mere decentralization and use of states in a subservient and managerial way.9 Still others brand
themselves modern federalists and see state activity within federal frameworks
as nonsovereign activity that both serves nationalism and works as a safety
valve for the expression of dissenting views.10 The details of the ACA’s
implementation do not fully support any of those stories.
To the contrary, our findings make clear that the ACA’s implementation is
indeed a story about state leverage, intrastate governance, and state policy
autonomy, even within a national statutory scheme. That these, and other
common federalism values, were effectuated independently of any particular
structural arrangement or formal separation may be difficult for some
federalism aficionados to swallow, but it is a key conclusion of this Article and
one we think offers a new perspective. It also complicates what it means to be
an essential attribute of federalism. For instance, we found that policy
variation and experimentation—two oft-referenced federalism attributes11—
were generated as much in the various nationally run insurance exchanges as
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 5, at 11-13.
9. Cf. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND

TRAGIC COMPROMISE, at ix (2008) (suggesting, prior to the ACA, that some aspects of
modern federalism are actually just “managerial decentralization”).
10. See Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism, supra note 5, at 1005.
11. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 923-24 (1994) (describing the variation produced by
experimentation as an “instrumental argument for federalism”).
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in the state-run exchanges. Those attributes thus do not seem unique to
federalist arrangements, even though theorists typically call on federalism to
produce them. Sovereignty does not seem absolutely necessary either, although
it played a key role at times. And with respect to autonomy, full structural
separation of states from the ACA (i.e., total nationalization) would have
diminished state power far more than did giving states the lead implementation role that they had. More than anything else, we found that state
participation and choice, rather than any particular structural allocation, gave
states the most power under the statute.
To be sure, aspects of the ACA’s implementation will not resonate with
federalism scholars at all. For starters, we begin with the view that national
intervention in healthcare is unavoidable and that the ACA was not a unique
interloper in an otherwise exclusive sphere of state authority. That will be
anathema to the constitutional law-tethered federalists. But as we illustrate, the
ACA is only the latest instance in a long pattern of incremental, national
healthcare interventions.12 That history renders mostly irrelevant
constitutional arguments about federalism in healthcare and the views of
classic federalists who slice the world into separate compartments of federal
and state authority. Instead, state-federal allocation in healthcare has been,
from the beginning, a feature of congressional design more than of any
constitutional mandate requiring exclusive domains. One of us has called this
“intrastatutory federalism”: federalism arrangements produced by federal
statutes themselves.13
Further, the ACA’s deployment of the states, even as it empowered them,
has almost certainly helped enact and entrench the statute. That is a nationalist
end, served by state-implementation means, and one that most would not
associate with traditional federalism values. The existence of these vectors of
state power and state service in the same story complicates it tremendously.
In the end, however, these different expressions and aims of federalism
matter only once we define what federalism is supposed to be and what it is for.
Federalism is a term that today is difficult to pin down.14 The complications
our study uncovers underscore how federalism has tended to stand in for so
many different values, as well as for many different types of structural
arrangements—whether separation, checks and balances, variation, autonomy,
or experimentation. They also reveal that these attributes do not always line
up coherently, even within the same statute.

12. See infra Part II.
13. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 538.
14. See generally The Federalist Soc’y, Is Everyone Now for Federalism?, YOUTUBE (Nov. 17,

2017), https://perma.cc/2485-Z4MY.
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Healthcare fits right into this modern federalism story. While state
authority over areas of healthcare certainly remains, the major decisions about
allocation of power in healthcare now typically come not as requirements of
constitutional law but rather from political and policy decisions by Congress to
incorporate states into federal schemes. The question we set out to answer was
whether this modern brand of federalism succeeds in health law. We initially
attempted to quantitatively measure the ACA’s federalism in implementation,
evaluating where federalism delivered and where it failed. Our efforts,
however, were stymied by conceptual barriers in federalism and healthcare
theory alike.
The first problem we encountered was a federalism-theory problem. It was
impossible to weigh whether one type of structural arrangement was more
autonomous, sovereign, experimental, or cooperative because, as noted, aspects
of those attributes exist across all of the different state-federal allocations in the
statute. Federalism scholars typically argue for structural decisions based on
the ends they wish to produce; our findings question whether it is even possible
to talk about ends as related to any particular kind of structure, as well as
whether federalism has ever been properly defined by either side.
The second problem we encountered was a problem of health policy
theory: What is healthcare federalism even for? Most of the healthcare policy
literature has failed to engage this threshold question why we are focused on
state-federal allocation in healthcare in the first place.15 (This problem could be
generalized to most any field, we suspect,16 but we confine our analysis to
healthcare.) For instance, we might view healthcare federalism as about
federalism for federalism’s sake—federalism for political or constitutional
values—reserving some power over healthcare for states in the interest of state
sovereignty and balance of power, regardless of the effect on healthcare
coverage, cost, access, or quality. If so, we should examine whether it does in
fact accomplish those goals. If, on the other hand, healthcare federalism is a
mechanism for producing particular policy outcomes, we should examine
instead whether locating a particular facet of healthcare design in the states
versus the federal government positively affects, for example, healthcare
coverage, cost, access, quality, innovation, or some other health policy aim.
15. The most extensive treatment comes in a terrific 2003 Urban Institute volume, which

posits different reasons why federalism might be favored in healthcare. See John
Holahan et al., Federalism and Health Policy: An Overview, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH
POLICY 1, 5-7 (John Holahan et al. eds., 2003). The authors conclude: “U.S. health policy
reflects a shared approach to federalism . . . . There is little agreement that either level
of government would necessarily do better than the current arrangement.” Id. at 6.
16. Cf. Judith Resnik, What’s Federalism For?, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 269, 270 (Jack
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (illustrating the variety of causes to which
federalism has been turned in modern times).
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Complicating matters further is the lack of theoretical foundation in the
field of health law in general. The field remains caught in a centuries-old,
unresolved tension between the so-called “social solidarity” model—which
posits that every person should be guaranteed some minimal level of
healthcare; and the “individual responsibility” model—which posits that a
person should receive only the healthcare she can pay for.17 The ACA built on
a fragmented system that compromised on both sets of values and, while the
ACA itself pushed the needle toward solidarity by enacting policies aimed at
universal coverage, it did not go all the way and still leaves the field without
clear core principles.18
As such, federalism becomes even more difficult to measure because the
menu of potential health policy goals is not necessarily coherent. For instance,
health policy that decreases costs for the federal government is not difficult to
construct, and such a policy might also be deemed states’ rights- or federalismfriendly if it pushes policy choices to the states. But such a policy could well
reduce access to care, especially for the poor,19 and it would not be statefriendly if it increased the financial or regulatory burdens on states beyond
what they could meet. As another example, health policy that allows for
interstate variation might be a benefit of federalism, but it also leads to
significant inequality when it comes to healthcare access across the country.20
For some, a moral belief in equality might trump whatever other benefit (like
policy variation) a federalist structure could generate. This is why, without a
clear goal, it is impossible to know whether federalism is simply a structural
preference regardless of its effect on healthcare or a substantive choice whose
success warrants verification.
This Article unfolds as follows: Part I summarizes the key findings. The
ACA’s implementation was marked by structural dynamism, negotiation,
administrative pragmatism, complex intrastate politics, and interstate
17. See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform,

14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 227 (2008) (“The peculiarly American mix of entitlement and
personal responsibility in today’s health reform proposals may . . . mask deep divisions
in beliefs about whether society or the individual ought to be responsible for health.
Trying to have it both ways may make it impossible to agree on sustainable reform.”);
see also Abbe Gluck, Opinion, America Needs to Decide: Is Heath Care Something We Owe
Our Citizens?, VOX (updated Mar. 18, 2017, 9:36 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/763M
-NAQM (describing current debates’ failures to engage with the tension Mariner
identified).
18. See Gluck, supra note 17.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See, e.g., Samantha Artiga et al., The Impact of the Coverage Gap for Adults in States Not
Expanding Medicaid by Race and Ethnicity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 26, 2015),
https://perma.cc/J6VR-BNXH (documenting significant health disparities in states
that chose not to expand Medicaid).
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horizontal competition and learning. Part II provides an abbreviated history of
federalism and nationalism in healthcare and situates that history in modern
theories of federalism. Part III details the ACA’s federalism structure and
provides background on our study of the implementation of two of the ACA’s
key pillars, which were also its most state-centered components: the Medicaid
expansion and the health insurance marketplaces (called exchanges).21 Parts IV
and V offer a deep dive into the federalism features of the Medicaid and
exchange implementations, respectively. Part VI circles back to the question
what federalism in healthcare is for and extrapolates lessons that can be
learned.
We conclude that the ACA’s story substantiates the existence of some
federalism attributes within federal administration under the right
circumstances. For instance, state leverage and policy flexibility seem real—
even within a national law—when states have choices to make that are
important to the statute’s success. Those characteristics in turn serve state
sovereignty, as we discuss. But other federalism attributes may not be
dependent on states being involved at all—including the famous Brandeisian
federalism values of experimentation and variation.22 We saw those values
emerge from nationally run aspects of the ACA, too, and did not see any
evidence that state-run components did any better. Perhaps these no longer
should be thought of as classic federalism values.
We recognize that thus deconstructing federalism’s key attributes poses
dizzying complexities not only for conceptualization but also for legal
doctrine. As one of us has detailed elsewhere, federalism doctrine has barely
moved past the separate-spheres conception.23 But it must if the various values
we associate with federalism are worth protecting, because they now clearly
emerge outside of separate-spheres design. Moreover, the values are many and
are not always produced together by the same state-federal structural
arrangement. Yet we continue to invoke federalism as a single placeholder for
all of these different things. Recognizing these developments and concretizing
what is essential to federalism is necessary to effectuate and evaluate it—not
only in the ACA but also beyond.

21. Many of the dynamics we describe play out in other areas of state-federal relationships

in health regulation, but those were not the focus of our study, nor has federalism been
at the forefront of those areas in such stark exposition as in the case of the ACA.
22. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
23. See Abbe R. Gluck, Essay, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2022-43 (2014).
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I.

Summary of Key Findings

Several of our findings should be of particular interest to federalism
experts, health-oriented or not. First, we found the ACA’s federalism to be
dynamic, negotiated, adaptive, and horizontal. It was marked by robust
intergovernmental activity. States copied other states and leveraged the success
of forerunners for more gains in later negotiations.24 The federal government
adapted each time, setting the stage for the next round of activity. This
federalism was multidirectional, not an on-off switch: States have changed
structural architecture in both directions, moving between state-led and
federally led models and vice versa.25 State choices have moved in waves.26
Second, the ACA’s federalism generated some fascinatingly pragmatic and
creative hybrids of national and state-level solutions that we have not seen
theorized elsewhere in the federalism literature and that emerged only in
implementation. The ACA’s initial framework, it turned out, was a mere
starting point for the ultimate allocation of authority. The hybrids that
emerged were notable in striking a middle ground between one and fifty
options—those two extremes being the typical way that state-federal allocation
of power questions are considered, and the typical kind of choice Congress
makes in designing statutes in areas that implicate the states. The ACA’s story
reveals instead that some lower number of structural options—say, four or
eight—might be the sweet spot between variety and efficiency.
We also found that many states were eager to accept the kind of federal
help for which the federal government has particular economies of scale,
including administrative and technical assistance, even as they wished to retain
control over policy decisions.27 These hybrid solutions had negative
byproducts too. Most importantly, they jeopardized transparency. Some states
that took advantage of the hybrid approach did so because it allowed them to
hide the fact they were getting federal help from their constituents and, in some
cases, hide it even from parts of their own governments.28 The hybrids thus
gave red-state officials cover to entrench the ACA but arguably came at a steep
price when it comes to accountability. One official colorfully called it the
“secret boyfriend model” of state-federal relations—a relationship coveted by

24. The account of the negotiations we offer substantiates much of Erin Ryan’s work. See

25.
26.
27.
28.

generally Ryan, supra note 5, at 1159-60 (discussing the breadth and importance of
bargaining between states and the federal government in the context of contemporary
federalism).
See infra Parts IV-V.
See infra Parts IV-V.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.B.2.

1700

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270

What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018)

the states, but one that states were unwilling to admit publicly for political
reasons.29
Third, the ACA’s federalism story highlights the importance of intrastate
governance.30 Each state is an individual republic of its own, even as most
federalism scholars still talk about “the states” as a monolithic bloc.31 But states
had different laws going into the ACA, which shaped policymaking decisions
under the law. For instance, some states had generous preexisting insurance
requirements, which affected the design of their exchanges. Other states had
laws about Medicaid policy, which influenced governors in their negotiations
over whether and how to expand Medicaid in their own states under the ACA.
State actors also have significant differences among them. State insurance
commissioners (most of whom are elected) view health policy differently from
governors, who themselves take a different position from legislators—even
those within the same party. The ACA’s implementation saw many governors
bucking legislators in their own party to take advantage of the ACA’s benefits
to their states—often using preexisting features of state law to do so—
underscoring the different priorities of different members of state government
and the different structures of the state governments themselves. These
internal dynamics within states have a profound, and mostly unrecognized,
influence on national policy.32
Fourth, Parts IV and V take a deep dive into implementation that deconstructs federalism’s commonly touted attributes and so reveals the complications for empirically measuring federalism in healthcare and beyond. We
suggest that many of the most common “federalism” questions are unanswerable or at least seriously oversimplified. Take for instance the popular question
whether states are engaging in cooperative or uncooperative (disobedient)
federalism, as well as the related question whether certain structural
arrangements serve state autonomy.33 The ACA allowed states to choose
whether to operate their own health insurance exchanges or to have the
29. Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, and 4

30.
31.

32.

33.

(Aug. 5, 2016) (on file with authors). Because many interviewees were sitting officials,
or formerly sitting officials, we granted all of them confidentiality to allow for more
candid discussion.
See infra Parts IV.B, V.D.
For an important exception, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of
Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1201, 1203 (1999).
Our account responds to Rick Hills’s longstanding call to “dissect” the states and
develop a federalism story that recognizes the differences both among the states and
among various governmental players within each state. See id.
See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Essay, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L.J. 1256, 1258-59 (2009).
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federal government do so for them.34 Many believe that blue states cooperated
by establishing their own state-run exchanges and that red states rebelled by
defaulting to a federally run exchange. This binary is too simplistic. When
Oregon, for example, switched from a state-run to a federally supported
exchange,35 did it suddenly become uncooperative? Or was Oregon still
cooperating by defaulting to the national exchange, even though the common
wisdom is that red states that did the same thing were not cooperating and
were more autonomous?
As for rebellious states, were they more sovereign, autonomous, and
uncooperative in the context of the exchanges—even though, as a result of
their refusal to implement the exchanges themselves, they paradoxically
welcomed the federal government takeover of their insurance markets?36 Or did
other states instead better exert and increase their own sovereign power when
they implemented the ACA themselves, typically making their own policy
choices and passing state laws to do so? Regardless of the structural
arrangement chosen, it is clear that states would have enacted far fewer
healthcare-related laws—and been in control of far less health policy—had they
been left out of the ACA entirely. In other words, constitutional federalism’s
preference for formalist and exclusionary structural arrangements would not
have served the values here that those arrangements are supposed to serve.
States exerted power—leverage and checks on the federal government, in
addition to control of policy—from within the statute, not from outside it.
In exploring all these topics, we build upon the recent wave of new
federalism scholarship—work that has been occupied with mapping and
explicating federalism across all subjects in an age of national power.37 As we
elaborate in Parts VI, our findings challenge areas of this research. Contrary to
34. See infra Part III.A.
35. See Louise Norris, Oregon Health Insurance Marketplace: History and News of the State’s

Exchange, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Jan. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/776P-P9UP (“Oregon
initially had a fully state-run exchange—Cover Oregon—but it was plagued with
technological failures, and never worked as planned.”).
36. See infra Part V.
37. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 461 (2012) (arguing that states increasingly use cooperative
federalism to challenge federal executive power and enforce federal statutes); Gluck,
supra note 23, at 1998 (arguing that modern federalism is a “National Federalism”
created by federal statutory design); Greve, supra note 2, at 34-35 (highlighting the
United States and Argentina as examples of federal states increasingly using cooperative federalism); see also Ryan, supra note 5, at 1151-55 (situating environmental law in a
theory of federalism that collapses national and federal); Ernest Young, William
Howard Taft Lecture, Federalism as a Constitutional Principle, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1057,
1067, 1076-77 (2015) (describing the enumerated powers strategy of protecting
federalism through constitutional law and advocating for the importance of political
and sociological forces in supporting modern federalism).
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what some new federalism scholars would argue, the ACA’s federalism does
more than serve nationalist ends. It also gives the states more power than the
new federalism account allows. At the same time, the ACA’s story demolishes
the utility of the concept of cooperation in federalism, beloved by modern
federalism scholars, because that concept illuminates nothing in this context.
Indeed, it challenges even more broadly the very notion that any particular
structural arrangement is required to produce most of the values we associate
with federalism at all.
Finally, this Article also responds to a particular weakness of federalism
scholarship in general by pausing to examine the deep details of the ACA’s
federalism in operation. As one of us has chronicled, federalism theory tends to
be high on abstraction and low on concreteness.38 Detailed exposition situated
in both history and theory is wanting, and we hope to provide that here.
II. Healthcare Federalism, Old and New
From the time the ACA was introduced, debates about the law’s desirability have been entangled with debates about American federalism. Politicians,
commentators, and scholars alike have portrayed the ACA as a federal
takeover, a uniquely nationalist intervention in the terrain of state health
policy.39 Others have incorrectly theorized about the ACA’s structural
arrangements as a new and unique violation of constitutional lines of division
between states and the federal government in healthcare.40
In fact, the ACA follows on a long history of national interventions into
state health regulation, many with similar structural features to the ACA itself.
And it is not the case that any of the recent proposals to repeal or replace the
ACA would restore some erased constitutional dividing lines between state and
federal. Indeed, each Republican proposal has kept intact the major federal
38. See Gluck, supra note 23, at 1998 (arguing that when it comes to federalism theory and

doctrine, “[w]e are still muddling through”); see also Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 285 (2005) (arguing that modern
federalism lacks “rules of engagement”).
39. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out?: Federal
Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 199
(2011) (arguing that the ACA “extend[s] and deepen[s] federal regulation of health
insurance”); Richard A. Epstein, Bleak Prospects: How Health Care Reform Has Failed in the
United States, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 10-11 (2010) (describing the ACA’s approach as “a
profound transformation of how we think about the role of government”); Melinda
Henneberger, “Frankly, It’s Bull----”: Kathleen Sebelius Is Fighting Mad About Obamacare
Attacks, KAN. CITY STAR (updated Oct. 13, 2017, 7:49 PM), https://perma.cc/QA4N-J86U
(“‘It’s just nonsense’ the way it’s been portrayed as a government takeover of health
care, [Sebelius] said . . . .” (quoting Kathleen Sebelius, former U.S. Secretary of Health and
Human Services)).
40. See infra Part II.C.
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programs and laws (for example, Medicaid and Medicare) and massive federal
subsidies (the most important example being the employer tax deduction for
healthcare that helps to insure half of all Americans).41
Understanding this historical and legal context makes clear why we need
to move past arguments about formal constitutional federalism to arguments
about the policy and political choices—as well as concerns for states’ rights—
that go into allocation in modern federalism-based federal statutes. It also
explains why this is an Article about federalism that does not begin with the
possibility of a world in which the national government has no role in
healthcare but rather takes the ACA’s joint state-federal framework as given
for the kind of structure we are likely to see going forward, regardless what
happens to the specifics of the ACA itself.
Interestingly, and consistent with the story we tell about the ACA, neither
federalism nor nationalism has ever been fully embraced in healthcare policy.
When it comes to federalism, it was the case long before the ACA that classic
federalism values such as states as “laborator[ies]” of “experiment[ation]”42 had
often been effectuated in health policy not by traditional federalism (the
preservation of separate spheres of state authority) but by nationalism (federal
laws setting a baseline and inviting state participation with funding nudges).43
States have been limited in what they can accomplish alone in healthcare
experimentation.44 Disincentives, such as industry exit, prevent a single state
from bearing all of the costs of innovation risk that would arise if it were one
of the few making costly regulatory demands.45 Federal laws that allow for
state experimentation within federal law often provide a steadier path toward

41. See infra Part II.C; see also JESSICA C. BARNETT & EDWARD R. BERCHICK, U.S. CENSUS

42.
43.
44.

45.

BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2016, at 3, 4 tbl.1 (2017), https://perma.cc/98XQ-JFZW; Jonathan Gruber, The
Tax Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance 3-5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 15,766, 2010), https://perma.cc/54XP-DA7K.
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
See Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the OldFashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1750 (2013).
See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594, 610-11 (1980) (analyzing the economic impacts of
and lack of incentives for risky state experimentation); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 11,
at 925-26 (noting that federal financial and organizational assistance aids states in
overcoming the free-rider problem); David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution:
Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 58283 (2008) (describing states’ hesitation to experiment with welfare policies due to
population mobility); see also Gluck, supra note 43, at 1764 (describing the ACA as a
federal law incentivizing states to increase experimentation).
See Super, supra note 44, at 557.
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experimentation.46 The ACA offers a striking example: It was modeled on a
major Massachusetts experiment, which the state undertook not alone but
rather with federal permission and funds (largely from the Medicaid
program).47
On the other side, healthcare nationalism often is characterized as an
oppressive interloper in state domains, and has been so characterized with
respect to the ACA.48 But history shows not only that states sometimes need
federal intervention to make their own healthcare systems work—federal
intervention typically comes in response to some state regulatory or market
failure—but also that federal intervention, when it comes, tends to be focused
and incremental. Although Congress has debated fuller-scale national
programs49 and has occasionally enacted laws that are sweeping (still never
universal), it typically enacts compromise legislation that instills piecemeal or
targeted federal reform.50
This strategy in turn has prevented a complete vision of healthcare
nationalism from being realized. Uniformity and equality of access to
healthcare are still wanting, and fragmentation of the U.S. healthcare system
remains a salient problem.51 Federal intervention has tended to be highly
incremental and therefore incomplete. Take the ACA again as an example:
Despite being a major federal intervention in health policy, the ACA
perpetuated and entrenched the fragmentation of U.S. healthcare by expanding
the various and very differently structured healthcare programs already in
existence—some state-led, some federal, some mixed—rather than starting
fresh with a single, integrated approach.52
46. See Gluck, supra note 43, at 1764; Rubin & Feeley, supra note 11, at 925-26.
47. See Ryan Lizza, Romney’s Dilemma, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2011), https://perma.cc

48.
49.

50.

51.

52.

/3WXQ-T9WK (detailing how Massachusetts’s health reform was made possible by a
Bush Administration Medicaid waiver).
See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 YALE L.J.F. 1, 4 (2017)
(“[T]he ACA . . . wrests more regulatory authority from states than necessary.”).
See generally, e.g., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., National Health Insurance—A
Brief History of Reform Efforts in the U.S. (2009), https://perma.cc/2H68-4ZWB
(summarizing the healthcare reform movements and failures of the twentieth century
in anticipation of the then-nascent Obama Administration’s effort).
See, e.g., Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-178, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code) (adding prescription drug coverage to Medicare only); Emergency Medical
Treatment and Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 9121(b), 100 Stat. 82, 164-67 (1986)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2016)) (requiring only emergency medical
treatment in hospitals).
See Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation and How to Fix
It, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 1, 9-15 (Einer
R. Elhauge ed., 2010).
See infra Part III.A.
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The pattern is a recurring one of call and response between the states and
the federal government. We present here some highlights of this long story.
A. An Abbreviated History of Federal Interventions in Healthcare
During the colonial era and beyond the Revolutionary War, medical care
was the domain of state and local governments when not being addressed by
private charities. But even in the early days of the republic, the federal
government established payments for veterans’ war injuries and, later,
hospitals for veterans’ care (as well as for merchant seamen).53 A series of
federal laws offered increasing responses to states’ inability to provide for
veterans, whose medical needs became even more pressing after the Civil
War.54 Ultimately, veterans’ healthcare was fully federalized; Congress created
the U.S. Veterans Bureau in 1921 to provide medical care for battle-injured
World War I veterans; later, the Veterans Administration covered all medical
care for veterans.55 The same year, Congress passed the Sheppard-Towner
Maternity and Infancy Act of 1921, which for the first time put the federal
government into the area of health and the family by providing states with
funds for prenatal and newborn care.56
The turn-of-the-century industrialization, and later the Great Depression,
World Wars I and II, and an influx of the war-wounded illuminated the states’
inability to handle the relatively new phenomenon of medical policy or
payment alone.57 Although wealthier states were able to increase spending to
53. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREAT FACING OUR PUBLIC

54.
55.
56.

57.

HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 77 (2003) (tracing various
early federal payments for healthcare, including those for veterans and merchant
seamen); BARBARA MCCLURE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 83-99 EPW, MEDICAL CARE
PROGRAMS OF THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION 1-4 (1983) (tracing the history of
healthcare programs for veterans); JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING
JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC
COURTROOMS 140-43 (2011) (noting that federal hospitals were among the few existing
federal buildings prior to 1850). In 1811, Congress deducted a portion of naval sailors’
pay to care for war veterans’ injuries; in 1833, Congress opened a home for disabled
naval officers, seamen, and marines; and in 1851, Congress established a home for
disabled soldiers. See MCCLURE, supra, at 1-2.
See H. COMM. ON VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 90TH CONG., MEDICAL CARE OF VETERANS 30, 5962 (Comm. Print 1967).
See MCCLURE, supra note 53, at 2-3.
See Pub. L. No. 67-97, 42 Stat. 224 (repealed 1929); Historical Highlights: The SheppardTowner Maternity and Infancy Act, HIST. ART & ARCHIVES, https://perma.cc/PG4L
-MFDG (archived Apr. 25, 2018). Thanks to Rick Hills for this insight.
See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE
STUDY OF MEDICAID 5-36 (1974) (detailing various federal interventions throughout the
early twentieth century to assist states with their traditional role of providing both
welfare and medical assistance).
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pay for their swelling medically needy populations, most other states had no
means to add healthcare to the list of welfare programs they already supported,
so states sought federal funding to care for the indigent.58 President Roosevelt
considered but did not include healthcare in the Social Security Act of 1935, and
an attempt to include it again during World War II failed but was followed
closely by Senator Wagner’s proposed National Health Act of 1939, which
would have directed federal funds through state administration.59 President
Truman likewise attempted to achieve national health coverage, but fears of
“socialized medicine” proved then, as they have continued to be, an
insurmountable obstacle to universal, nationalized reform.60 After Truman’s
national health program was rejected, Congress took the smaller step of
encouraging the construction of hospitals where medical needs were unmet
through the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, commonly known
as the Hill-Burton Act.61 In return for this federal funding, new Hill-Burton
hospitals had to provide care to low-income individuals, formalizing so-called
charity care.62
During this period, developments in the courts confirmed that healthcare
could largely be handled—as a matter of law—as a national, rather than a state
or local, problem. In 1944, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that insurance was
national commerce and could be regulated by Congress as such.63 But Congress,
58. See id. at 7 (describing how the Federal Emergency Relief Administration took over

59.

60.

61.
62.
63.

states’ welfare responsibilities during the Depression); Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing
Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 444 (2011) (describing states’ inability to pay for
welfare medicine).
See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 266-70, 275-77
(1982); see also Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397mm (2016)); National Health Act of 1939, S. 1620, 76th
Cong. One contemporaneous scholar described Senator Wagner’s bill as “merely
another step, albeit a long step, in the orderly development of existing federal health
work, while the federal grants for medical care, and the disability compensation
program, cannot be thought of as radical innovations, for they, too, have a broad body
of precedent.” Harold Maslow, The Background of the Wagner National Health Bill, 6 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 606, 618 (1939).
See Special Message to the Congress Recommending a Comprehensive Health Program,
PUB. PAPERS 475, 477, 488 (Nov. 19, 1945). In addition, opposition to national health
insurance and other national benefits was rooted in part in racism because southern
states were fearful that the federal government would use national health programs as
a mechanism for desegregation. See DAVID G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID
POLITICS AND POLICY, 1965-2007, at 8-10 (2008). In addition, the American Medical
Association fought national health programs as “socialized” medicine. See id. at 25. The
Journal of the American Medical Association went so far as to call President Truman’s
proposal an “attempt to enslave medicine.” Id.
See Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 209).
Id. sec. 2, § 622(f), 60 Stat. at 1043.
See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944).
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in a moment unappreciated by most federalism scholars (especially those
unwilling to recognize the concept of federalism as a congressional option),
voluntarily gave that power back to the states with the passage of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945.64 That statute created a presumption that
regulation of insurance remains with the states unless Congress explicitly
declares otherwise (as it did in the ACA).65
Concomitantly, the National War Labor Board was formed in 1942 and
later ruled that World War II-related wage controls did not apply to fringe
benefits such as pensions and insurance within certain limits, and a few years
later, the National Labor Relations Board upheld unions’ engagement in
collective bargaining for benefits such as health insurance.66 Such federal
policies helped employers offer greater benefits to much-needed war-effort
employees, as did an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling in 1943 that
employer-based healthcare would not be taxable income for the employee.67
Labor unions used this valuable benefit as a bargaining tool throughout the late
1940s and into the 1950s, and the IRS further pushed the trend by ruling in
1954 that employer-sponsored health insurance was not taxable to employees
or employers.68
This significant series of interventions in private health insurance, as one
of us has previously written, has turned out to be one of the most overlooked
and underappreciated federal interventions in the typically state-based terrain
of health insurance.69 Modern policy experts who oppose the “socialization” of
medicine (especially when it comes to healthcare for the poor) rarely
acknowledge the more than $200 billion each year that the federal government
spent long before the ACA to subsidize the health insurance of working
Americans.70 Employer-sponsored health insurance benefits are still the source
64. See Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2016)).
65. See id. §§ 1-2, 59 Stat. at 33-34.
66. See COMM. ON EMP’R-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS, INST. OF MED., EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH

67.
68.

69.

70.

BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT RISK 70-71 (Marilyn J. Field & Harold T. Shapiro eds.,
1993); JOST, supra note 53, at 77-80; TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A
CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 60 (2007) [hereinafter JOST, HEALTH
CARE AT RISK].
See JOST, supra note 53, at 77-79.
See id. at 79 (discussing the 1954 IRS ruling’s role); STARR, supra note 59, at 311-13
(discussing unions’ role). For a thorough discussion of the role of labor unions in the
growth of employer-sponsored health insurance, see JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK, supra
note 66, at 62-64.
See Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance, 57
B.C. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2016) (detailing the “hidden” subsidy of tax benefits for employersponsored health insurance).
See id. at 18 (noting that the Congressional Budget Office valued these tax subsidies at
$248 billion as of 2013 even though this form of spending is “rarely discussed as such”).
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of health insurance coverage for about 56% of the U.S. population today,71
rendering this tax subsidy—for the wealthier, non-Medicaid population, no
less—a major ongoing federal intervention.
Ongoing medical access failures led Congress to enact the Social Security
Act Amendments of 1950, which provided federal grants-in-aid to states in the
form of vendor payments—capped payments for specific services such as
hospital, skilled nursing, and physician care.72 The legislation delegated
payment delivery to states, allowing states and localities to vary widely in their
use of the funding.73 Even though vendor payments offered cost-shifting to the
federal government while reinforcing the state role in medical services, many
states resisted participating, in part because vendor payments were available
only for individuals receiving welfare benefits. But increased federal funding
improved participation over time.74 With medical care tied to welfare
administration, stigmatization of the medically needy population was virtually
automatic.75
Congress’s next notable intervention was the Kerr-Mills program included
in the Social Security Amendments of 1960, which offered the states additional
money and included funding for elderly people who were “medically indigent”
at a matching rate rather than a capped allocation.76 Kerr-Mills continued the
connection between welfare and medical payments for nonelderly indigent
individuals, allowing states to determine eligibility and coverage.77 In sum,
Kerr-Mills offered incremental reform with more federal money and some
federal standard setting, staving off grander federal intervention while
preserving states’ role in healthcare.78 States were in a slightly better economic
position for the existence of Kerr-Mills, but wide variation in state
implementation led to confusion, inconsistencies and disparities in coverage
and care, and state cost-shifting to the federal government in ways unintended
71. BARNETT & BERCHICK, supra note 41, at 4 tbl.1.
72. See Pub. L. No. 81-734, tit. III, 64 Stat. 477, 548-58 (codified as amended in scattered
73.
74.

75.
76.

77.
78.

sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 23-24.
See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 23-24 (describing state “variations” in
implementing vendor payments).
See Judith D. Moore & David G. Smith, Legislating Medicaid: Considering Medicaid and Its
Origins, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., Winter 2005-2006, at 45, 45-46 (describing how
vendor payments were augmented by the federal government throughout the 1950s,
which increased state uptake).
See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 30.
See Moore & Smith, supra note 74, at 46 (“A most important innovation in the KerrMills Act was to extend medical benefits to a new category generally known as the
medically indigent . . . .”); see also Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86778, 74 Stat. 924 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 30-31.
See Huberfeld, supra note 58, at 443-44.
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by the law.79 Further, even though wealthier and heavily industrialized states
were eager to take advantage of federal funds—California, Massachusetts, and
New York accounted for more than half of enrollees in the program’s first
year—many poorer states were reluctant to participate.80
Poor states needed more funding for healthcare, but some did not have the
necessary matching funds of their own to afford the federal assistance.81 Many
of these states—especially in the South—also had particular anxieties about
federal intervention in areas involving both the family and minority
populations.82 This led those states to resist federal funding outright or to
allow only limited participation83 and, as with later federal reforms, to insist
79. See SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH OF THE ELDERLY, S. SPEC. COMM. ON AGING, 88TH CONG.,

80.
81.

82.

83.

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE AGED: THE KERR-MILLS PROGRAM, 1960-1963, at 1-2
(Comm. Print 1963) (giving a harsh assessment shortly after Kerr-Mills’s enactment of
the program’s failure to assist the elderly).
See Moore & Smith, supra note 74, at 46-47.
See id. (noting that poorer states were stingy with welfare, which carried over to
medical welfare); see also STARR, supra note 59, at 368-70 (laying out historical developments before Medicaid and noting that the most industrialized states were most likely
to participate in federal funding).
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Remarks at the Yale Law School Conference on the Law of
Medicare and Medicaid at 50, at 6-7 (Nov. 7, 2014) (transcript on file with authors)
(detailing racist motivations for southern states to resist Medicaid’s public health
insurance for the poor at its inception and throughout Medicaid’s history). Opposition
to national health insurance and other national benefits was rooted in part in racism
and the southern drive for cheap agricultural labor; southern states feared that the
federal government would use national health programs as a tool for desegregation. See
SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 6-7. In fact, Medicaid’s devolution to states to
determine eligibility and benefit levels can be directly traced to Senator Byrd’s efforts
to defeat any possible federal interjection into “the Negro question.” See id. at 10
(quoting EDWIN E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 144 (1962)).
And part of the reason Medicaid contains the very specific Early and Periodic
Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) requirement of “a comprehensive
unclothed physical exam,” see 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(1)(B)(ii) (2016), is that southern
doctors would not have touched black children without a federal rule telling them
otherwise. When the Reagan Administration tried to remove this standard in 1981, the
director of EPSDT from Mississippi’s Medicaid agency demanded that it remain for
fear that “doctors [would] stop taking clothes off Black children to examine them.” See
Attachment to Email from Sara Rosenbaum, Harold & Jane Hirsh Professor of Health
Law & Policy, George Washington Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health, to Nicole Huberfeld,
Professor of Health Law, Ethics & Human Rights, Bos. Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health & Sch.
of Law (Aug. 25, 2017, 2:08 PM EDT) (on file with authors); see also Medicaid Requirements for State Programs of Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment of
Individuals Under 21, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,420 (May 18, 1979) (codified as amended at 42
C.F.R. §§ 441.50-.62 (2017)) (formalizing EPSDT guidance into regulations).
See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 40 (noting that states in the South, the Southwest,
and those with “rural or sparsely populated areas” were holdouts). After five years, ten
states still had not implemented Kerr-Mills; three of those states had authorized use of
federal funds but did not allocate state funds necessary to trigger the federal match. See
Moore & Smith, supra note 74, at 47.
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on structures that gave states control over their minority populations. This
combination of distrust, conservative values, and racism also led states to
demand a continued role for themselves in managing the federal distributions
and preserving the political economy of the region.84 It further allowed for less
aggressive implementation by some states less eager to assist minority
populations,85 entrenching interstate coverage disparities.
By the early 1960s, it was clear more help was needed beyond existing state
assistance for needy populations. First introduced by President Kennedy, and
enacted as part of the Johnson Administration’s War on Poverty in 1965,
Medicare offered a radically different approach with a fully nationalized
program for all elderly people designed to offer what was then comprehensive
health insurance (hospital and physician care, not just one or the other).86 It
was to be funded and administered entirely by the federal government with no
role preserved for states.87 This shift to a totally federalized scheme resulted in
part from successful lobbying by the elderly, who did not want their access to
medical care to fluctuate depending on the economic whims and welfare biases
of the states.88 But also, Medicare was enacted as a federal program because
states did not want to be responsible for elderly people’s medical needs,
evidenced in part by states’ slow uptake of prior programs.89
The push for nationalization did not extend to the nonelderly poor.90
Although Medicaid was enacted with the same pen stroke as Medicare,
Medicaid was structured differently, offering federal funding and statutory
baselines while continuing shared state financing and a state-driven, welfarebased approach to healthcare that encoded a philosophy of aiding only the
“deserving poor” (such as the blind, disabled, young children, and their

84. See SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

90.

PUBLIC POLICY 61 (1998).
See id. at 75-77.
See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 46-49.
See id. at 48-51. For the current codification of Medicare, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395lll.
See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 45-46.
See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 41 (noting that “many states were too poor or
unwilling . . . to put up the matching funds” for Old Age Assistance and other medical
welfare programs that predated Medicare); STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 30-33
(arguing that although Kerr-Mills was a way to “shift[] the burden of [aid to the elderly]
from others to the federal government,” “the states responded slowly to the new
program”).
Medicare and Medicaid have always been linked for poor elderly who cannot pay outof-pocket costs. STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 49, 52. Thanks to Sara Rosenbaum
for this insight.
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parents)91—and keeping state control over those populations—that continued
until the ACA.92 Thus, the distinction between social insurance and welfare
that was encoded in the first Social Security Act was carried through into the
statutory principles that underlie the differences between Medicare and
Medicaid.93
Medicare has been modified from time to time, for example to cover
people with long-term disability in 197294 and to add a major drug benefit in
2003,95 but it tends to avoid the same kind of frequent tinkering seen elsewhere
in healthcare law. On the other hand, Medicaid has seen much more significant
modification over time, often reflecting the larger pattern of federal
incremental intervention where state governance is failing. For example,
Medicaid has been amended to increase coverage categories and financial
eligibility levels over time. In the 1980s, for instance, eligibility was expanded
to cover all financially eligible children up to age eighteen and to increase the
levels of financial eligibility for children younger than six.96 And in 1989, the
singular Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT)
benefit (which ensures uniform, comprehensive medical benefits for children)
was made mandatory for states.97 In each instance, the federal government was
stepping in where states failed to serve certain populations’ medical needs.
Medicaid was decoupled from welfare in the 1990s after President Clinton’s
healthcare reform failed and the Gingrich plan for block grants was defeated—
a legislative change that unenrolled vulnerable people but that also set the stage
91. See Huberfeld, supra note 58, at 436-46; see also Social Security Amendments of 1965,

92.
93.

94.
95.

96.

97.

Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42
U.S.C.) (enacting Medicare and Medicaid).
See Jost, supra note 82, at 1, 6-8 (discussing this progression and the link between state
control of healthcare and continued limitations on serving all poor people).
See id. at 1, 5. For further discussion of the historically exclusionary approach to U.S.
healthcare, see Nicole Huberfeld, The Universality of Medicaid at Fifty, 15 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 67 (2015).
See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 201(a)(3), 86 Stat. 1329,
1371 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2016)); 42 C.F.R. § 406.5 (2017).
See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 101(a)(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 2071-150 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395w-101 to -154).
See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 133-36 (2d ed. 2015); Nicole Huberfeld et al.,
Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 20-24 (2013) (detailing amendments
to Medicaid that expanded eligibility, such as for pregnant women and children).
See S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 589-90 (5th Cir. 2004). The benefit had
been optional since 1967. See id. at 589. Congress realized that states were bypassing the
optional EPSDT benefit and created a highly detailed list of rules for screening children
regularly. See id. at 589-90; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (defining the current EPSDT
benefit).

1712

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270

What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018)

for the ACA’s expansion to all of the nation’s poor in 2010.98 Further, Medicaid
both laid a foundation and acted as a foil for the creation in 1997 of the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program (then SCHIP, now CHIP), a federal block
grant that allows states to subsidize coverage for children at higher financial
eligibility levels than does Medicaid, after the Clinton health plan failed to
create comprehensive coverage in 1994.99
Every President from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Barack Obama tried to
expand or improve healthcare access.100 After Medicare and Medicaid, in the
early 1970s, President Nixon promoted a new format for private insurance that
was modeled on organizations like Kaiser Permanente.101 Nixon’s Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 preempted conflicting state laws and
offered funding to support the creation of health maintenance organizations,
commonly known as HMOs.102 The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) of 1974 was also negotiated by the Nixon Administration.103
Although primarily conceived as a federal floor of rules addressing the
problem of failed pensions, ERISA effectively (and mostly accidentally)
nationalized the rules for a wide swath of health plans—those provided by
employers who self-insure employee health benefits—immunizing them from
98. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.

99.

100.

101.

102.

103.

No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code)
(creating the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program).
See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4901(a), 111 Stat. 251, 552-70
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397mm). See generally Sara Rosenbaum et
al., The Children’s Hour: The State Children’s Health Insurance Program, HEALTH AFF.,
Jan./Feb. 1998, at 75 (discussing features of CHIP).
See DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A. MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER: HEALTH AND
POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE 1-20 (2010); cf. PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION: THE
PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE OVER HEALTH CARE REFORM 4 (2011) [hereinafter
STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION] (noting a century of effort in health reform, starting
with Teddy Roosevelt’s failed social insurance plan). See generally STARR, supra note 59,
at 235-449 (describing the history of efforts in U.S. healthcare reform). President
Trump campaigned on a universal access platform, see, e.g., Aaron Blake, Trump’s
Forbidden Love: Single-Payer Health Care, WASH. POST: THE FIX (May 5, 2017),
https://perma.cc/E8B9-EWDR (“Everybody’s got to be covered.” (quoting Donald
Trump’s statement on 60 Minutes: Trump (CBS television broadcast Sept. 27, 2015))), but
quickly moved to undermine the ACA and repeal many of its most generous provisions, see, e.g., Robert Pear et al., Trump to Scrap Critical Health Care Subsidies, Hitting
Obamacare Again, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/U7QD-VQFC.
See STARR, supra note 59, at 394-405. President Obama embraced this format in the ACA.
See Phil Galewitz, Nixon’s HMOs Hold Lessons for Obama’s ACOs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Oct. 21, 2011), https://perma.cc/N3TR-QB75.
See Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and
42 U.S.C.); Marjorie Smith Mueller, Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, SOC.
SECURITY BULL., Mar. 1974, at 35, 35, 38.
Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
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state regulations.104 ERISA has remained a major obstacle to state-based health
policy reform.105
In the 1980s, Congress further expanded the federal baseline by enacting
two important budget laws that transformed, in an effort to increase
uniformity, Medicare physician payments106 and the continuation of
employer-sponsored health coverage at the termination of employment.107
The second of these laws also contained a provision that prevents patient
dumping and requires hospitals to treat patients who present with an
emergency medical condition, commonly called the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA).108 President Reagan supported these
federal interventions in traditionally state-based healthcare.109
After the Clinton health reform effort of 1993 failed, prominent academics
argued that states would have to take up the mantle of health reform.110 That
largely did not occur. Instead, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 next addressed ongoing private insurance
104. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Alternative Models of Federalism: Health Insurance Regulation and

105.

106.

107.
108.
109.

110.

Patient Protection Laws, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY, supra note 15, at 361, 365
(describing ERISA’s increased preemptive sweep as more employers turned to selffunded health benefits); Abbe R. Gluck et al., ERISA: A Bipartisan Problem for the ACA
and the AHCA, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/WN67-HZHM
(explaining that the Congress that passed ERISA did not foresee its major impact on
healthcare and detailing impediments to state reform caused by the statute’s reach).
See Gluck et al., supra note 104; see also, e.g., Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct.
936, 940-41, 947 (2016) (holding that ERISA preempts Vermont’s state all-payer claims
database).
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6104, 103 Stat.
2106, 2208-09 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (2016)) (replacing the “reasonable charge” method of reimbursing physicians in Medicare with a relative value scale
method of payment).
See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 10002(a), 100
Stat. 82, 227-31 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (2016)).
See id. § 9121(b), 100 Stat. at 164-67 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd).
See, e.g., Henry Olsen, Reagan’s Real Legacy: A Reply to Donald Devine, NAT’L REV.
(Nov. 10, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://perma.cc/4XR7-PAZD (noting that Reagan’s
signature on the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) legislation that made EMTALA law was consistent with other views he held on healthcare).
The finances of COBRA and EMTALA were consistent with President Reagan’s desire
to prevent any additional taxing or spending by the federal government. To wit:
COBRA’s cost was borne by a departed employee, who could be asked to pay up to 102%
of the employer’s cost of providing health insurance. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act sec. 10002(a), § 602(3), 100 Stat. at 228 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 1162(3)). EMTALA’s cost was borne by hospitals accepting Medicare as
reimbursement for services but was not separately or specifically funded. See id.
§ 9121(b), 100 Stat. at 164-67.
See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Commentary, The Case for Federalism and
Health Reform, 28 CONN. L. REV. 115, 117 (1995).
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market failures.111 HIPAA facilitated credit for insurance coverage when an
employee moved from one job to another within a short period of time, offered
incentives for creating medical savings accounts to try to address the
continually growing problem of uninsurance, and facilitated the growth of
high-risk pools in the states.112 HIPAA did not preempt state laws regarding
health insurance so long as they met the federal baseline of facilitating
continued coverage for preexisting conditions, thereby allowing states to
continue in their historic role of regulating insurance but with federal
statutory guiderails.113 A number of the ACA’s reforms are in fact amendments
to these predecessor federal interventions, including ERISA and HIPAA, and in
part respond to perceived failures in those statutes to improve healthcare
markets and the difficulties for those with preexisting conditions.114
In 2003, Congress enacted the most noteworthy benefit amendment to
Medicare since its creation—a prescription drug benefit, supported by the
second President Bush.115 A few years later, the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act implemented a
part of HIPAA pertaining to electronic health records by setting federal
standards and offering grants to states for improved electronic records.116
111. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.

Code).
112. See id. sec. 101(a), § 701, 110 Stat. at 1939-45 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1181)

113.
114.

115.

116.

(credit for coverage); id. sec. 102(a), § 2701, 110 Stat. at 1955-61 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3) (credit for coverage); id. sec. 111(a), § 2744, 110 Stat. at 1984-86
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-44) (high-risk pools); JOST, supra note 53, at
188-89 (discussing some of HIPAA’s features, including its interaction with employersponsored health insurance and attempts at regulating failing small-group markets).
See Bovbjerg, supra note 104, at 367 (describing HIPAA’s structure).
See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1104, 124 Stat.
119, 146-54 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d, 1320d-2, 1395y) (amending
HIPAA); id. § 1562(e), 124 Stat. at 270 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185d) (amending ERISA); see
also id. sec. 1561, § 3021 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-51) (amending the Public
Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 201 to 300mm-61), to address health information technology).
See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, § 101(a)(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 2071-150 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395w-101 to -154); Bush Signs Landmark Medicare Bill Into Law, CNN (Dec. 8, 2003,
1:23 PM EST), https://perma.cc/JKF8-64FP.
See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, div. A, tit. XIII, sec. 13101, § 3001, 123 Stat. 115, 230-34 (2009) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-11) (establishing the Office of the National Coordinator for
Health Information Technology); id. sec. 13301, § 3013, 123 Stat. at 250-52 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 300jj-33) (establishing standards for grants to states); Nicolas P. Terry,
Certification and Meaningful Use: Reframing Adoption of Electronic Health Records as a
Quality Imperative, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 43, 46-49 (2011) [hereinafter Terry, Certification
and Meaningful Use] (discussing the history of HITECH and its amendment of prior
law); Nicolas P. Terry, To HIPAA, a Son: Assessing the Technical, Conceptual, and Legal
footnote continued on next page
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Promoting electronic records was long a priority of the second President Bush,
and the HITECH Act was enacted as part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 at the beginning of the Obama Administration.117 The ARRA also included increased federal funding for Medicaid to help
states overcome increased enrollment related to the Great Recession.118
This is a long history, and it does not even include the parallel development of federal intervention in and regulation of the terrain of pharmaceutical
innovation and approval.119 Notably, although certain healthcare reform ideas
tend to be floated from the right or the left, this history is not nearly as
politicized as common understanding would have it. To be sure, Democrats
supported programs such as the Social Security Act, Medicare, Medicaid, and
the ACA, but Republicans supported the Health Maintenance Organization
Act, ERISA, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA),
EMTALA, CHIP, and Medicare Part D. Pressure for healthcare intervention
occurs on nearly every Congress’s watch.
B. Patterns of National Intervention
Some notable patterns appear. First, the states’ consistent need for federal
support in times of economic stress underscores the importance of
countercyclical spending in making some federal intervention almost
inevitable.120 During a recession, unemployment increases and health
insurance coverage decreases, but income taxes decline at the same time,
leading states to lose funding at the moment their citizenry most needs
governmental support.121 Most state constitutions require balanced budgets,122
so states seek federal money to fill their gaps because the federal government
can engage in deficit spending and respond to states’ needs.

117.

118.
119.

120.

121.
122.

Frameworks for Patient Safety Information, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 133, 133 (2005) (discussing
HIPAA’s provisions regarding electronic records).
See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act § 13001(a),
123 Stat. at 226 (noting that the HITECH Act comprises two titles of the ARRA); Terry,
Certification and Meaningful Use, supra note 116, at 48 (describing President Bush’s drive
to improve electronic records).
See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 5000(a), 123
Stat. 115, 496 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a app. at 3571-72).
See generally Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://perma.cc/V6EW-ML9N (last updated Feb. 1, 2018) (detailing federal statutes
regulating food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices since the nineteenth century).
Cf. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2641-42 (2005)
(describing how states’ political and budgetary structures make them ill prepared to
support social services in emergencies and times of economic distress).
See id. at 2629-39.
See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, NCSL Fiscal Brief: State Balanced Budget
Provisions 4 (2010), https://perma.cc/3X7C-MVHJ; id. app. at 11-12.
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Second, the same states do the same things over and over again.123 Southern states and states with limited resources hold out; wealthier states like
California, Massachusetts, and New York spend on social welfare programming while maximizing available federal money.124 Discrimination based on
race and class continues due to persistent echoes of welfare policy and
stigmatization of the poor in healthcare reform efforts.125 Even today, for
example, we hear echoes of this history in calls to remove the so-called “able
bodied” from Medicaid eligibility or to add work requirements when they are
enrolled—even though most Medicaid-eligible households do contain
workers.126 The ACA rejected such castigatory thinking,127 but new proposals
aim to introduce work requirements and are being approved as this Article
goes to print.128
Third, most federal interventions have been incremental and fragmented.
This is a key place where federalism and health policy intersect. Political
scientists have consistently demonstrated that Congress legislates across all
areas (not just healthcare) in piecemeal fashion.129 Many reasons exist for
policy incrementalism, including the numerous barriers to lawmaking of any
sort in Congress and the difficulty of attaining consensus in a polity as diverse
123. See Huberfeld, supra note 58, at 436-49 (discussing path dependence in healthcare policy,

especially in Medicaid).
124. For a fuller description of this phenomenon in the context of the Kerr-Mills regime,

see notes 76-93 and accompanying text above.
125. See generally Huberfeld & Roberts, supra note 69, at 41-59 (discussing how, under the

126.

127.
128.

129.

ACA as implemented, people who need public health insurance are subjected to “selfreliance scrutiny” while people who receive subsidies for purchasing private insurance
are not).
See, e.g., Rachel Garfield et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Understanding the
Intersection of Medicaid and Work 1-3 (2018), https://perma.cc/KPV7-Z28J; see also
Phil Galewitz, Medicaid Chief Says Feds Are Willing to Approve Work Requirements,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (updated Nov. 7, 2017, 3:20 PM), https://perma.cc/8RRB-2CMM.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services issued guidance for states interested in
adding work requirements shortly before this Article went to print. See Letter from
Brian Neale, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
to State Medicaid Director (Jan. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/S246-FMN5.
See Huberfeld, supra note 93, at 67-68 (contrasting the universality principle of the ACA
with exclusionary practices in healthcare laws that predated it).
See Huberfeld & Roberts, supra note 69, at 5-6; Garfield et al., supra note 126, at 4
(discussing proposed work requirements); see also, e.g., Letter from Demetrios L.
Kouzoukas, Principal Deputy Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., to Stephen P. Miller, Comm’r, Ky. Cabinet for Health &
Family Servs. 1-2 (Jan. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/X57W-NQMV (approving
Kentucky’s application for a section 1115 waiver with work requirements for newly
eligible beneficiaries).
For the classic statement of this point, see Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling
Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).
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and populous as ours.130 But as one of us has argued, a link exists between
Congress’s tendency toward policy incrementalism and the design of federal
statutes that rely on state administration.131 The historical backdrop of state
social policy regulation creates both political and pragmatic incentives for
Congress to rely on, rather than to displace, the embedded state administrative
apparatus.132 As a political matter, federalism-related concerns about big
government and respect for traditional areas of state authority lead Congress
to design federal schemes that give states large roles in administration.133
Politically, it seems like less of a displacement, and like less of an expansion of
government, to structure federal programs this way.134 Pragmatically, in
addition to the lack of sufficient federal personnel, established state
bureaucracies provide ready experts to implement new federal legislation.135
The result in healthcare is a policy design that has been criticized for being
structurally fragmented in multiple ways.136 All the federal interventions
discussed above have different structures. The Veterans Health Administration
is structured differently from Medicare, even though both are purely national
programs;137 Medicaid’s state-federal partnership is uniquely structured in its
open-ended match for state spending;138 and block grants to states in programs
such as HITECH, CHIP, and the ACA’s exchanges are each differently
designed.139 A huge chunk of the private insurance market rests on the

130. See id. at 84-85.
131. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 572-74.
132. See id. at 572-73.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 572.
136. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 51, at 1-10.
137. See About VHA, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., https://perma.cc/9JRN-TUG9 (archived

May 15, 2018) (describing the kinds of medical providers and facilities run by the
Veterans Health Administration). Medicare offers financing but not facilities or special
providers. See Health Care Insurance, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., https://perma.cc/Q3ZG
-F24F (archived May 15, 2018) (noting that Veterans Affairs benefits are not a form of
health insurance but that Medicare is); see also The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., An
Overview of Medicare 5 (2017), https://perma.cc/9QF4-MVBP (describing Medicare’s
financing).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2016); see also Laura Snyder & Robin Rudowitz, The Henry J.
Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Financing: How Does It Work and What Are the
Implications? 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/AC9P-Z6PC (explaining Medicaid’s funding
structure).
139. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-31 (providing HITECH funding for healthcare entities), with
id. § 300jj-33 (offering grants to states to develop health information technology), and
id. §§ 1397aa, 1397dd (establishing CHIP as a federal block grant offered annually to
states). For discussion of the ACA’s exchanges, see Part V below.
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employer tax deduction—yet another entirely different structure of federal
financing.140
This fragmented structure leads different populations in our system to
access healthcare in different ways, variation that fosters disparities and
inefficiencies. Likewise, rather than wiping the slate clean to build a new,
unified system from the ground up, the ACA’s main components are drawn
from these preexisting programs, each one the product of an incremental
legislative moment. And because those earlier efforts also largely depended on
state bureaucracies, the incremental way in which Congress has intervened in
healthcare has reinforced the states’ role, even within a more robust national
framework.141
C. Theoretical Underpinnings of Healthcare Federalism
Before the enactment of the ACA, the most important works in healthcare
federalism dated to the late 1990s and early 2000s and were largely autopsies of
the Clinton health reform effort. That scholarship was marked by a then-new
recognition that federalism in health policy could no longer be understood
through the classic constitutional model: an either-or separate spheres model
that asks which government (state or federal) has control over a particular facet
of health policy.142 With failed national reform in the rearview mirror, a
consensus among federalism scholars emerged that some kind of joint statefederal model would be necessary.143 Although proposals’ specifics varied, they
coalesced around arguments for a system in which at least some minimum
standards were set by the federal government and in which states could benefit
from federal funds.144 Being relatively new theoretical and policy terrain, the
earlier scholarship did not go much further than that. Specifically, little if
anything was written on the kind of negotiating relationships that mark
140. See Matthew Rae et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Tax Subsidies for Private

141.
142.

143.
144.

Health Insurance 1 (2014), https://perma.cc/2G32-DLVW (“The largest tax subsidy for
private health insurance—the exclusion from income and payroll taxes of employer
and employee contributions for employer-sponsored insurance . . . —was estimated to
cost approximately $250 billion in lost federal tax revenue in 2013.”).
See Gluck, supra note 1, at 572-74.
See generally Bovbjerg, supra note 104 (describing states’ and the federal government’s
roles in developing particular healthcare policies); Robert F. Rich & William D. White,
The American States, Federalism, and the Future of Health Care Policy, in HEALTH POLICY,
FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES 293, 293-96 (Robert F. Rich & William D.
White eds., 1996) (arguing that “[c]hallenges to the . . . senior/junior paradigm of
federalism in health care” point “toward a reduced federal role and an increased state
role in setting [health] policy, as well as in administering and financing it”).
See, e.g., Holahan et al., supra note 15, at 6-7.
See Bovbjerg, supra note 104, at 380-83; Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 110, at 117-18;
Rich & White, supra note 142, at 293-300.
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collaborative federalism schemes or on other dynamics of implementation,
including complications posed by intrastate politics or the salient role for
Congress in any model in which the federalism is structured by an overarching
national law.145
Fast forward to the recent attempts at postmortems on the ACA and
Republican proposals to replace it. Federalists critical of the ACA argue for a
return to “states’ rights” in healthcare.146 Some depict the ACA as an
unconstitutional invasion of state authority.147
These characterizations are deeply mistaken as a matter of both basic
constitutional law and federalism theory, and they distract from the main
questions. Federalism scholars who criticize the ACA in the name of the
Constitution do not propose in its stead a wholesale return of insurance market
governance or oversight of low-income populations (Medicaid) to states, nor
do they advance a theory of why the federal government is legally restricted in
so regulating. Instead, each counterproposal, in the name of constitutional
“states’ rights,” would retain a supervisory, preemptive role for the federal
government. For example, the bill that passed the House in May 2017, the
American Health Care Act, would have made cuts but still would have retained
the Medicaid program and the basic requirement that insurers cover all
Americans without discriminating based on health risk.148 The GrahamCassidy proposal in the Senate, in many ways the most radical proposal offered,
would have given the states more choices about how to spend federal dollars to
satisfy federal policy floors but would still have funded state health policy and
retained federal requirements in the form of continuing the federal Medicaid
program and imposing federal requirements on state insurance markets.149

145. This scholarship has only recently begun to emerge in other fields. See, e.g., Ryan, supra

146.
147.

148.

149.

note 5, at 1152-55 (discussing intergovernmental bargaining in modern environmental
federalism).
See Bagley, supra note 48, at 2-3 (describing the states’ rights federalism narrative).
See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, President Obama’s Top Ten Constitutional Violations of 2015, NAT’L
REV. (Dec. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/8RT6-YJYK (arguing that the ACA is a
“constitutional abuse[]” and “a never-ending bonanza of lawlessness”). See generally
Nathaniel Stewart, Brief Observations: A Review of Obamacare Briefs and the Original
Meaning of the Constitution (2012), https://perma.cc/C4J5-QTLS.
See American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. §§ 111-117 (as passed by
House, May 4, 2017); Compare Proposals to Replace the Affordable Care Act, supra note 3.
The bill included more flexible waiver options with respect to what benefits must be
covered. Anna Edgerton et al., House Passes Obamacare Repeal in Razor-Thin GOP Victory,
BLOOMBERG POL. (updated May 4, 2017, 12:36 PM PDT), https://perma.cc/CKX4-AG2N.
See 163 CONG. REC. S5682-95 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2017) (SA 1030) (proposing GrahamCassidy); see also Sarah Kliff, Graham-Cassidy: The Last GOP Health Plan Left Standing,
Explained, VOX (updated Sept. 13, 2017, 2:47 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/7HRG-LC6S.
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This is not a different kind of federalism from the ACA. The difference lies
only in the policy choices—whatever baseline Congress sets and how much
discretion Congress gives states within the statutory framework—all made
within a national superstructure with delegated state-led elements. That
argument is not about constitutional federalism or any other fundamental
structural difference.150 It is, rather, about policy choices within the same
structural paradigm we currently have: a federal-statute-based, state-federal
cooperative regime.
In other words, the suggested models for federalism post-ACA are the same
models as the ACA’s federalism. Every proposal involves a federal superstructure that allows for state variation within a prescribed framework.151
Recognition of this point is key because it illustrates the irrelevance of classic
dual sovereignty federalism theory in the healthcare sphere. Instead, we have a
recognition dating to 1944 that Congress has the power, when it desires to use
it, to regulate insurance markets.152 No constitutional barriers prevent
Congress from so doing.153 (This is not to say that Congress will always choose
the right means. But structured correctly and legally, Congress can surely
regulate.) The substance of the current Republican proposals reveals a
consensus on that point. It also reveals an apparent consensus that some federal
intervention is in fact warranted—or that at a minimum, once it is given it is
hard to take away. The question now is what that intervention should be, not
which governments should be involved.
This is where we see weaknesses in arguments of scholars like Nicholas
Bagley, who argues in this vein that it would “spell[] the end of federalism” if a
federal intervention in health policy such as the ACA were justified solely by
virtue of unwise or unjust policymaking by the states.154 In direct tension with
such statements, commentators like Bagley himself still argue for Congress to
set some baselines—precisely because those scholars disagree with some aspects
of state policy, want some policy decisions nationalized, and wish to have and
150. For one example of this misunderstanding, see Bagley, supra note 48, at 17 (arguing that

151.
152.

153.

154.

states “have some reason to complain” that the ACA’s prohibition against charging
older people more than three times more for insurance than younger people violates
federalism because it represents a “value judgment” that should be left to the states).
See, e.g., H.R. 1628 (leaving federal requirements in place but giving states additional
flexibility).
See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (upholding
Congress’s power to regulate the business of insurance under the Commerce Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3), superseded in other part by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act of
1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2016)).
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.) (holding that Congress could pass the ACA’s individual insurance
mandate as a tax rather than under its commerce power).
See Bagley, supra note 48, at 9.
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eat the cake alike.155 The fact is that healthcare statutes today squarely align in
their structure with other federal laws like the Clean Air Act and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which set national baselines in the
face of state regulatory failures but still preserve key roles for states as thought
leaders.156 That is modern federalism, and it is precisely how Congress now
regulates in many areas once considered state domain.
A few other points need to be made here because they tend to be overlooked by formalist federalists writing about healthcare. One important reason
healthcare reform tends to be driven from above, by federal law, is that statelevel reform by either legislatures or courts is not likely, even though such
local reforms have driven national reforms in other areas, such as same-sex
marriage.157 When it comes to legislative reform, it is very difficult for states
to experiment in health policy without federal assistance both in funding and
in standard setting. Experimenting is risky and expensive. In the case of
demanding insurance standards, costs will rise and insurers may withdraw
from state markets with such requirements.158 (Remember that Massachusetts’s experiment in universal coverage was funded and facilitated by a
Medicaid demonstration waiver; it was not a solo state experiment.)159 Indeed,

155. See, e.g., id. at 3, 19-20; see also Health Reform Roundtable, Convergence Ctr. for Policy

156.

157.
158.

159.

Resolution, A Bipartisan Answer to “What Now?” for Health Reform 1-2 (2017),
https://perma.cc/Q4EM-WNLT (publicizing a bipartisan group advocating for state
flexibility and federal “guardrails”).
See generally Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2016)); Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 84159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2016)).
See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 48, at 2-3 (suggesting that the same-sex marriage movement
is an apt comparison).
Cf., e.g., Frank J. Thompson, New Federalism and Health Care Policy: States and the Old
Questions, in HEALTH POLICY IN TRANSITION: A DECADE OF HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY AND
LAW 79, 80-81 (Lawrence D. Brown ed., 1987) (discussing why states have been stingy
rather than generous in experimenting with health policy).
See John Holahan & Linda Blumberg, Massachusetts Health Care Reform: A Look at the
Issues, 25 HEALTH AFF. w432, w432, w436, w443 (2006) (discussing the technical and
political elements that made Massachusetts’s universal coverage possible). In an amicus
brief supporting the national regulatory scheme of the ACA, Massachusetts offered
data on the external costs imposed on its unique universal healthcare system by the
residents of neighboring states:
During fiscal year 2009 alone, for example, Massachusetts hospitals provided inpatient care to
more than 43,000 patients who were not residents of Massachusetts, at an estimated cost of
$910,000,000. Of these non-Massachusetts residents, approximately 1,200 did not have any
health insurance. The number of out-of-state patients without insurance coverage was even
greater at Massachusetts emergency departments where more than 12,900 uninsured individuals received care during fiscal year 2009. Massachusetts cannot regulate insurance coverage
for non-Massachusetts residents, nor can it (or should it) restrict access to necessary and
emergent care.

footnote continued on next page
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those very facts are frequently cited in policy literature as a reason why states
do not experiment in health policy at the level traditional federalism theory
would predict.160 State health policy is pushed, collectively, in a race to the
bottom, not lifted to the top toward reform.161
With respect to recourse to state courts for state-level reform, no state
constitution or state law offers a positive right to healthcare.162 By contrast,
every state constitution contains other positive rights, which have helped to
drive such social policy change as marriage equality.163 Some state constitutions even contain other special welfare rights the U.S. Constitution does not,
including the right to basic education.164 Judicial remedy through state
constitutional law therefore does not provide an alternative to federal
statutory reform.165

160.

161.

162.
163.

164.

165.

Brief of Amicus Curiae, Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Supporting Petitioners and
Addressing Whether Enacting Minimum Coverage Provision of ACA Authorized by
Article I) at 15, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11398), 2012 WL 160239 [hereinafter Massachusetts NFIB Amicus Brief] (footnotes
omitted).
See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 43, at 1764; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 44, at 610-11; Rubin &
Feeley, supra note 11, at 925-26; cf. Super, supra note 44, at 563 (“[T]he process of
establishing democratic experimentalism in the first place may be problematic.”).
See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 158, at 80-81 (noting the view that states do not have the
commitment or the capacity to experiment effectively in healthcare); Jonathan Chait,
The Health Care Regulatory Race to the Bottom, NEW REPUBLIC (May 25, 2011),
https://perma.cc/X2UU-SB5H (arguing that insurers will flock to states with less
stringent regulations and concluding that “[f]or a small population state, the attractions
of a major industry setting up shop within state laws almost invariably outweigh the
costs it would incur in poor regulation”); Massachusetts NFIB Amicus Brief, supra
note 159, at 1-6, 15-17. Bagley overlooks this argument in concluding that no collective
action problem exists that supports a need for national regulatory standards in
healthcare. See Bagley, supra note 48, at 5.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1328, 1347, 1391-92 (2010).
See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948-49, 969 (Mass. 2003)
(“The Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual liberty
and equality than the Federal Constitution; it may demand broader protection for
fundamental rights; and it is less tolerant of government intrusion into the protected
spheres of private life.”).
Compare, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“Public education is not a ‘right’
granted to individuals by the Constitution.”), with, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249,
255 (N.C. 1997) (“We conclude that Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the
North Carolina Constitution combine to guarantee every child of this state an
opportunity to receive a sound basic education in our public schools.”).
Bagley also argues that racism is not a reason to consider national regulatory standards.
See Bagley, supra note 48, at 8 (“The case [for federal reform based on racism concerns] is
harder to sustain than it may at first appear.”). U.S. healthcare has a long, deep history
of discrimination that has infiltrated and stymied many efforts at universalism in
healthcare reform—so much so that groups like the NAACP were even leery of the
Clinton Administration’s health reform effort. See, e.g., Beatrix Hoffman, Health Care
footnote continued on next page
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In short, we should be wary of arguments for federalism or states’ rights
that are couched in constitutional arguments when they are really arguments
about policy disagreements and statutory design. The ACA’s federalism is about
how states react to and act within the framework of a national law that offers
states options about how and whether to participate. Whether or not the ACA
survives, the Republican proposals in 2017 largely would have strengthened
this dynamic, keeping the federal superstructure and giving states choices
within it—again in the name of that slippery concept called federalism.
Although supporters of the bills being floated in Congress and some health
policy wonks may wish that the ACA’s specific policy choices were different,
none are advocating a truly different brand of federalism from the one that
already exists in the ACA. Our observations about the ACA’s implementation—
its dynamism, its negotiated and horizontal character, its reliance on hybrid
state-federal partnerships, and the role of internal state politics—will be even
more relevant if the state options within national reform expand under the
Trump Administration.
III. Federalism Under the ACA
Like other federal interventions before it, the ACA responded to regulatory gaps and market failures in healthcare by focusing largely on weaknesses in
(mostly state-run) insurance markets. Uninsurance had reached a record high
of more than 16% during the first year of the Obama Administration, a trend
exacerbated by the Great Recession, and the uninsured were concentrated
among people earning less than 250% of the federal poverty level (FPL).166
Reform and Social Movements in the United States, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 75, 75, 80 (2003)
(exploring the complex relationship between segregation, other forms of racism, social
movements, and healthcare reform in the United States). These historic patterns are
still relevant. See Mark A. Hall, States’ Decisions Not to Expand Medicaid, 92 N.C. L. REV.
1459, 1464-66 (2014) (suggesting that implicit racism may be a factor in the opposition
to Medicaid expansion). Timothy Jost has documented the racism underlying
resistance to Medicaid expansion, concluding that until Medicaid is federalized, “the
original sin of racism will continue[] to infect” it. See Jost, supra note 82, at 6-8. Jost has
explained:
If you look at the map today, it is many of the same states today that are rejecting Medicaid
expansion whose senators blocked federal standards for public assistance almost 80 years ago,
and, I would argue, for the same reason. They still want to keep control of determining which
of the poor are eligible for assistance, and not to help those who are not worthy.

Id.
166. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE

COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 22-28, 26 tbl.9 (2010), https://perma.cc
/Q9AH-GUBL (reporting new Census Bureau data indicating a continued increase in
the uninsurance rate and that the greatest number of uninsured individuals earned less
than $25,000 at the time the ACA was enacted); 2009 HHS Poverty Guidelines, OFF.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION (Dec. 1, 2009), https://perma.cc/P5U2
footnote continued on next page
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Fewer employers offered health insurance as an employment benefit, and those
that did had increased employee cost sharing over time.167 Additionally,
individual and small group health insurance markets were inaccessible for
many (especially the lower- and middle-income uninsured) because of high
prices and exclusionary policies designed to prevent coverage of subscribers
who were not “healthy.”168 Though Medicaid had expanded since 1965 to
include additional populations over time, it still offered an incomplete safety
net, with many populations not covered in most states.169 As of 2006, only
about 45% of the nation’s poor uninsured were eligible for Medicaid.170 Those
excluded from insurance coverage often would seek care in emergency
rooms171—a poor and increasingly expensive substitute for systematic care.

167.
168.

169.
170.
171.

-TF28 (noting that the FPL in 2009 for one person was $10,830); Andrew Villegas &
Phil Galewitz, Uninsured Rate Soars, 50+ Million Americans Without Coverage, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 16, 2010), https://perma.cc/JN5U-2YZC (reporting that the
number of people uninsured was at “an all time high”); see also ROBIN A. COHEN ET AL.,
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH
INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY-MARCH 2016, at 1, 4, app. at A1 tbl.I, A7 tbl.IV (2016),
https://perma.cc/ML7N-N8TA (reporting long-term trends in insurance coverage
before and after the ACA); COMM. ON HEALTH INS. STATUS & ITS CONSEQUENCES, INST. OF
MED., AMERICA’S UNINSURED CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 2544 (2009) (detailing trends of declining insurance coverage); RACHEL GARFIELD ET AL.,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER; KEY FACTS ABOUT
HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE UNINSURED IN THE ERA OF HEALTH REFORM 3-4 (2016),
https://perma.cc/6LQU-KSWN (discussing the landscape of uninsurance before the
ACA).
See STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 100, at 79-80, 155-56.
See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1589 (2011) (describing ACA provisions
designed to address pricing practices that made nongroup insurance too costly for most
who did not fit in other insurance mechanisms). See generally Jessica L. Roberts &
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What Is (and Isn’t) Healthism?, 50 GA. L. REV. 833, 837-38, 84244 (2016) (considering which types of health-based distinctions are unjustifiable
discrimination, deemed “healthism”).
See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
See STAN DORN, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., MILLIONS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS CAN’T
GET MEDICAID: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 5 (2008), https://perma.cc/3UHF-SE7W.
The practice was so common that President George W. Bush said, “[P]eople have access
to health care in America. After all, you just go to an emergency room.” Remarks to the
Greater Cleveland Partnership and a Question-and-Answer Session in Cleveland, Ohio,
43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 920, 922 (July 10, 2007); see also Rachel Weiner, Romney:
Uninsured Have Emergency Rooms, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2012), https://perma.cc/2ZPL
-2VCJ (recounting this statement and reporting that candidate Mitt Romney made a
similar comment).
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A. The ACA’s Federalism as Drafted
The ACA responded to these gaps in coverage with an overarching
philosophy one of us has called “universality”—universal access to healthcare
through universal access to insurance coverage, even for most populations
historically excluded due to health status or financial status.172 (Some
populations were left out, notably millions of undocumented immigrants; legal
immigrants were left out of Medicaid, too.)173 The statute’s two central
mechanisms to accomplish this goal turned out to be its most federalismoriented. First, it expanded Medicaid coverage to populations long excluded
from categorical eligibility (namely, nonelderly childless adults, including men,
with income up to 138% of the FPL).174 Second, it facilitated individual access to
insurance in the private market by subsidizing insurance purchases and
creating individual insurance markets—the exchanges—to make options more
transparent for consumers and to ensure that insurance so purchased met a
minimum standard of coverage.175
Universality under the ACA does not mean uniformity, however. Nationalizing the whole system under a single structure would probably be the easiest
way to achieve universality, but it was not politically palatable in 2009 and was
not consistent with Congress’s documented preference to legislate incrementally. Instead, the ACA built on what came before, maintaining but buttressing
both the private markets and Medicaid.
From a federalism perspective, the two central mechanisms of the statute—
the Medicaid expansion and the exchanges—were not drafted to be structurally
the same. The Medicaid expansion was intended to be more national; the
private insurance reforms were envisioned to be largely state-led. However, as
detailed below, politics and law intervened to make the ACA’s federalism in
implementation almost the mirror image of its federalism as drafted.
172. See Huberfeld, supra note 93, at 67-69.
173. See id. at 68 n.7 (noting the exclusion of undocumented immigrants); see also Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1312(f)(3), 124 Stat. 119, 184
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(3) (2016)) (limiting access to ACA exchanges to
lawful residents); Coverage for Lawfully Present Immigrants, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://perma.cc/Q58C-LXEG (archived Apr. 23, 2018) (explaining that lawfully
present immigrants can get coverage through ACA exchanges but that many must wait
five years prior to receiving Medicaid coverage).
174. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 271 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII)) (creating a new Medicaid eligibility category). The
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 immediately amended the ACA
and created a 5% income disregard, raising eligibility for the new category to 138% of
the FPL. See Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1004(e)(2), 124 Stat. 1029, 1036 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(e)(14)(I)).
175. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321(a), 124 Stat. at 186 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 18041(a)) (detailing exchange structure).
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The Medicaid expansion that the ACA enacted did not take Medicaid away
from the states but did nationalize the program in the important sense that it
mandated eligibility expansion to populations that prior to the ACA had been
covered only at a state’s option. The ACA ended Medicaid’s limitation to the
“deserving poor” by requiring that states expand eligibility to all adults under
age sixty-five (when Medicare kicks in) with income up to 138% of the FPL.176
The ACA funded the eligibility expansion completely from 2014 through 2016,
after which it decreases the federal match slightly, paying for 90% of the
expansion population’s costs by 2020.177 Even at 90%, the supermatch is more
generous than the matching rates states have received historically, which are
tied to per capita income and range from 50% to about 80%.178 The ACA as
enacted did not authorize partial expansion of eligibility, so states could not
expand eligibility in a more limited fashion and still receive the supermatch.179
The idea was to make more uniform and comprehensive the coverage that had
become so distant for most of the nation’s poor by the time of the 2008 election.
With respect to the insurance markets, the proposed bill originally
considered in the House of Representatives would have created a nationally
run ACA insurance market for the privately insured population. But the Senate
insisted on a federalist structure.180 The ACA as enacted therefore gave states
the right of first refusal to run their own insurance exchanges.181 The
exchanges were new marketplaces, creatures of federal law introduced by the
ACA (but pioneered in Massachusetts).182 They not only aimed to increase
insurance coverage through a baseline of coverage and information that would
be delivered to subscribers but also enabled federal tax credits that subsidized
the purchase of private health insurance for individuals earning between 100%
176. See id. § 2001(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 271; see also Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act

§ 1004(e)(2), 124 Stat. at 1036.
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y).
178. See MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, MACSTATS: MEDICAID AND CHIP

DATA BOOK 17 exhibit 6 (2017), https://perma.cc/D8X2-RWR8.
179. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1), (3), 124 Stat. at 271-74

(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 1396d(b), (y)). Wisconsin has
a Medicaid waiver for BadgerCare, which is equivalent to a partial expansion, but the
waiver predated the ACA and has been renewed after the ACA, allowing coverage to
continue despite noncompliance with the ACA. See Sara Rosenbaum, Wisconsin’s 1115
Medicaid Demonstration: What Will Policymakers Learn?, COMMONWEALTH FUND: TO THE
POINT (June 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/8346-M738.
180. Compare America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong.
§ 201(a) (as reported to House, Oct. 14, 2009), with Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 1321 (as passed by Senate, Dec. 24, 2009).
181. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321, 124 Stat. at 186-87 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 18041).
182. See JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 113, 128 (2011).

1727

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270

What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018)

and 400% of the FPL.183 Unlike the ACA’s nationalized Medicaid eligibility
provisions, the exchange provisions were written to put states in the driver’s
seat, giving states priority to create their own exchanges and broad discretion
in how exchanges could be structured for a given state’s existing insurance
market.184 The federal government would provide a fallback should the states
decline (or fail) to run their own exchanges.185
Less relevant to the federalism narrative but important to understanding
these reforms and their political context is the ACA’s minimum coverage
requirement—the infamous individual mandate challenged in the Supreme
Court in 2012.186 The individual mandate required all individuals (with a few
exceptions) to obtain insurance coverage or pay a tax.187 The mandate was
designed to bring more customers into the private insurance markets to sustain
those markets in the face of the ACA’s dramatic new requirements on the
insurance industry.188 The Republican tax bill of 2017 repealed the
enforcement penalty.189
B. The ACA’s Flipped Federalism as Implemented
We will never know what the ACA’s intended federalism structure would
have looked like after implementation. One high-level former federal official
told us that state administrative officials of all political persuasions were
moving steadily toward Medicaid expansion and exchange implementation,
despite strong rhetoric from state politicians, immediately following the

183. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1401(a), 10105(a)-(c), 10108(h)(1), 124

184.
185.
186.
187.

188.

189.

Stat. at 213-19, 906, 914 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 36B (2016)); King v. Burwell, 135
S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (discussing the tax credits).
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1321, 124 Stat. at 186-87.
See id. § 1321(c), 124 Stat. at 186-87 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)).
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 530-32 (2012) (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.) (addressing challenges to the constitutionality of the individual mandate).
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1501(a), 10106(a), 124 Stat. at 242-44,
907-09 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091); id. §§ 1501(b), 10106(b)-(d), 125 Stat. at 244-49, 90910 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 5000A).
See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2486-87; Sara Rosenbaum, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act: Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice, 126 PUB. HEALTH REP. 130, 130-32
(2011); see also MCDONOUGH, supra note 182, at 121-22. The ACA requires insurers to
cover everyone, regardless of health risk, at essentially equal prices with variation
allowed in limited categories (e.g., age, tobacco use, and geography), a 180-degree
deviation from the way the industry has traditionally measured risk and reaped profits.
See, e.g., BlueCross BlueShield of N.C., In the Spotlight: ACA Insurance Reforms (2011),
https://perma.cc/8PC8-FZ43.
See H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 11081 (2017) (enacted) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A).
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statute’s enactment.190 But the Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) was a game changer.191
NFIB was largely framed as a constitutional challenge to the ACA’s
insurance mandate.192 The Court, however, surprised many legal experts193 by
sustaining the mandate as a permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing power but
declaring the Medicaid expansion an unconstitutionally coercive exercise of
the spending power.194 The Court consequently interpreted the Medicaid
expansion as optional for the states.195 The result was to introduce a powerful
element of state leverage—and with it state-federal bargaining—into ACA
implementation.
Following NFIB, as we detail in Part IV below, many states—especially red
states—stopped plans already in progress to expand Medicaid immediately.
They later worked through both intrastate negotiations between governors
and legislatures and through external negotiations with the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to create individualized deals for their
expansions.196 This change of events also gave Medicaid section 1115
demonstration waivers, which allow states to seek federal approval to deviate
from statutory Medicaid requirements,197 heightened significance under the
ACA, as section 1115 became the primary vehicle for such negotiating.
Congress did not write new Medicaid waivers into the ACA, and it did not
190. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 5 (Oct. 6,

2016) (on file with authors).
191. See id.; see also NFIB, 567 U.S. 519.
192. See, e.g., Brief for Private Respondents on the Individual Mandate at 1, 7-12, NFIB, 567

U.S. 519 (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 379586.
193. We each cautioned before oral argument that the government would be wise to pay

194.

195.
196.
197.

attention to the Medicaid question. See Abbe R. Gluck, Opinion, The 10th Amendment
Question, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Mar. 28, 2010, 7:00 PM), https://perma.cc
/H5S4-MYCB; Nicole Huberfeld, Jumping Ahead to Coercion, CONCURRING OPINIONS
(Dec. 9, 2011), https://perma.cc/22VT-YZRU.
See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 574 (upholding the individual mandate); id. at 587-88 (opinion of
Roberts, C.J.) (striking down the provision conditioning preexisting Medicaid funding
on accepting the expansion).
See id. at 587-88 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
See infra Part IV.
Section 1115 allows HHS to approve a state waiver proposal that furthers the
“objectives” of Medicaid while maintaining federal budget neutrality. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1315 (2016). The provision was introduced as an amendment to the Social Security
Act (in which Medicaid is codified) before Medicaid was created. See Public Welfare
Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 122, 76 Stat. 172, 192 (enacting the first
version of the waiver provision as a new section 1115 of the Social Security Act).
Budget neutrality is not a statutory requirement but rather an informal policy that
HHS applies. See MaryBeth Musumeci et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found.,
Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: The Current Landscape of Approved
and Pending Waivers 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/HVG9-KVY4.
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need to: HHS has always had authority to allow deviation from Medicaid
requirements by approving a section 1115 waiver.198 But NFIB, in giving states
more choices, opened the door to section 1115 waivers’ becoming a central
element of Medicaid expansion implementation and thus allowed states to
negotiate for special programmatic features that embraced policies that
deviated from the ACA’s principle of universality.
NFIB also reinvigorated an atmosphere of state autonomy and sprouted
acts of political resistance that bled outside Medicaid policy and into the realm
of exchange implementation. Despite the fact that the states’ rights faction in
Congress had insisted on the state-run exchanges in the first place, it became an
act of political loyalty for states to refuse to implement the ACA, including
refusing to run an exchange.199 The results of the 2010 state elections bolstered
this effect, as Republicans scored a net gain of five governorships and eleven
state legislatures.200
This political positioning ironically extended the federal enterprise in
insurance much further than the ACA’s drafters had envisioned because it
required the federal government to run the exchanges in those states.201 What
we call “federalism for federalism’s own sake” became the dominant approach
as states paradoxically refused to run their own exchanges, even though statebased exchanges would have been the natural choice for states acting in their
“autonomous” or “sovereign” interests.
This amplification of state resistance produced parallel state-federal
negotiations in the exchange context. Unlike in the Medicaid context, no
statutory provision facilitates an “exchange demonstration waiver,”202 but
HHS still worked closely with states, informally when necessary, on
modifications to the ACA’s envisioned exchange structure to bring as many
198. See SMITH & MOORE, supra note 60, at 332 (discussing the history of section 1115’s

199.

200.

201.
202.

waiver authority). The language in 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) specifically refers to § 1396a, the
provision delineating what a state’s Medicaid plan must include to participate in the
program.
See Anna Yukhananov, U.S. State Officials in Stealth Mode on Health Exchanges, REUTERS
(Sept. 16, 2012, 2:10 PM), https://perma.cc/EH2A-PVFP (describing political opposition
faced by Republican insurance administrators tasked with implementing the ACA).
Compare Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 2010 State and Legislative Partisan
Composition (2010), https://perma.cc/386J-UR9W (reporting that as of January 31,
2010, Republicans held 24 governorships and controlled both chambers of 14 state
legislatures), with Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 2011 State and Legislative
Partisan Composition (2011), https://perma.cc/BU85-TX52 (reporting that as of
January 31, 2011, Republicans held 29 governorships and controlled both chambers of
25 state legislatures).
Cf. MCDONOUGH, supra note 182, at 128.
ACA section 1332, discussed in Part V below, is different. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1332, 124 Stat. 119, 203-06 (2010) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 18052); infra text accompanying note 436.
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states successfully into ACA implementation as possible.203 Choices included
matters of exchange operation (eligibility and enrollment, health plan
management, and consumer assistance), the platform of the consumer web
portal (federal or state), the choice of benchmark plan for determining the
essential health benefits to be provided by health plans in the exchange, the
number and location of geographic rating areas, the choice of methods for
reinsurance and risk adjustment, and the responsibility for reviewing health
plan rates and compliance with the medical loss ratio requirements.204 HHS
even gave states choices not envisioned by the statute: For instance, as detailed
in Part V below, HHS allowed states to retain authority over certain key
components of the exchanges, even as HHS ran some components itself. These
developments led to significant variation across states, not just across states
that chose to operate their own exchanges—where variation might be
expected—but also in states that had a nationally run exchange. National has
not meant uniform.
Thus, although states were always meant to play vital roles in both of the
ACA’s core reforms, those elements of the statute were not implemented in the
way Congress envisioned. Medicaid has always been structured under the useit-or-lose-it model of cooperative federalism, and the ACA continued that: If a
state declined federal Medicaid funds, no Medicaid program would exist in that
state. In contrast, the exchanges were to be a nationwide feature established by
the ACA that could operate along two parallel tracks, state and federal. States
that declined to exercise their right of first refusal to set up exchanges were to
have them nonetheless, through federal operation.
But after NFIB, the Medicaid expansion became optional, even though
Congress had intended to nationalize it. And the exchanges became more
national than federalist—at least in terms of formal structural arrangement—as
political resistance led many states to reject the very power over the exchanges
they had asked for. In short, the Court’s decision in NFIB turned the federalism
architecture of the ACA on its head.
C. Study Methodology
The scale of the ACA and the fundamental changes it made in U.S.
healthcare structure and finance are reasons enough to study it. The flipped
203. See infra Part V.
204. See Ctr. for Healthcare Research & Transformation, Guide to State Requirements and

Policy Choices in the Affordable Care Act (2011), https://perma.cc/6DYY-RN8G;
Explaining Health Care Reform: Medical Loss Ratio (MLR), KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 29,
2012), https://perma.cc/9VQZ-5Y34. For an overview of each state’s decisions, see
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES OR
MARKETPLACES: STATE PROFILES AND ACTIONS (2017), https://perma.cc/25S4-299Z.
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federalism of the ACA’s implementation makes it all the more interesting. The
detail in the following two Parts is both empirical and theoretical. By
grounding our inquiry in real-world detail, our project responds to the
frequent criticism that federalism scholarship is too abstract.205
Our data derive from three different research methods. First, beginning in
July 2013, we collaborated with the HIX 2.0 Project at the University of
Pennsylvania to systematically code and evaluate variations in states’
implementation of the exchange and Medicaid expansion aspects of the ACA.
The HIX 2.0 Project, which is no longer active, aimed to construct quantitatively coded datasets to support research on the impact of variations in state
health law and policy choices on outcome measures of significance, such as the
rate of uninsurance, the number of insurers active in a state market, and health
insurance prices.206 We identified for the investigators categories to track that
would be relevant for federalism in both the Medicaid and exchange contexts.
Second, we independently tracked state-federal activity in each state, using
publicly available sources, including government materials. We tracked factors
ranging from program design to political party in office to the legal means—
such as statutes and executive orders—by which the new programs were
implemented in each state.
Finally, we interviewed implementers themselves—current and former
state and federal officials who ranged from state governors to insurance
commissioners to high-ranking members of the Obama Administration. We
also interviewed leaders in major healthcare nonprofit and trade groups that
were known to be working closely with state and federal officials on
implementation. The interviews are the subject of a separate article;207 for the
purposes of this Article, their relevance is in corroborating the federalism story
that emerged from the tracking data.
The initial goal of all of these methods was to measure the traditional
federalism attributes—state autonomy, sovereignty, cooperation, experimentation, and variation—in the statute as well as what impact those attributes may
have on health policymaking.
As noted, we ultimately were not able to quantitatively assess the federalism attributes as we had intended. The richness and complexity of the data, as
detailed in the next two Parts, revealed aspects of autonomy, sovereignty,
cooperation, experimentation, and variation occurring within all of the
205. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
206. The project had a very long time horizon, so its dataset could not be put to use

immediately. We built on the initial dataset with our own data collection and
confirmation efforts.
207. For a more comprehensive account of the interviews, see Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole
Huberfeld, The New Health Care Federalism on the Ground, 15 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1
(2018).
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different structural arrangements in the ACA—even structural arrangements
perceived to be in opposition to one another. Assigning weights to measure
these attributes relative to one another (for instance, whether an early
Medicaid-expanding state was more or less autonomous than a late Medicaid
waiver state) proved impossible, at least in this initial foray. Those
observations changed our focus and gave rise to the theoretical analysis in this
Article.
IV. The Medicaid Expansion
The Medicaid expansion is a story of dynamic, adaptive, horizontal,
negotiated, and small-r republican federalism. Even though the Medicaid
expansion became an option for the states after NFIB, it has not operated like
an on-off switch. It has been in constant motion. Some opt-out states—even
those that initially proclaimed resistance—have moved gradually to expansion,
and many opt-in states have renegotiated deals with HHS even after flicking
the on switch years before.208 Leaders among states emerged organically,
creating horizontal state dynamics that changed implementation.209 For
instance, states like Arkansas and Indiana became red-state thought leaders by
pushing unconventional waiver elements and, in the process, taught other
states how to negotiate and what could be gained.210 A clear learn-and-response
pattern materialized, resulting from these negotiations within states, among
states, and between states and the federal government. Intrastate features
pervaded the process, with governors and legislators of the same (typically
Republican) party at odds on whether and how to expand.211
Classic federalism accounts, including the way in which the Court often
describes federalism, tend to make zero-sum assumptions about federalism’s
sovereignty tradeoffs. The federal government’s gain is portrayed as the states’
loss, and vice versa.212 Our research illustrates that this has not been the case
with the Medicaid expansion. Our interviews with high-level current and
former state and former federal officials confirmed that largely because the
Obama Administration adopted a very long time horizon—the administration’s
basic goal was to get the ACA entrenched and fix it later—states (often with
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See infra Parts IV.A.3-.4.
See infra Parts IV.A.3-.4.
See infra Parts IV.A.3-.4.
See infra Part IV.B.
See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767,
812-14 (1994) (exploring exclusivity through the lens of preemption); Theodore W.
Ruger, Preempting the People: The Judicial Role in Regulatory Concurrency and Its Implications for Popular Lawmaking, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1029, 1038-46 (2006) (tracing the
history of exclusive spheres of power in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
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shorter-term goals) achieved significant victories in their federalism
negotiations.213 With the Obama Administration eager to get as many states to
expand Medicaid as possible, states were able to negotiate special deals that
enabled them to do so. Both sides viewed themselves victorious.
A. Four Waves of Dynamic, Negotiated, and Horizontal Medicaid
Expansion
We found that the Medicaid expansion occurred in four discernible waves.
1.

Early, generous implementers: the first wave

The first wave began in 2012, before the ACA’s Medicaid implementation
date of January 1, 2014. The ACA permitted early expansion, although at a
state’s usual federal funding match, rather than at the ACA’s post-2014
supermatch.214 The draw of early expansion was that it offered federal funds
for the new expansion population, an economic boon for a handful of states
that had already covered childless adults with no federal funds before the
ACA.215 Led by Minnesota, states including California, Colorado, Connecticut,
New Jersey, and Washington, as well as the District of Columbia, expanded to
childless adults by April 2012.216 These early adopters largely aligned with the

213. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1 (June 21,

2016) (on file with authors); Interview with Former Governor (Aug. 4, 2016) (on file
with authors); Interview with State Policy Organization Officers 1, 2, 3, and 4 (June 6,
2016) (on file with authors).
214. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 2001(a)(4)(A),
10201(b), 124 Stat. 119, 274, 918 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(2)-(3) (2016))
(permitting states to expand via state plan amendments (SPAs) before 2014, when the
supermatch kicked in).
215. Cf. Larisa Antonisse et al., Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The Effects of Medicaid
Expansion Under the ACA: Updated Findings from a Literature Review 1-2 (2018),
https://perma.cc/X8C6-QQV8 (reviewing literature “using data from 2014 or later”
and concluding that “[a]nalyses find positive effects of [Medicaid] expansion on
numerous economic outcomes”).
216. See States Getting a Jump Start on Health Reform’s Medicaid Expansion, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Apr. 2, 2012), https://perma.cc/8JRJ-VTVM; see also Letter from Marilyn Tavenner,
Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., to Suzanne Brennan, State Medicaid Dir., Colo. Dep’t of Health Care Policy &
Fin. (Mar. 30, 2012), https://perma.cc/5TMZ-URJM (granting Colorado a section 1115
waiver allowing it to expand Medicaid to certain adults without dependent children
beginning in April 2012). Some states implemented expansion through SPAs, and some
amended existing demonstration waivers. See States Getting a Jump Start on Health
Reform’s Medicaid Expansion, supra. Some states sought section 1115 waivers to enroll
individuals earning more than the ACA’s baseline of 138% of the FPL. See id.
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ACA’s universal coverage goal, yet some first-wave states obtained section 1115
demonstration waivers to expand more generously beyond the ACA.217
2.

NFIB and the second wave

The NFIB decision, which came down on June 28, 2012,218 initiated the
second wave. Some states that had been waiting to see whether the ACA would
be declared unconstitutional expanded almost as soon as the decision upheld
the law. Due to the timing of the state budget cycle and a desire for consultant
studies to prove the potential benefits of opting in, many others did not
formally opt in until 2013. The second-wave states largely relied on state plan
amendments (SPAs)—amendments to their existing Medicaid programs—for
expansion and did not negotiate or seek special concessions from HHS, at least
not at first.219
Notably, during the second wave, governors were likely to take the lead,
often at odds with their own legislatures or their states’ national representatives in Congress. For example, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer,220 Kentucky

217. See, e.g., Letter from Donald M. Berwick, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,

U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to John McCarthy, Medicaid Dir., D.C. Dep’t of
Health Care Fin. 1 (Oct. 28, 2010), https://perma.cc/E96U-2TK9 (approving the District
of Columbia’s expansion of Medicaid to adults with incomes up to 200% of the FPL);
Carol Backstrom, Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs., Project No. 11-W-00039/5, Minnesota
PMAP+ Section 1115 Waiver Renewal Request 1 (2013), https://perma.cc/UST3-QFVC
(requesting approval to expand “to adults with children, 19- and 20-year[-]olds, and
adults without children at incomes between 133% and 200% of the federal poverty
level”); Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., to Lucinda E. Jesson, Comm’r, Minn. Dep’t of Human Servs. 1
(Dec. 20, 2013), https://perma.cc/HJN7-2EBA (granting Minnesota’s request); Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., No. 11-W-00194/1, Global Commitment to Health
Section 1115 Demonstration: Waiver Authority (2012), https://perma.cc/LWZ8-E2DU
(granting Vermont permission to expand financial eligibility for certain services).
218. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
219. See generally State Medicaid & CHIP Profiles, MEDICAID.GOV, https://perma.cc/HF2M
-Y7PZ (archived Apr. 23, 2018) (documenting each state’s SPAs and waivers). SPAs are
subject to less scrutiny than section 1115 demonstration waiver applications because
they are merely a description of how the state is meeting the mandatory elements of
Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (establishing requirements for state plans); State Plan,
MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/PF6K-2638
(archived Apr. 29, 2018) (providing background information on state plans and the SPA
process). The Medicaid expansion was drafted in the ACA as a mandatory element. See
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 271 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII)).
220. Governor Brewer signed legislation expanding Arizona’s Medicaid program on
June 17, 2013 after calling a surprise emergency legislative session designed to force
Medicaid expansion. See Mary K. Reinhart, Brewer Signs Into Law Arizona’s Medicaid
Program, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (June 18, 2013, 12:36 AM), https://perma.cc/55MZ-HB64.
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Governor Steve Beshear,221 and North Dakota Governor Jack Dalrymple222
pushed—and in some cases explicitly defied and circumvented—their
legislatures to achieve Medicaid expansion. We detail those intrastate
dynamics in Part IV.B below.
At the same time, some states recognized that NFIB gave them leverage
that the ACA as drafted did not originally contemplate. They began exploring
what kinds of concessions they could extract in a world of now-optional
Medicaid expansion that would look beyond a traditional, “cooperative,” SPA
approach.223 The annual meeting of the National Governors Association held
just one month after NFIB was crucial to this exploration; after state-to-state
conversations at that meeting, holdout states started to investigate expansion
options in earnest.224
HHS fed this interest. Although the HHS Secretary initially provided lean
guidance after NFIB,225 within a few months HHS informed states that they
could opt in at any time without being penalized or locked in.226 That meant
states could opt in or opt out of expansion on a timeline and in a manner
different from that initially envisioned by the ACA.227

221. See Caroline Humer, Kentucky Governor Announces Medicaid Expansion Under Obamacare,
222.

223.

224.

225.
226.

227.

REUTERS (May 9, 2013, 4:05 PM), https://perma.cc/9N7F-XDXN.
See Jeffrey Young, North Dakota Medicaid Expansion Favored by Republican Governor,
HUFFPOST (updated Mar. 17, 2013), https://perma.cc/8XDR-ZTTY (reporting that
Governor Dalrymple submitted a Medicaid expansion bill to the state legislature); see
also Nick Smith, Lawmakers Pan Medicaid Expansion, BISMARCK TRIB. (Apr. 12, 2013),
https://perma.cc/97KH-5WUL (reporting that the bill passed and discussing some state
legislators’ opposition).
See Letter from Dan Crippen, Nat’l Governors Ass’n, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (July 2, 2012), https://perma.cc/SE3A-LUFT; see also
RGA Letter on Medicaid and Exchanges to President Obama, REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS ASS’N
(July 10, 2012), https://perma.cc/G3N3-XVGL.
See Michael Cooper, Many Governors Are Still Unsure About Medicaid Expansion, N.Y.
TIMES (July 14, 2012, 10:07 AM), https://perma.cc/BPX4-CDYZ; Lisa Lambert, At
Annual Meeting, U.S. Governors Come Out Swinging over Medicaid, REUTERS (July 14,
2012), https://perma.cc/8H3V-WFXR; see also Interview with Former Governor, supra
note 213.
See Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to
Governor (July 10, 2012), https://perma.cc/72HV-XQ3F.
See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and Medicaid 12 (2012),
https://perma.cc/GV5E-JP55.
States that expand partially, such as by expanding only up to 100% of the FPL, are not
eligible for the supermatch. See id. at 12.
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3.

Waivers, concessions, and the third wave

HHS’s expressed flexibility stimulated the third wave, which was led by
Arkansas, the first state to obtain a section 1115 demonstration waiver in
September 2013 to implement Medicaid expansion.228 The Arkansas waiver
included a pioneering concession that allowed Arkansas to move toward
privatizing the Medicaid market by funneling the newly eligible Medicaid
population into private insurance available through the exchange rather than
enrolling beneficiaries in traditional Medicaid.229 Thus, this demonstration
project made Arkansas Medicaid expansion beneficiaries the first to be
enrolled in private coverage using federally funded premium assistance for
purchasing private insurance with benchmark coverage in the exchange.230
Arkansas publicized its negotiations with HHS, generating intense
curiosity among other states exploring expansion.231 Some states strategically
started to wait out other states’ waiver negotiations, feeling that they could
benefit from piggybacking on early moving states’ efforts and get even more,
as evidenced by the progression of states opting in to expansion. One high-level
former federal official we interviewed noted that states perceived the Obama
Administration as so eager to expand Medicaid that every state wanted to be
228. See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S.

Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Andy Allison, Dir., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. 1
(Sept. 27, 2013), https://perma.cc/MYJ9-LRPY (approving the waiver for three years).
229. See id. For more details about Arkansas’s waiver program, see Tracy Garber & Sara R.
Collins, The Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion: Alternative State Approaches,
COMMONWEALTH FUND: TO THE POINT (Mar. 28, 2014), https://perma.cc/WQ5U
-MZV3.
230. Premium assistance waivers were obtainable before the ACA, but the few that existed
had low enrollment because no private insurance was actually available to low-income
workers. See Teresa A. Coughlin & Stephen Zuckerman, State Responses to New Flexibility
in Medicaid, 86 MILBANK Q. 209, 227-28 (2008) (discussing the minimal uptake for
premium assistance waivers during the George W. Bush Administration); Sara
Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Perspective, Using Medicaid to Buy Private Health
Insurance—The Great New Experiment?, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 7, 8 (2013) (noting that
employer-sponsored insurance was the only private insurance that could be purchased
with premium assistance before the ACA and that such insurance was not accessible for
most low-income workers). The ACA’s exchanges made purchasing private insurance
with premium assistance a realistic option for low-income populations by broadening
the availability of small group and individual insurance and by offering financial
assistance through premium tax credits. See Rosenbaum & Sommers, supra, at 8.
Further, new rules such as the prohibition on excluding people with preexisting
conditions, see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 1201(2)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 154 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a) (2016)), and the
establishment of adjusted community rating, id. sec. 1201(4), § 2701, 124 Stat. at 155-56
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg), opened coverage to previously uninsurable
populations.
231. See Robert Pear, States Urged to Expand Medicaid with Private Insurance, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2013), https://perma.cc/FD8X-T2SE.
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“last in line” to negotiate a waiver so that it could benefit from prior states’
successes and concessions won from the federal government.232 The succession
of waivers following Arkansas’s bears that out and shows that the strategy was
effective.
Iowa announced its interest in a waiver around the time that Arkansas
announced its deal with HHS.233 Iowa appeared to have benefited from
Arkansas’s application by seeking to negotiate even more concessions, which
HHS granted through two waivers. Beyond applying for a waiver for premium
assistance (which applied to individuals earning more than 100% of the FPL),
Iowa proposed enforceable premium payments for individuals earning more
than 100% of the FPL (allowing it to deny coverage for failure to pay
premiums), healthy behavior rewards (which could offset premium payments),
a one-year waiver of the requirement to provide nonemergency transportation
services, and copayments for nonemergency use of emergency departments.234
HHS approved each of these new features.235
Soon thereafter, in September 2013, Michigan initiated expansion waiver
negotiations (before Arkansas’s waiver was formalized).236 Michigan did not
seek a premium assistance waiver but, like Iowa, it sought and received
concessions for cost sharing and healthy behavior incentives.237 In addition,
Michigan wanted to create health savings accounts for enrollees’ cost sharing

232. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 5, supra

note 190.
233. Iowa announced its intent to negotiate a waiver on February 26, 2013, see Rod Boshart,

234.
235.

236.

237.

Branstad to Seek Federal IowaCare Waiver, SIOUX CITY J. (Feb. 26, 2013), https://perma.cc
/AZ7T-WVHN, the same day Arkansas announced that it had reached an agreement
with HHS, see David Ramsey, Update: Medicaid Game-Changer, ARK. TIMES: ARK. BLOG
(Feb. 26, 2013), https://perma.cc/GZ69-LWQ8 (reporting that HHS gave oral approval
for Arkansas’s proposal on February 22, 2013). Iowa announced the details of its
proposal on March 4, 2013. See Mike Wiser, Branstad Releases Medicaid Expansion
Alternative, SIOUX CITY J. (Mar. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/85S6-UM4T.
See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Expansion in Iowa (2015),
https://perma.cc/7DJW-TDJK.
See id. Until 2014, Iowa required people earning 101-138% of the FPL to enroll in a
Marketplace Qualified Health Plan in its exchange, but low insurer participation led
the state to make this type of enrollment optional. See id.
See Jonathan Oosting, Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder Signs Historic Medicaid Plan Into Law:
This Is About “Family” Not “Politics,” MLIVE.COM (updated Sept. 16, 2013, 2:51 PM),
https://perma.cc/5NK3-V9YG (reporting that Michigan’s governor signed legislation
allowing him to proceed with negotiating waivers).
See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Stephen Fitton, Dir., Mich. Med. Servs. Admin. 1
(Dec. 30, 2013), https://perma.cc/S53V-BR7G (approving Michigan’s waiver request
and SPA for Medicaid expansion, including cost sharing for beneficiaries earning more
than the FPL).
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requirements,238 which Arkansas later proposed in an amendment to its
original section 1115 waiver.239 HHS approved Michigan’s waiver application a
few weeks after Iowa’s.240
Following Arkansas, Iowa, and Michigan, Pennsylvania’s governor at the
time, Tom Corbett, held protracted negotiations with HHS.241 These were high
profile, in part because the waiver application included contentious elements
such as enforceable cost sharing and, more controversially, work search
requirements, which were not approved by the Obama Administration.242
Pennsylvania’s original proposal called for Arkansas-style premium assistance,
but in the end Pennsylvania chose—like Iowa—to use Medicaid managed care
networks for the newly eligible population.243 (Under a new governor, Tom
Wolf, Pennsylvania reversed course and abandoned its expansion waiver,
opting instead for the kind of straightforward expansion envisioned by the
ACA.)244
Additional states soon followed. Tennessee and South Dakota proposed
partial expansion through premium assistance waivers.245 The ACA did not
238. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., No. 11-W-00245/5, Healthy Michigan

239.
240.

241.

242.
243.

244.
245.

Section 1115 Demonstration: Special Terms and Conditions 13-16 (2013),
https://perma.cc/S53V-BR7G.
See Michelle Andrews, Arkansas Weighs Plan to Make Some Medicaid Enrollees Fund
Savings Accounts, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/K64S-5S4L.
Michigan’s waiver was approved December 30, 2013. See Letter from Marilyn
Tavenner to Stephen Fitton, supra note 237, at 1. Iowa’s was approved December 10,
2013. See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Jennifer Vermeer, Medicaid Dir., State of Iowa
1 (Dec. 30, 2013), https://perma.cc/J6VJ-GXGC (noting that Iowa’s waiver was
originally approved December 10, 2013 and approving amendments to that waiver).
See Greg Sargent, Another Big Boost for Obamacare, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE (Aug. 28,
2014), https://perma.cc/8DFV-WF48 (noting that “months of jockeying between
Corbett and the federal government” occurred before approval of Pennsylvania’s plan).
See id.
See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Beverly Mackereth, Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare
1-2 (Aug. 28, 2014), https://perma.cc/UP7V-FLD5 (approving the program and noting
that it would use managed care networks); see also Virgil Dickson, Pennsylvania to
Expand Medicaid, but with Strings Attached, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Aug. 29, 2014),
https://perma.cc/6RMP-89B6 (discussing the terms of the waiver Pennsylvania
negotiated with HHS); The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 234 (noting
Iowa’s move to Medicaid managed care networks after insurers dropped out).
See John George, Wolf Begins Dismantling Corbett’s Healthy PA Plan, PHILA. BUS. J.
(updated Feb. 10, 2015, 3:46 PM EST), https://perma.cc/9KAH-DQG4.
See Dana Ferguson, Daugaard Encourages Medicaid Expansion, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux
Falls, S.D.) (updated Dec. 8, 2015, 9:23 PM), https://perma.cc/8WR2-E36D; David
Montgomery, Feds Reject Daugaard’s Partial Medicaid Plan, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls,
S.D.) (Mar. 5, 2014, 12:09 AM CT), https://perma.cc/X9ZF-C24J; Andy Sher, Tennessee
GOP Skeptical of TennCare Expansion, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Dec. 12, 2012),
footnote continued on next page
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allow partial expansion—that is, expansion that does not include everyone
earning up to 138% of the FPL—so Tennessee’s and South Dakota’s proposals
were rejected by the Obama Administration but led to additional discussions.246
In sum, the third wave not only introduced premium assistance waivers
and other red-state features into Medicaid expansion but also showcased HHS’s
highly pragmatic approach to getting as many states to expand Medicaid
eligibility as possible. Convincing a state to opt in, even with a waiver that
deviated from the ACA as originally envisioned, was a critical step toward
achieving the statute’s goal of near-universal coverage.
HHS also saw that it could more effectively get states to adopt the ACA’s
policy through individualized state-by-state negotiations, rather than viewing
the resisting states as a monolithic group. Our interviewees credited HHS
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius’s background as the former governor of Kansas for
her taking this highly effective approach, going state by state, even as it meant
that HHS was in a near-constant state of negotiation.247
4.

Renegotiated deals, political change, and the fourth wave

The fourth wave began with the ACA’s January 1, 2014 implementation
date and has progressed at a more gradual pace than the first three waves.
Notably, Medicaid was not implemented by all states immediately after its
passage in 1965 either. Although many states embraced Medicaid’s promise of
generous federal funding, others nearly missed the 1970 deadline for
participation; Arizona did not implement Medicaid until 1982.248 This pattern
of gradual—but ultimately widespread—uptake has been replicated to a degree
in the ACA’s implementation, although the change in presidential administration disrupted implementation momentum and guiderails.
During the late Obama Administration years (2014-2016), New Hampshire,
Indiana, Alaska, Montana, and Louisiana expanded Medicaid, each choosing
different mechanisms of expansion and pulling different levers of policy and
https://perma.cc/B5FJ-UGLH (noting interest in expanding only for those with
incomes up to the FPL); see also Alex Tolbert, How Is New TN Medicaid Expansion Plan
Different?, TENNESSEAN (July 17, 2016, 8:02 AM CT), https://perma.cc/B92F-TZ2X
(reporting on Tennessee’s 2015 and 2016 efforts to negotiate expansion, including
through a premium assistance waiver).
246. See Montgomery, supra note 245 (reporting that the Obama Administration rejected
South Dakota’s proposed partial expansion); see also Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., supra note 226, at 12 (“[HHS] will not consider partial expansions for populations
eligible for the 100 percent matching rate in 2014 through 2016.”).
247. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1, supra
note 213; Interview with Former Governor, supra note 213.
248. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 57, at 61; Erik Eckholm, Late Starter in Medicaid,
Arizona Shows the Way, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 1991), https://perma.cc/LQ2P-853R.
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power. For example, New Hampshire began expansion through its existing
Medicaid program in the summer of 2014 but received a waiver in March 2015
that phased in Arkansas-style premium assistance through 2016 and beyond.249
In other words, New Hampshire began with a traditional Medicaid expansion
through an SPA and later switched to follow the lead of Arkansas. Alaska and
Louisiana both expanded through traditional SPAs, discussed more below.
The thought leader of the first part of the fourth wave was Indiana.
Perhaps the most aggressively negotiated expansion to occur during the Obama
Administration, Indiana’s section 1115 waiver built on its existing Healthy
Indiana Plan (HIP) Medicaid waiver as well as prior expansion states’ waivers,
and it sought more concessions than prior states had requested.250 Approved in
January 2015, HIP 2.0 included elements from other states’ waivers such as
variation in benefit packages (Michigan and Pennsylvania), wellness incentives
(Iowa and Michigan), nonemergency transportation payment exclusion (Iowa
and Pennsylvania), and premium assistance for beneficiaries to purchase
employer-sponsored insurance (Iowa).251 HIP 2.0 also contained elements that
were new to post-ACA section 1115 waivers, such as a complex cost sharing
scheme that—for the first time ever—allowed Medicaid enrollees earning more
than 100% of the FPL to be locked out of coverage for six months if they could
not pay premiums; mandatory use of health savings accounts to pay for cost
sharing; nonretroactive enrollment for certain beneficiaries; and graduated
cost sharing for nonemergency use of emergency departments.252 Work
requirements were part of the original proposal but were publicly rejected by
the Obama Administration.253
Notably, then-Governor Mike Pence (now Vice President of the United
States) pursued HIP 2.0 with the aid of then-consultant Seema Verma (now
249. See Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,

250.

251.
252.

253.

U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Nicholas A. Toumpas, Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. 1 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://perma.cc/KV9Z-KBDQ; see also Todd
Bookman, Hassan Holds Medicaid Expansion Kick-Off Event, N.H. PUB. RADIO (June 30,
2014), https://perma.cc/49VR-EL84 (reporting the initial expansion).
See Letter from Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Joseph Moser, Medicaid Dir., Ind. Family & Soc.
Servs. Admin. 1-3 (Jan. 27, 2015), https://perma.cc/9U6V-3BAF (approving Indiana’s
HIP 2.0 waiver application).
See id.
See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., No 11-W-00296/5, Waiver List: Healthy
Indiana Plan (HIP) 2.0, at 1-3 (2015), https://perma.cc/9U6V-3BAF; see also Abby
Goodnough, Indiana Will Allow Entry to Medicaid for a Price, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015),
https://perma.cc/2GRQ-MF35.
See Phil Galewitz, Kentucky and Feds Near Possible Collision on Altering Medicaid
Expansion, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/W4LH-GMBM
(recounting that Indiana’s plan was approved “only after [the state] gave up on
requiring Medicaid recipients to hold jobs”).
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Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)), who
was also paid to design section 1115 waivers for Iowa, Kentucky, Ohio, and
Tennessee.254 (We see multistate consultants playing the same role in the
horizontal dynamics of insurance exchange implementation, as detailed in
Part V below.) Verma’s participation surely facilitated the horizontal learning
so prominent in the third and fourth waves of the Medicaid expansion, and
HIP 2.0 quickly became a model for other states, including some that had
already opted in and that sought modified or new waivers through the end of
the Obama Administration and into the Trump Administration.255 New
Hampshire’s new Arkansas-style premium assistance waiver included some
Indiana-style elements such as preventing retroactive coverage for newly
eligible enrollees.256 Montana also mimicked parts of Indiana’s successful
negotiations, gaining approval for up to ninety-day disenrollment upon
nonpayment of premiums for beneficiaries earning more than 100% of the
FPL.257
The fourth wave also added a novel phenomenon: existing opt-in states
reconsidering already-implemented SPAs or renegotiating existing waivers
after witnessing new concessions being granted by HHS. Perhaps most notable
among the existing opt-in states, Kentucky elected Republican Governor Matt
Bevin in November 2015 after he campaigned on eliminating Kentucky’s
widely heralded implementation of the ACA, which included Medicaid
expansion through a traditional SPA.258 Kentucky proposed a section 1115
254. See Seema Verma, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://perma.cc/59XL-YUQV

(archived Apr. 23, 2018).
255. Verma’s CMS expects states to learn from one another. For example, CMS issued

guidance promoting the streamlining of section 1115 waivers. See Brian Neale, Ctr. for
Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Section 1115 Demonstration Process Improvements 3 (2017), https://perma.cc/E827-SK8N (“CMS will develop
parameters for expedited approval of certain waiver authorities under
demonstrations . . . that are substantially similar to those approved in other states . . . .”).
Language in CMS’s approval letter for Kentucky’s demonstration project that includes
work requirements is also telling. See Letter from Brian Neale, Deputy Adm’r, Ctr. for
Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Adam Meier, Deputy
Chief of Staff, Office of Governor Matthew Bevin, State of Ky. 1 (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://perma.cc/X57W-NQMV (“Your substantial work will help inform future state
demonstrations seeking to draw on Kentucky’s novel approaches to Medicaid
reform . . . .”).
256. See Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt to Nicholas A. Toumpas, supra note 249, at 1.
257. See Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs.,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Mary E. Dalton, State Medicaid Dir., Mont.
Dep’t of Pub. Health & Human Servs. 1 (Nov. 2, 2015), https://perma.cc/7CLR-H3XE.
258. See Nora Kelly, Can Kentucky’s New Governor Undo Obamacare?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://perma.cc/GBC5-U225 (noting that Governor Bevin pledged to dismantle
Kentucky’s insurance exchange and alter its Medicaid expansion); see also The Henry J.
Kaiser Family Found., Proposed Changes to Medicaid Expansion in Kentucky 2 (2017),
footnote continued on next page
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waiver in the summer of 2016 that contained many of the same elements as the
Indiana HIP 2.0 waiver but sought even more concessions.259 Like Indiana’s,
Pennsylvania’s, and those of other states before it, Kentucky’s waiver proposal
included work requirements for the population Governor Bevin called the
“able-bodied,” which the Obama Administration consistently refused to
allow.260
CMS approved Kentucky’s waiver application—including the work
requirements—shortly before this Article went to print,261 signaling how the
Trump Administration will proceed with fourth-wave renegotiations and new
waiver applications. In addition to Kentucky, other states such as Arizona,
Arkansas, Michigan, and Ohio have been attempting to renegotiate their
expansions, seeking to win the same concessions other states received and, in
most cases, pushing for even more.262

259.

260.

261.
262.

https://perma.cc/K9LQ-BYYC (noting the move from traditional expansion to waiver
expansion).
See Kentucky HEALTH Waiver Application 7-14 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/34C9-HREH;
see also Joseph Gerth, Matt Bevin Calls for Unity at Inauguration, COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.) (updated Dec. 8, 2015, 6:38 PM ET), https://perma.cc/YQ74-PESB (reporting that
Governor Bevin said in his inaugural address that “he would model Kentucky’s
Medicaid policies after” Indiana’s).
See Ryland Barton, Federal Government Starting to Question Bevin’s Medicaid Proposal,
89.3 WFPL (Louisville, Ky.) (July 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/44XR-LC5K. In July 2017,
Kentucky submitted an amendment to its application that made the work requirements more stringent by effectively shortening the clock for work requirements to
kick in when enrollees churn out of and back into the program. See Kentucky
HEALTH Operational Modification Request 3-6 (2017), https://perma.cc/T83G
-A5WM; see also Deborah Yetter, Bevin Revises Medicaid Plan, Seeks to Reduce Kentucky’s
Rolls by Another 9,000 People, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.) (updated July 8, 2017, 10:58 AM
ET), https://perma.cc/9E88-B5ZZ (explaining the amended waiver application in plain
English). This amendment was part of the approved section 1115 waiver. See Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Nos. 11-W-00306/4 & 21-W-00067/4, KY HEALTH
Section 1115 Demonstration 33 (2018), https://perma.cc/JV3Q-SRXL.
See Letter from Demetrios L. Kouzoukas to Stephen P. Miller, supra note 128, at 1-2.
Arizona pursued many of the concessions other states received in their waivers,
including wellness incentives, exclusion of nonemergency medical transportation,
varied benefit packages, and enforceable premiums and copayments with lockout
periods. See Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., Arizona’s Application for a New
Section 1115 Demonstration: Section I—Program Description 2-6 (n.d.),
https://perma.cc/PSF4-6RFB.
Arkansas added cost sharing and limited nonemergency medical transportation by
requiring prior approval, but its proposed work requirements and asset tests were
rejected. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Expansion in Arkansas 1
(2015), https://perma.cc/JZ9L-5Y3Z; see also David Ramsey, Governor Seeks New
Concessions from CMS to Maintain Arkansas’ Medicaid Expansion, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Feb. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/Q89V-WJWL.
footnote continued on next page

1743

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270

What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018)

Work requirements may be where the transition to the Trump Administration will make the most difference in the Medicaid expansion context.
Former federal officials told us that in trying to make the ACA work during
the end of the Obama Administration, HHS found new ways to compromise.263
Yet one place where President Obama’s HHS consistently drew the line was
work requirements.264 However, the new CMS Administrator Verma—who, as
discussed above, crafted waiver applications with work requirements while
working as a consultant—and then-HHS Secretary Tom Price issued a letter in
March 2017 emphasizing their desire to protect “the most vulnerable
populations” and stating that “[t]he best way to improve the long-term health
of low-income Americans is to empower them with skills and employment.”265
The letter continued: “It is our intent to use existing Section 1115 demonstration authority to review and approve meritorious innovations that build on
the human dignity that comes with training, employment and independence.”266 Thus, the fourth wave is developing to include additional concessions
that will motivate red states to opt in, and it appears that Kentucky’s waiver

263.
264.

265.
266.

Michigan too sought new concessions. See Virgil Dickson, GOP-Led Medicaid Expansion
States Test Limits of CMS Flexibility on Waivers, MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 7, 2015),
https://perma.cc/T2D6-3Y69.
Ohio requested a waiver allowing it to require premium payments for all income
levels; that request was denied along with other proposed features such as lockouts that
would have “exclude[d] individuals from coverage indefinitely until they pa[id] all
arrears.” See Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to John McCarthy, Medicaid
Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Medicaid 1 (Sept. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/EAU6-N78H.
For a summary of states’ waiver requests, see MaryBeth Musumeci et al., The Henry J.
Kaiser Family Found., Section 1115 Medicaid Expansion Waivers: A Look at Key
Themes and State Specific Waiver Provisions (2017), https://perma.cc/Q8ZL-R26W
(comparing requests and flagging questionable application features such as work
requirements and partial expansion). For additional resources tracking recent
developments, see Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Which States Have Approved and Pending
Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc
/W43Q-L8YG; and Musumeci et al., supra note 197.
Third-wave demonstration waivers expire within five years, see Waivers, MEDICAID &
CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/T85C-KVLL (archived
Apr. 24, 2018), creating potential for further negotiation and adaptation as those
waivers are reapproved, amended, or dropped.
See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1, supra
note 213.
See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 5, supra
note 190; Interview with Health Policy Nonprofit Officers 1 (a Former State Official)
and 2 (Aug. 1, 2016) (on file with authors).
See Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, and Seema Verma, CMS Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., to Governor 1-2 (Mar. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/5Q6Q-3B79.
Id. at 2.
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could be the switch that flips other states in the post-Obama realm of ACA
implementation,267 if it survives legal challenges.268
As this Article went to print, Indiana, Arkansas, and New Hampshire had
work requirements approved by CMS in rapid succession.269 Other states are
exploring section 1115 waivers that would include work requirements, cost
sharing, and other novel limitations on Medicaid coverage and benefits.270
But as we have emphasized, movement in Medicaid goes both ways. In a
mirror image to Kentucky’s 2015 election, Democrat John Bel Edwards
rejected prior Republican Governor Bobby Jindal’s nonexpansion politics and
expanded Medicaid eligibility in Louisiana.271 His desire to enroll uninsured
individuals as quickly as possible with a lean administrative staff led Louisiana
to be first to take advantage of a rapid enrollment mechanism that allows states
to use eligibility data for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP), the program commonly known as food stamps, to reach out to
Medicaid-eligible individuals for enrollment.272 By exercising this option,
Louisiana swiftly added more than 300,000 new beneficiaries;273 Louisiana thus
267. See Nicole Huberfeld, Perspective, Can Work Be Required in the Medicaid Program?, 378

268.
269.

270.
271.
272.

273.

NEW ENG. J. MED. 788, 790 (Feb. 7, 2018) (predicting that new Medicaid expansions will
be shaped by CMS’s new policies permitting work requirements).
See, e.g., Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Stewart v.
Hargan, No. 1:18-cv-00152 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2018), 2018 WL 525491.
Indiana’s waiver application was approved three weeks after Kentucky’s. See Letter
from Demetrios Kouzoukas, Principal Deputy Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Allison Taylor, Medicaid Dir., Ind.
Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. 1-2 (Feb. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/R8W2-536U. For
Arkansas’s and New Hampshire’s work requirements, respectively, see Letter from
Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., to Cindy Gillespie, Dir., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. 1-2 (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://perma.cc/G57C-Y8P4; and Letter from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Henry D. Lipman,
Medicaid Dir., N.H. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 1-2 (May 7, 2018),
https://perma.cc/S3XE-PYLQ.
See Musumeci et al., supra note 197.
See Elizabeth Crisp, Louisiana Road to Medicaid Expansion Long, Winding but Finally Here,
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.) (July 5, 2016, 4:17 PM), https://perma.cc/E3ED-92MT.
See Kevin Litten, Louisiana to Use Food Stamp Data for Medicaid Expansion, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.) (updated May 6, 2016, 2:53 PM), https://perma.cc/3GM2CL2S. HHS had encouraged this approach. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for
Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to State Health Official
and State Medicaid Dir. 1-2, 4-5 (May 17, 2013), https://perma.cc/H7VR-PEFE.
See Elizabeth Crisp, Medicaid Expansion Enrollment Tops 300K in Louisiana, ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge, La.) (Sept. 19, 2016, 11:55 AM), https://perma.cc/7NXY-6NN3; Letter
from Vikki Wachino, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., to State Health Official and State Medicaid Dir. 3 (Aug. 31, 2015),
https://perma.cc/23Z5-7JMC (noting that CMS will allow targeted enrollment
through SNAP).
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offered a model for states that may experience political switches that lead to
opting in with a desire to onboard newly eligible beneficiaries quickly, even in
a post-Obama Administration environment.
One former governor told us that the topic of successful strategies for
expansion is a popular one at governors’ closed-door gatherings, especially at
the National Governors Association.274 This is horizontal interaction to be
sure, but it is not states acting in concert or using combined leverage to move
HHS. Rather, states have experienced horizontal learning, leading to a sort of
sibling rivalry, seeking what others acquired plus a little more.
The Medicaid implementation story illustrates our point that this is not a
zero-sum game. Some states “won” concessions through individualized
demonstration waivers. The Obama Administration arguably “lost” by
conceding on the principle of universality in negotiations, allowing states to
reintroduce exclusionary measures like lockout for failure to pay premiums.
But President Obama’s HHS “won” by bringing state after state into the ACA.
States that have not yet negotiated their way to expansion have arguably “lost”
because their uninsurance rates are higher on average than those in states that
expanded.275 Consider Kentucky, which originally adopted an ACA-based
Medicaid expansion but then sought an exclusionary demonstration waiver.276
Is Kentucky cooperative? Is it more sovereign to implement Medicaid
expansion through an SPA or through a negotiated waiver? Each reserves
power and allows choices for the state, and each involves federal standards the
state must observe. Who has won?
Even if we could answer such questions, wins and losses do not necessarily
teach anything about healthcare federalism. It is uncertain whether these
negotiations have been beneficial for health outcomes, or more beneficial than
total nationalization would have been. It seems clearer, however, that these
negotiations increased state power and control within the ACA’s framework
and that these dynamics are continuing into the Trump Administration’s
implementation of the ACA.
B. Federalism Attributes: States as Individual Republics; Local Variation
and Control
It is ironic that federalism scholars often discuss “the states” as if they were
a monolithic bloc, as one of the underpinnings of classic federalism theory is to
recognize each state as a sovereign government—and thus distinguishable from
274. Interview with Former Governor, supra note 213.
275. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Key Facts About the Uninsured Population

app. A at 8 (2017), https://perma.cc/33L8-3JR3; see also id. at 1-3 (discussing continued
obstacles to coverage in states that have not expanded Medicaid).
276. See supra notes 221, 258-61 and accompanying text.
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the next state. The Medicaid expansion highlights these differences and
reinforces the important influence that intrastate politics—and the expression
of state sovereignty that comes with it—has on state interaction with federal
law. Medicaid expansion involved fifty-two different negotiating sovereigns—
each state (plus the District of Columbia) individually and the federal
government. It also involved politically fraught intrastate decisionmaking that
both underscores the important differences among state governors,
legislatures, and administrative agencies in state policymaking and undermines
accounts of modern federalism as dominated by partisanship.
1.

Intrastate differences as a countervailing force to partisanship

Not all states have the same legal or constitutional structure. These
acknowledged differences affect how a state might go about implementing, or
even deciding to implement, a federal program.277
One of our interviewees emphasized that “the lack of knowledge of how
states function is rampant in Congress” and that Congress does not think about
preexisting state regulatory structures when drafting.278 States had different
laws regulating insurance and Medicaid going into the ACA, which affected the
implementation choices they made.279
Internal state actors also diverge from one another in significant ways. In
the Medicaid context, budget considerations, influential healthcare
stakeholders (especially hospitals), and the needs of low-income and rural
citizens turned some red-state governors into Medicaid supporters, even when
they faced resistance from legislators in their own party. For example,
Republican Governor Brewer announced that Arizona would expand, then
faced opposition from legislators; she then called a surprise legislative session
and refused to end it until expansion legislation passed.280 Similar (though less
extreme) circumstances arose in North Dakota and Ohio, each of which also
had a Republican governor supporting expansion over vociferous Republican
legislative protests, but in which expansion ultimately occurred.281
277. Cf., e.g., SHELLY TEN NAPEL ET AL., STATE HEALTH REFORM ASSISTANCE NETWORK,

278.
279.

280.
281.

MANAGING STATE-LEVEL ACA IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH INTERAGENCY
COLLABORATION 4-9 (2012), https://perma.cc/5B8L-ARK4 (encouraging state actors
that have historically had different goals in state policymaking to work together to
implement the ACA).
See Interview with Former Governor, supra note 213.
See Interview with Health Policy Nonprofit Officers 1 (a Former State Official) and 2,
supra note 264; see also Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare
Officials 2, 3, and 4, supra note 29.
See Reinhart, supra note 220.
See Smith, supra note 222; Young, supra note 222; Dan Zak, Spurning the Party Line,
WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/RB8P-4GE7.
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Some governors tried working around legislatures altogether. For instance, Kentucky Governor Beshear (a Democrat) implemented Medicaid
expansion using a longstanding Kentucky law that commanded Medicaid
funds to be maximized.282 He commissioned reports supporting his position,
which then enabled him to instruct the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and
Family Services to expand Medicaid pursuant to state law.283 A lawsuit argued
that he could not expand in this manner—administratively and without
legislative action—but state courts sided with the governor, allowing
expansion to proceed.284 Similarly, Ohio Governor John Kasich (a Republican)
asked the state Controlling Board (a commission that facilitates use of federal
funds outside the legislative budgeting process) to approve the use of available
federal funds for Medicaid expansion.285 This maneuver bypassed the
legislature, which had refused to pass a budget that included expansion.286 In
2017, the legislature enacted a requirement that the state’s Department of
Medicaid seek reapproval by the Controlling Board every six months so as to
limit this kind of workaround.287
In Alaska, Governor Bill Walker (an independent) rejected the antiexpansion policy of Governor Sean Parnell (a Republican) and expanded
through an existing state Medicaid law that automatically accepts federal
eligibility categories labeled as mandatory.288 The Alaska Legislative Council
challenged Governor Walker’s action to expand Medicaid, claiming that NFIB
282. See Sheila Lynch-Afryl, Kentucky Court Rejects Constitutional Challenges to Medicaid

283.
284.

285.
286.
287.

288.

Expansion, Insurance Exchanges, HEALTH L. DAILY (Sept. 5, 2013), https://perma.cc/N9G5
-CJUA; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.520(3) (West 2018) (“[I]t is the policy of the
Commonwealth to take advantage of all federal funds that may be available for medical
assistance.”).
See Press Release, State of Ky., Gov. Beshear Expands Health Coverage to over 300,000
Kentuckians (May 9, 2013), https://perma.cc/P5XY-KMAQ.
See Lynch-Afryl, supra note 282; The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., An Overview of
Actions Taken by State Lawmakers Regarding Medicaid Expansion 4-5 (2015),
https://perma.cc/JQX8-8XV9.
See David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 796-97 (2017)
(detailing the history of Medicaid expansion in Ohio).
See id.
See Andy Chow, Despite Complaints, Medicaid Expansion Funding Approved by Ohio Panel,
WOSU RADIO (Columbus, Ohio) (Oct. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/UT4U-5ELL; Andy
Chow, House Budget Proposes a Tighter Grip on Medicaid Expansion Funds, WKSU (Kent,
Ohio) (May 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/6PGG-KWUW.
See Craig Tuten, Legislature’s Medicaid Expansion Lawsuit Against State Dismissed, ALASKA
COMMONS (Mar. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/UCY4-HQ93 (discussing Governor
Walker’s expansion strategy); Reid Wilson, Alaska Says No to Medicaid Expansion,
WASH. POST: GOVBEAT (Nov. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc/L335-T4KJ (reporting that
Governor Parnell refused to expand Medicaid); see also ALASKA STAT. § 47.07.020(a)
(2017) (“All residents of the state for whom the Social Security Act requires Medicaid
coverage are eligible to receive medical assistance . . . .”).
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had converted the expansion into a Medicaid option that could be implemented only through affirmative legislative changes.289 A state court held that
Alaska could sign on to the expansion over legislative objection.290 The
Legislative Council lost steam and did not appeal the decision.291
In other states, governors commissioned studies of expansion, which have
supported ongoing intrastate negotiations regarding Medicaid expansion.292
Movement toward expansion has continued, even after the Trump
Administration took office.293
On the other hand, some governors who fought expansion were deeply
opposed by their legislatures. For example, in Maine, Governor Paul LePage
vetoed Medicaid expansion five times, leading to a 2017 ballot initiative that
made Maine the first state to expand by referendum.294 And some governors
have supported expansion but have been unable to work around their
legislatures, such as North Carolina Governor Roy Cooper, a Democrat who
attempted to reverse his Republican predecessor’s decision to opt out of

289. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3-5,

290.
291.

292.

293.

294.

Alaska Legislative Council v. Walker, No. 3AN-15-09208 CI, 2016 WL 4073651 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2016), 2016 WL 1257541; see also Tuten, supra note 288 (discussing the
litigation).
See Alaska Legislative Council, 2016 WL 4073651, at *9 (holding that “existing law
required the Governor to provide Medicaid to the expansion group”).
See Tegan Hanlon, Legislative Council Drops Medicaid Lawsuit Against Gov. Walker,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (updated June 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/7CFY-P2X4.
Thanks to Mark Regan for assistance in making the points in this paragraph.
See, e.g., Luke Ramseth, Utah Governor Signs Medicaid Expansion Bill. Now, Utah Waits to
See If the Feds Will Approve It, SALT LAKE TRIB. (updated Mar. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc
/ZDU7-44RS (reporting Utah’s approval of expansion); Press Release, Utah Dep’t of
Health, Medicaid Expansion Options Community Workgroup to Hold First Meeting
(Apr. 22, 2013), https://perma.cc/4VW9-WVJ4; Utah Governor: Don’t Rush to Judgment
on Medicaid Expansion, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2013, 5:02 PM), https://perma.cc
/PMR8-7DWK (reporting on the Utah governor’s commission); see also, e.g., Press
Release, Office of the Governor of Idaho, Governor Appoints Working Groups to
Study Obamacare Questions (July 13, 2012), https://perma.cc/BZS6-4PHE; Gary Rayno,
Governor’s Commission Recommends Expanding State’s Medicaid Program, N.H. HOSP. ASS’N,
https://perma.cc/96XN-BGY9 (archived May 16, 2018).
See, e.g., Rose Hoban, In First Budget, Cooper Pushes for Medicaid Expansion, N.C. HEALTH
NEWS (Mar. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/4TGK-AZHX (reporting that North Carolina
Governor Roy Cooper “remain[ed] at loggerheads” with legislators over his efforts to
expand Medicaid); Bruce Japsen, More States to Expand Medicaid Now That Obamacare
Remains Law, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2017, 9:19 AM), https://perma.cc/Q28J-QBGW
(reporting Kansas’s and North Carolina’s continued efforts to expand).
See Patrick Whittle, Maine OKs Medicaid Expansion in First-of-Its-Kind Referendum,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/J4GC-U9NU.
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Medicaid expansion,295 and Missouri Governor Jay Nixon, a Democrat who
was thwarted by a Republican-dominated legislature.296
Of course, some governors and their legislatures have aligned. For example, Texas Governor Rick Perry submitted a letter to HHS Secretary Sebelius
just days after NFIB, publicly proclaiming that Texas opted out of both the
Medicaid expansion and the exchanges.297 The Texas legislature supported that
letter with legislation preventing compliance.298
We surmise that the reason governors have diverged so much from
legislatures of their own party has to do with governors’ traditional
accountability for state budgets and their longer time horizons.299 Governors
are also likely to feel the heat from industry—such as the ire of the hospitals
that suffered in nonexpansion states—in more focused fashion than any single
legislator.300 It may be easier for legislators to take stands purely for political
reasons.301 Governors, on the other hand, must work with Medicaid
commissioners and (sometimes elected) state insurance commissioners, get
blamed for budget crises, answer to industry, and see benefits in shifting
healthcare costs to the federal government while simultaneously creating more
in-state medical sector jobs.302
295. See Anne Blythe, NC Legislators Drop Lawsuit Challenging Cooper’s Attempt to Expand

296.

297.
298.

299.
300.

301.
302.

Medicaid Under Obamacare, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (updated July 20, 2017,
6:21 PM), https://perma.cc/PU4T-RF4X; David Ranii & Lynn Bonner, Gov. Roy Cooper
Wants to Expand Medicaid; Republicans Vow to Fight, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.)
(updated Jan. 5, 2017, 3:36 PM), https://perma.cc/7D8C-VKK2; Dan Way, McCrory
Announces Limited Medicaid Expansion, CAROLINA J. (Apr. 12, 2016, 12:37 AM),
https://perma.cc/3QQW-E8FL.
See Kyle Cheney, Missouri Nixes Medicaid Expansion, POLITICO (May 8, 2013, 5:19 AM
EDT), https://perma.cc/G4BV-C37P. The newly elected Republican governor opposed
expansion in early 2017. See Austin Huguelet, Despite Failure of GOP Health Care Bill,
Greitens Remains Opposed to Medicaid Expansion, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 28,
2017), https://perma.cc/8JA6-2JEC.
See Letter from Rick Perry, Governor of Tex., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. (July 9, 2012) (on file with authors).
See James Jeffrey, Texas Bill Thwarts Medicaid Expansion Here, AUSTIN BUS. J. (May 28,
2013, 7:32 AM CDT), https://perma.cc/G23R-5FTM; see also Act of June 14, 2013,
ch. 1310, § 6.09, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3409, 3446.
See Interview with Former Governor, supra note 213.
See, e.g., Alexander Hertel-Fernandez et al., Business Associations, Conservative Networks,
and the Ongoing Republican War over Medicaid Expansion, 41 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
239, 244 (2016) (noting that hospitals have pressed states to expand Medicaid); Bruce
Japsen, Pressure on Governors to Expand Medicaid Under ObamaCare, FORBES (Mar. 8,
2014, 10:01 AM), https://perma.cc/3SR4-2WZX (describing pressure on governors).
See, e.g., Hertel-Fernandez et al., supra note 300, at 259-61 (offering the example of
Missouri legislators’ rejection of expansion).
Cf. id. at 250 (“Governors are pivotal state officials and have long played a central role
in Medicaid policy making.”).
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One former governor we interviewed put it this way: “The governor
represents the entire state . . . [and] has to advance a statewide vision to move
the state forward, whereas the legislature tends to be a more reactionary type
body, drawing from small districts.”303 Indeed, as the most recent Republican
efforts to repeal the ACA drew to a close, we saw this dynamic in play once
again. Bipartisan groups of governors allied to protest the repeal legislation.304
Some recent federalism scholarship puts a heavy emphasis on partisan
politics as the primary domain in which modern federalism issues play out.
That narrative is a nationalist narrative to some extent, as inter- and intrastate
differences matter less to it than national party affiliation. But as Rick Hills has
observed, the ACA’s implementation calls this assumption into question.305 For
instance, Jessica Bulman-Pozen argues that states are a proving ground in
which national parties test their policies and claims that the resistance to the
ACA’s implementation was “perfectly partisan.”306 David Schleicher likewise
predicts, as Hills puts it, that state politicians will “march[] in lockstep with
their national counterparts.”307 Schleicher also notes, however, that federalism
theory that emphasizes partisanship may be less relevant when it comes to
governors.308 Our findings substantiate that claim. Schleicher further suggests
that state democracy itself—a key federalism attribute—is strengthened by
these acts of differentiation from the national party.309
The ACA story, to be sure, illustrates a key role for partisanship, but in
many ways the partisanship has been superficial. Our account uncovers an
intrastate dynamic that undermines the lockstep partisan account of statefederal interaction as the only, or even dominant, game in town.

303. Interview with Former Governor, supra note 213.
304. See Letter from John Hickenlooper, Governor of Colo., et al., to Mitch McConnell,

305.

306.

307.

308.
309.

Majority Leader, and Charles E. Schumer, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate (Sept. 19, 2017),
https://perma.cc/6W6Q-DEUL.
See Rick Hills, Governors and the Failure of ACA Repeal: Federalism as Safeguard Against
National Partisan Politics, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 28, 2017, 11:46 AM), https://perma.cc
/KPU2-XLGM.
See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1081, 1098 (2014)
(arguing that both political resistance and litigation against the ACA reflected
partisanship).
See Hills, supra note 305; see also Schleicher, supra note 285, at 765 (“Elections where
voters rely on party preferences developed in relation to another level of government
are common enough worldwide that political scientists have developed a term for
them: ‘second-order elections.’”).
See Schleicher, supra note 285, at 797-98.
See id. at 771.
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2.

Autonomy and local variation

Furthering the point about individual states acting as their own differentiated sovereigns, no state or federal official we interviewed told us that any
states acted jointly in negotiations with HHS.310 The Medicaid expansion did
not play out as a battle between the national government and “the states” as a
collective. Instead, the Obama Administration was a serial negotiator, inking
distinct deals with individual states, all of which watched the others and then
negotiated in their own interests.311
One influential critique of modern federalism theory—Malcolm Feeley and
Edward Rubin’s argument that schemes like the ACA’s offer mere decentralization, not federalism—argues that two key criteria for federalism, even within a
cooperative program, are at least “partial autonomy” and identity with the
state.312 The leverage the states exerted in the ACA’s implementation and the
extent to which they were able to shape their programs so individually seems
to fit within the Feeley-Rubin model of federalism. To us, it is notable in this
vein that state Medicaid programs typically adopt a state-centered identity.
They have names like HIP 2.0, TennCare, and Husky Health, rather than
Indiana Medicaid, Tennessee Medicaid, or Connecticut Medicaid.313
With respect to the kind of variety federalist regimes are expected to
demonstrate, these individual state negotiations produced enormous policy and
legal diversity. Table 1 below offers a snapshot of the wide range of possible
state decisions regarding Medicaid expansion. These decisions include not just
whether to expand Medicaid but also how as a matter of law, when, and with
which negotiated modifications to the ACA’s structure. The breadth of
variations illustrates a classic federalism value in action—local decisionmaking—but with the modern twist of occurring within a national baseline
established by federal law. At the same time, variability across states in
Medicaid access conflicts with a common health policy goal of equality—the
310. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1, supra

note 213; Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3,
and 4, supra note 29; Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare
Official 5, supra note 190; Interview with Former Governor, supra note 213; Interview
with State Policy Organization Officers 1, 2, 3, and 4, supra note 213.
311. One scholar of Canadian federalism wrote: “A common observation is that federalprovincial relations resemble international diplomacy, and often Ottawa’s only option
is to negotiate separate bilateral deals with individual provinces.” JONATHAN A.
RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 263
(2006).
312. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 9, at 16.
313. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, and 4,
supra note 29; see also, e.g., HUSKY HEALTH CONN., https://perma.cc/FF9M-4XJ6
(archived Apr. 30, 2018); TennCare Medicaid, DIVISION TENNCARE, https://perma.cc
/36J9-CPVS (archived Apr. 30, 2018); supra text accompanying notes 250-51.
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very goal the ACA’s universal Medicaid expansion was designed to address.314
A preference for variety and state choices tends to undermine moral aims like
this one in a federalist regime; but of course, this point is not unique to
healthcare.

314. See Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Essay, An Empirical Perspective on Medicaid as

Social Insurance, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 556 (2015) (exploring Medicaid expansion as
social justice); supra Part III.A.
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Table 1
State Decisions Regarding Medicaid Expansion
Covered
Childless
Adults
Before
ACA

Exchange
Design

Challenged
Constitutionality of
Expansion

FFM

✔

FFM

✔

HHS
Approval

Method

Alaska

✔

SPA†

Ariz.

✔

*

FFM

✔

Ark.

✔

Waiver

Cal.

✔

SPA

✔

SBM

State

Type of Waiver

Ala.

First prem. assist.; later work reqs.

SBM-FP

Colo.

✔

SPA

✔

SBM

Conn.

✔

SPA

✔

SBM

Del.

✔

SPA

D.C.

✔

Waiver

✔

SBM

✔

SPM
Beyond ACA

Fla.
Ga.

FFM

✔

FFM

✔

✔

SPA

Ill.

✔

SPA

Ind.

✔

Waiver

Prem. assist.; later work requirements

FFM

✔

Iowa

✔

Waiver

Premium assistance

SPM

✔⌁

FFM-PM

✔

Ky.

✔

Both†

La.

✔

SPA†

FFM

✔
✔

Haw.

FFM

Idaho

SBM

Kan.
First work requirements

SBM-FP

Me.

◊

◊

FFM-PM

Md.

✔

SPA

SBM

Mass.

✔

Waiver

Mich.

✔

Waiver

Minn.

✔

Waiver

Universal coverage

∞

SBM

Beyond ACA

✔

SBM

SPM

Miss.

FFM

Mo.

FFM

Mont.

✔

Waiver

✔

SPA

N.H.

✔

*

N.J.

✔

SPA

N.M.

✔

SPA

N.Y.

✔

Waiver

✔
✔

FFM-PM

Neb.
Nev.

✔

SPM

Prem. assist.; later work requirements

FFM-PM

✔

SBM-FP

✔

SPM

✔

FFM
SBM-FP

Beyond ACA

N.C.

SBM
FFM
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State

HHS
Approval

Method

N.D.

✔

SPA

✔

SPA†

Ohio

Type of Waiver

Okla.

Covered
Childless
Adults
Before
ACA

**

Exchange
Design

Challenged
Constitutionality of
Expansion

FFM

✔

FFM-PM

✔

FFM

Or.

✔

SPA

SBM-FP

Pa.

✔

*

FFM

R.I.

✔

SPA

✔

SBM

S.C.

FFM

✔

S.D.

FFM-PM

✔

Tenn.

FFM

Tex.

FFM

✔

FFM

✔

Utah

✔

Vt.

Waiver

Beyond ACA

SBM

Va.

FFM-PM

Wash.

✔

SPA

W. Va.

✔

SPA

✔

SBM

✔⌁

SPM

Wis.

**

Wyo.

FFM

✔

FFM

✔

FFM = federally facilitated marketplace; SBM = state-based marketplace; SPM = state
partnership marketplace; SBM-FP = state-based marketplace on the federal platform;
FFM-PM = federally facilitated marketplace with state plan management.
† Expansion initiated by executive action.
* Arizona began with expansion by SPA and obtained a waiver in 2016. New
Hampshire started with an SPA but submitted an application for a waiver at
the same time; its application was approved. Pennsylvania set aside its approved waiver after a gubernatorial election, instead expanding by SPA.
** Oklahoma has a state-funded program that helps to pay for the coverage of
individuals earning up to 100% of the FPL and that relies in part on federal funds
that were supposed to end with Medicaid expansion in 2013 but have been renewed on an annual basis due to Oklahoma’s inability to expand. Wisconsin has a
pre-ACA waiver that covers nonelderly adults up to 100% of the FPL; no supermatch applies, but BadgerCare offers more coverage than nonparticipating states.
◊ Maine’s electorate voted to expand Medicaid by ballot initiative in 2017, but
the governor has objected, leading to neither an SPA nor a waiver for expansion at the time this Article went to print.
∞ Massachusetts created universal insurance coverage in 2006 that was a model
for the ACA, but MassHealth put the childless nonelderly adult population in
subsidized private insurance because Medicaid did not match coverage for this
population until the ACA was enacted.
✔⌁ State attorney general and governor took opposite positions.
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Table 1 shows that states have explored a variety of legal structures for
implementing federalist policies. As discussed above, many first- and secondwave states complied with the ACA by using SPAs, the traditional mechanism
for a state to indicate to HHS its strategy for complying with federal Medicaid
law.315 But as also discussed above, states have sought section 1115 demonstration waivers too, both to offer more than the ACA requires and to pursue
variables that push on the baseline of universal coverage enacted in the
ACA.316 In states that have not yet expanded, negotiations are ongoing both
intrastate and intergovernmentally with HHS, and another snapshot one year
in the future would likely offer further variations.
To build on this narrative, Table 2 below offers a different snapshot,
illustrating the variety of policy choices states have made after expanding
Medicaid eligibility. For example, states have used section 1115 waivers to
expand eligibility above the ACA’s baseline; change the method of implementation, such as by providing benefits in the form of premium assistance; or adopt
cost sharing, premiums, healthy behavior or wellness incentives, or work
requirements. The states that have slowly opted in by negotiating their way to
expansion have enjoyed the most policy discretion, seen in the chart by the
numerous policy variations adopted by third- and fourth-wave expansion
states. As discussed in Part IV.A above, each new section 1115 waiver involves
more variation from the federal baseline, and fourth-wave states are leveraging
the option not to expand eligibility that NFIB created and that HHS might not
have been eager to grant if not for the Court’s interference. Table 2 accounts
for expansion waivers and submitted waiver applications but not informal
negotiations.

315. See supra Parts IV.A.1-.2.
316. See supra Part IV.A.
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Table 2
Policy Variations Through Waivers in Medicaid Expansion States
Eligibility
Beyond
ACA

State

Premium
Assistance

Work
Requirements

Premiums
or Cost
Sharing

Lockouts

Wellness
Incentives

Limits on
Nonemergency
Transportation

Health
Savings
Accounts

Alaska
Ariz.

Pending

✔

Ark.

✔

✔
✔

✔
✔

Cal.
Colo.
Conn.
Del.

✔

D.C.
Haw.
Ill.

✔

Ind.

✔*

Iowa

✔

Ky.

✔
✔
✔

✔
✔

✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔

✔

La.
Md.
Mass.

Pending

✔

Mich.
Minn.

✔

✔

✔

✔

Mont.

✔

✔

Pending

Pending

Nev.

✔

N.H.

✔

N.J.
N.M.

✔

✔

N.Y.
N.D.
Ohio

Pending

Or.

⌁

Pa.

⌁

⌁

R.I.

✔

Vt.
Wash.
W. Va.

States have waivers and pending waiver applications for existing Medicaid
programs that echo the policies reflected in the waivers they seek for Medicaid
expansion under the ACA, but nonexpansion waivers are beyond the scope of this
Article, so we focus on expansion population waivers only.
* Iowa initially had approval for premium assistance; later, HHS approved an
amendment to its waiver to enroll the newly eligible population in Medicaid
managed care.
⌁ Pennsylvania began expansion by negotiating a section 1115 waiver but then
switched to ACA-consistent expansion through an SPA.
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V. Insurance Exchange Implementation
Occurring alongside the Medicaid expansion and revealing similar themes,
the implementation of the ACA’s exchanges produced its own surprising array
of options and federalism-related features. This Part describes the ways that
exchange implementation was likely dynamic, adaptive, and marked by
horizontal relationships and intrastate politics. We focus on these themes
rather than on chronological progression because there were less visible waves
of implementation in this context and instead a more fluid environment in
which structures changed and evolved.
The exchange implementation story also turns many traditional federalism assumptions on their heads—or at least sideways. Traditional federalism
characteristics like autonomy, sovereignty, cooperation, experimentation, and
variation show up in unexpected ways in the context of the state-federal
interchange over the exchanges. For instance, it is difficult to predict how
cooperative, disobedient, autonomous, or experimental a state has been merely
from that state’s choice whether to implement its own exchange.
We also saw a recurrent desire in this context for some middle ground
between traditional federalist and nationalist stances. Congress tends to draft
statutes as nationalist or federalist in terms of architecture—with one or fifty
options. But under the ACA, states worked with HHS to devise hybrid statefederal exchange structures that were not envisioned by the ACA’s drafters but
that allowed states to retain control with significant federal support. Some
states preferred instead to model their exchanges on other states’, with a
general consensus emerging that while some variation of exchange structure
may be useful, fifty different exchanges were too many. Some of these state
moves were under the radar for political reasons and thus raise transparency
concerns; hybrid structures obfuscated state cooperation with the national
government while still allowing states to be in de facto control.
To that end, as in the Medicaid context, the exchange implementation also
undermines the account, popular both in the media and among some
federalism scholars, that partisanship above all else drove intergovernmental
relations under the ACA. Simultaneous with the public political resistance and
in direct tension with it, many red states actually worked quietly with the
federal government to devise the best policies for their states. In many cases,
these moves were precipitated by similar kinds of divergences among
intrastate actors that we highlighted in the Medicaid account, for example,
with state insurance commissioners bucking governors of their own party to
cooperate.
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A. Cooperation, Resistance, and Autonomy in Dynamic Exchange
Implementation
Like the Medicaid expansion, the exchange implementation rolled out
with a first wave, but the states’ exchange stances since then have been much
more fluid and unpredictable. All of the states except Alaska applied for and
received the initial, no-strings-attached exchange planning grants made
available in the fall of 2010, shortly after the ACA was enacted.317 Approximately three-fifths of the states also jumped in within months of the statute’s
enactment to exercise their option to operate their own transitional high-risk
pools for those with preexisting conditions.318 In February 2011, HHS also
awarded “early innovator” grants to six states—Kansas, Maryland, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Wisconsin—and to a consortium of New England
states—Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont—all of
which declared interest in developing exchange information technology that
could be adapted and implemented by other states.319 These states emerged
early out of an apparent desire to position themselves as thought leaders. By
mid-2013, forty-six states had received $3.6 billion in planning, implementation, and early innovator grants.320
But politics quickly turned the tide firmly against working with HHS after
the initial grant phase. The NFIB litigation both sowed uncertainty about the
ACA’s future—making states more reluctant to jump out in front and establish
exchanges that might ultimately be struck down—and turned opposition to the
statute into a Republican loyalty litmus test. Soon, Kansas, Oklahoma, and
Wisconsin returned their early innovator grants, other states returned their
exchange planning grants, and most red states declined to establish their own
exchanges at all.321
This resistance was unexpected. The most federalism-oriented states
were expected to exercise their federally offered right of first refusal to
317. See ANNIE L. MACH & C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43066, FEDERAL

318.
319.
320.
321.

FUNDING FOR HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 2 & n.6 (2014); Establishing Health
Insurance Marketplaces: An Overview of State Efforts, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (updated
Mar. 11, 2013), https://perma.cc/K4RX-MCME.
See Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: The Web Portal and Early Retiree
Reinsurance, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 6, 2010), https://perma.cc/6MUU-ECWR.
See MACH & REDHEAD, supra note 317, at 2-3, 4 tbl.I.
See Establishing Health Insurance Marketplaces, supra note 317.
See MACH & REDHEAD, supra note 317, at 2-3; Sarah Kliff, It’s Official: The Feds Will Run
Most Obamacare Exchanges, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Feb. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc
/FC89-A3AS. Nevertheless, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia applied for
and received Level 1 exchange establishment grants, which provided funds for states to
take steps toward establishing a state-based exchange without needing to meet the
specific exchange structure and governance requirements for a Level 2 grant. See MACH
& REDHEAD, supra note 317, at 2.
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implement the federal program at the state level, as we see in other similarly
structured schemes. It was expected that states would want the ability to
tailor their own programs to their particular needs and that states would
view the federal statute as encroaching less on state domains if states
controlled implementation.322 This was a key point in the original Medicaid
statute’s implementation and in those of predecessor programs.323 It was also
emphasized by Republicans early in the ACA’s implementation. One
prominent Republican said that letting the federal government operate a
state’s insurance exchange would be a “Trojan horse” paving the way for a
full-scale federal takeover.324 But the hot politics of the ACA trumped
traditional federalism perspectives and reversed the usual course. Notably,
states would have had this policy autonomy even without NFIB; the Court’s
holding had nothing to do with insurance exchanges. NFIB’s effect with
respect to the exchanges was on the choices states made rather than on the
existence of choice in the first place.
The paradoxical outcome was that the most anti-ACA states were the
same states inviting the federal government to take over their insurance
markets. The intention was to be seen as doing nothing to cooperate with
“Obamacare.”325 The result has been a much more robust role for the federal
government in running state insurance markets than Congress and many
states ever expected.326
There were surprises, too, even within the (typically blue) states that
rushed to implement their own exchanges. As in our Medicaid account—indeed
more so—extensive back-and-forth movement between state and federal
structures emerged in the exchanges. Some states have moved back and forth
between running their own exchanges and using federally operated exchanges.
Oregon, which created its own exchange, defaulted to the federal exchange
platform because of intractable technical issues.327 In the reverse direction, as
further detailed below, some Republican states like Kansas worked out deals
behind the scenes that effectively put their exchanges under state control,
322. Cf. Gluck, supra note 1, at 572-74 (describing how allowing states to implement federal
323.
324.
325.

326.
327.

programs may be more “politically palatable” in areas of traditional state control).
See Huberfeld, supra note 58, at 441-45.
See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Yes to State Exchanges, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 6, 2012, 5:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/FZQ4-TQHE.
See Interview with Former Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, and 4, supra
note 29 (“Obamacare is a bad word.”); Interview with State Policy Organization Officers
1, 2, 3, and 4, supra note 213.
See supra Part III.
See Jeff Manning, Cover Oregon: $248 Million State Exchange to Be Jettisoned in Favor of
Federal System, OREGONIAN (updated Apr. 25, 2014, 11:30 PM), https://perma.cc/C9MB
-4XNV.
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moving from red to blue in practice, even though they are still formally labeled
federal exchanges for purposes of political cover (and simplicity of reporting
and paperwork).328 Kentucky rhetorically opposed the ACA at the national
political level but still adopted a highly successful state exchange under
Governor Beshear—with the state-identified name Kynect.329 His successor
dismantled Kynect in opposition to the ACA—not because it was failing; it was
a “model” exchange by all accounts.330
These details bring to the surface questions about how useful it is, as
federalism scholars are wont to do, to focus on cooperation, and even
sovereignty, in complex state-federal schemes. For example, Texas used a
federal exchange in protest against the ACA. Was Oregon more “cooperative”
and Texas more “sovereign” merely because the latter resisted, the former
didn’t, yet both wound up with the same structure? Was Kentucky or Kansas
more “autonomous”? Both have been calling their own shots, but only
Kentucky ever had its own exchange.
This kind of analysis also raises the very difficult question about how we
could have a theory of federalism that turns on mere motivation. Taking the
example above, Texas is only more federalist because of its attitude. Constitutionalists would shudder at the thought that federalism could be so malleable or
subjective. Consider, for example, two states—New Mexico and Texas—both of
which have exchanges operated by the federal government and so as a formal
matter look identical from a structural federalism perspective. But each state’s
control is very different across its exchange. As Table 3 below illustrates, New
Mexico relies on the federal exchange platform but actually operates many
aspects of its own exchange, including conducting plan management and
consumer assistance; setting its own geographic rating areas, reinsurance, and
risk adjustment formulas; and running rate reviews and medical loss ratio
328. See Christine H. Monahan, Safeguarding State Interests in Health Insurance Exchange

Establishment, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 375, 424 (2015) (“In February 2013, the Kansas Insurance
Commissioner sent a letter to the director of [the Center for Consumer Information
and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO)] explaining that while there was ‘no political support
for a partnership arrangement,’ the state would like approval to perform plan
management functions (such as certifying that health plans met state and federal
statutory and regulatory requirements) on behalf of the federally run exchange.”
(quoting Letter from Sandy Praeger, Comm’r of Ins., Kan. Ins. Dep’t, to Gary Cohen,
Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight 1 (Feb. 15, 2013), https://perma.cc/KE6E
-ZJFQ)).
329. See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, What Did Mitch McConnell Mean When He Suggested the Kentucky
State Exchange Was “Unconnected” to Obamacare?, WASH. POST (May 29, 2014),
https://perma.cc/T29B-FDZ6; see also Editorial, Say Again, Senator, ACA Unkynected?,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (updated July 18, 2014, 9:52 PM), https://perma.cc/6X54
-X4DA.
330. See Amber Phillips, Kentucky, Once an Obamacare Exchange Success Story, Now Moves to
Shut It Down, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Jan. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/KHA5-ZWBP.
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compliance. Texas has declined to operate an exchange, enforce any reform
provisions like medical loss ratio compliance, or set its own geographic rating
areas. Now who looks more federalist and autonomous? Is it sufficient to put all
these categories aside and say that states got to make their own choices and that is
enough for federalism?
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Table 3
Exchange Structure and Policy Control331
State

Type of
Individual
Exchange

State Enforcing
Compliance with
Reform
Provisions

State Set
Geographic
Rating Areas

State Sought
Medical Loss
Ratio Adjustment
from Federal
Standard

State Conducting
Effective Rate
Reviews

Ala.

FFM

✔

Alaska

FFM

✔

✔

✔
✔

Ariz.

FFM

✔

✔

✔

Ark.

SBM-FP

✔

✔

✔

Cal.

SBM

✔

✔

✔

Colo.

SBM

✔

✔

✔

Conn.

SBM

✔

✔

✔

Del.

SPM

✔

✔

D.C.

SBM

✔

✔

✔

✔

Fla.

FFM

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

Ga.

FFM

✔

✔

Haw.

FFM

✔

✔

✔

Idaho

SBM

✔

✔

✔

Ill.

SPM

✔

✔

Ind.

FFM

✔

✔

✔

✔

Iowa

SPM

✔

✔

✔

✔

Kan.

FFM-PM

✔

✔

✔

✔

Ky.

SBM-FP

✔

✔

✔

✔

La.

FFM

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

✔

Me.

FFM-PM

✔

✔

Md.

SBM

✔

✔

✔

Mass.

SBM

✔

✔

✔

Mich.

SPM

✔

✔

Minn.

SBM

✔

✔

✔

✔
✔

Miss.

FFM

✔

✔

✔

Mo.

FFM

✔

✔

331. Data in this table were drawn from the following sources: Compliance and Enforcement,

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc/UVT4-4WEA (archived
Apr. 23, 2018); Market Rating Reforms, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://perma.cc/J2F9-QUB5 (last updated Apr. 20, 2018); State Effective Rate Review
Programs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc/N7KU-8P9Z (last
updated Mar. 17, 2017); State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, KAISER FAM.
FOUND., https://perma.cc/V5N8-PXMP (archived Apr. 23, 2018); and State Requests for
MLR Adjustment, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc/K5XP
-Q36K (archived Apr. 23, 2018).
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State Sought
Medical Loss
Ratio Adjustment
from Federal
Standard

State

Type of
Individual
Exchange

State Enforcing
Compliance with
Reform
Provisions

State Set
Geographic
Rating Areas

Mont.

FFM-PM

✔

✔

Neb.

FFM-PM

✔

✔

Nev.

SBM-FP

✔

✔

✔

✔

N.H.

SPM

✔

✔

✔

✔

N.J.

FFM

✔

✔

N.M.

SBM-FP

✔

N.Y.

SBM

✔

✔

N.C.

FFM

✔

✔

N.D.

FFM

✔

Ohio

FFM-PM

✔

✔

State Conducting
Effective Rate
Reviews

✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
✔

✔

✔

✔
✔

✔

Okla.

FFM

Or.

SBM-FP

✔

✔

✔

Pa.

FFM

✔

✔

✔

R.I.

SBM

✔

✔

✔

S.C.

FFM

✔

✔

✔

S.D.

FFM-PM

✔

✔

✔

Tenn.

FFM

✔

✔

✔
✔

Tex.

FFM

Utah

FFM

✔

✔

✔

Vt.

SBM

✔

✔

✔

Va.

FFM-PM

✔

Wash.

SBM

✔

✔

W. Va.

SPM

✔

✔

Wis.

FFM

✔

✔

Wyo.

FFM

✔
✔
✔
✔

✔

FFM = federally facilitated marketplace; SBM = state-based marketplace; SPM = state
partnership marketplace; SBM-FP = state-based marketplace on the federal platform;
FFM-PM = federally facilitated marketplace with state plan management.

We return to the subjects of autonomy and sovereignty in Part VI below.
But the state and federal officials we interviewed consistently emphasized that
states had “enormous autonomy” in developing their exchanges if they wished
to participate—regardless whether the exchange structure was state or
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federal.332 Indeed, states that have engaged with implementation have retained
much more control over their insurance markets’ policy design than those that
have resisted any role.
As Table 3 illustrates, the structure has been less important than the state’s
own involvement. States that ran their own exchanges did not necessarily
exert more control over exchange policy than did states defaulting to the
federal model. The key to policy control was participation and engagement
within the federal statutory scheme regardless whether it was formally
structured as state or federally implemented. For example, Kansas and Maine
defaulted to federal exchanges but opted to maintain significant control over
their health insurance markets. Both states conduct plan management, enforce
compliance with reform provisions, sought adjustments to medical loss ratios,
and conduct rate reviews.
* * *
The change of administration has added an important wrinkle to our
account. Until recently, the experience of the exchanges was mostly
interchangeable regardless of structural platform. But in 2017, some noticeable
differences emerged between state- and federally operated exchanges. Whereas
under the Obama Administration, states with federal exchanges received as
much, if not more, federal support as states with their own exchanges, the
Trump Administration has moved to strangle the exchanges as part of its
larger effort to destabilize the ACA.333 Federally operated exchanges are more
susceptible to these hostile efforts simply because the federal government has
more control over them.
One salient example occurred in the context of open enrollment, the key
period during which individuals must sign up for insurance. Whereas states
with their own exchanges retain control over enrollment periods and
advertising efforts, the Trump Administration slashed funding, canceled
332. See Interview with Health Policy Nonprofit Officers 1 (a Former State Official) and 2,

supra note 264; see also Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare
Official 1, supra note 213.
333. See Exec. Order No. 13,813, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,385 (Oct. 12, 2017) (directing agencies to
explore options to pull healthy individuals off of the exchanges); Market Stabilization,
82 Fed. Reg. 18,346, 18,381 (Apr. 18, 2017) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 155.410(e) (2017))
(ending the open enrollment period on December 15, 2017, rather than January 31,
2018); Abbe Gluck, President Trump Admits He’s Trying to Kill Obamacare. That’s Illegal.,
VOX (Oct. 17, 2017, 1:40 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/Q2P7-EQAE (detailing the Trump
Administration’s efforts to stifle open enrollment, cut advertising and navigator
funding, and cut off payments to the insurance industry); Shelby Gonzales, Trump
Administration Slashing Funding for Marketplace Enrollment Assistance and Outreach, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES: OFF THE CHARTS (Sept. 1, 2017, 1:30 PM),
https://perma.cc/C8UY-3RZV (discussing the Trump Administration’s decision to cut
funding for consumer outreach and navigator programs).
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outreach events, and cut the 2017 enrollment period in half for those states on
the federal exchange.334 The irony of course is that it is the red states that are
suffering most—that have lost the most autonomy—because they refused to
implement the statute in the first place.
In a further irony, this dynamic made state Republican officials some of
the most important advocates for sustaining the ACA in 2017. A bipartisan
governors’ letter was a pivotal turning point in one of the failed attempts to
repeal the ACA in the summer of 2017.335 Republican governors took to the
media in the fall of 2017 to protest the Administration’s moves to cut funding
to insurers and destabilize the exchanges.336
But another twist was underway at the time this Article went to print. Idaho,
one of the few red states that chose to run its own exchange,337 used that freedom
in 2017 to try to create a parallel marketplace to allow for lower-cost, lessregulated off-exchange plans.338 The Trump Administration refused to allow
that move339 but followed by proposing its own series of reforms, available to
states with all kinds of exchanges, that would allow any state to move more
people out of ACA plans and into different types of less-regulated plans.340
Critics argue that these proposals, if finalized, will destabilize the Act.341
334. See, e.g., Timothy Jost, CMS Cuts ACA Advertising by 90 Percent amid Other Cuts to Enrollment

335.

336.
337.

338.
339.

340.

341.

Outreach, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/7XER-6LYL (reporting 90%
cuts in advertising and 40% cuts in funding to insurance navigator programs).
See Letter from John Hickenlooper et al. to Mitch McConnell and Charles E. Schumer, supra
note 304; see also Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, Governors from Both Parties Denounce
Senate Obamacare Repeal Bill, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/P529-CPXH.
See, e.g., Jeff Stein, “It’s Going to Hurt Everybody”: Nevada’s GOP Governor Rips Trump over
ACA Sabotage, VOX (Oct. 13, 2017, 2:40 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/EVG6-T4M9.
See About, IDAHO INS. MARKETPLACE, https://perma.cc/BN4M-LRB8 (archived Apr. 23, 2018);
see also Louise Norris, Idaho and the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG
(Apr. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/5YRT-DBPD (reporting that Idaho has not expanded
Medicaid but that an effort to expand via ballot initiative is underway).
See Press Release, Office of the Governor of Idaho, Governor Directs Development of
Guidelines for More Affordable Health Coverage (Jan. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/Z7N9-ZXZC.
See Letter from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., to C.L. “Butch” Otter, Governor of Idaho, and Dean L. Cameron,
Dir., State of Idaho Dep’t of Ins. 1-2 (Mar. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/2G48-NJCG.
See, e.g., Short-Term, Limited-Duration Insurance, 83 Fed. Reg. 7437, 7438, 7445-47
(proposed Feb. 21, 2018) (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 and 45 C.F.R.)
(expanding the possible duration of short-term, off-exchange plans from three to up to
twelve months); Definition of “Employer” Under Section 3(5) of ERISA—Association
Health Plans, 83 Fed. Reg. 614, 615, 634-36 (proposed Jan. 5, 2018) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. §§ 2510.3-3, -5) (expanding the definition of “employer” to allow more plans to
qualify as association health plans that need not comply with all ACA requirements).
See Dylan Scott, Trump’s New Plan to Poke Holes in the Obamacare Markets, Explained, VOX
(Feb. 20, 2018, 10:10 AM EST), https://perma.cc/2WC7-M9HD (explaining these
proposals and their risks).
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On the one hand, then, the choice between a state-led and federal structure
may be more significant than it initially appeared. With an administration
pitted against the statute, states that do not go out on their own are suddenly
less stable—and indeed less autonomous—than they were just months earlier,
simply because a hostile caretaker is now in control. But on the other hand, the
Administration is treating all states alike—regardless of exchange structure—
when it comes to its new offers of flexibility of design. Again, national does not
mean uniform, even when the federal government is running the exchange.
To some federalism scholars, the rapidity with which the context of state
autonomy keeps shifting may further the point that federalism was never
there in the first place. They may argue that it is too contingent to be truly
federalist—a criticism they might level at all forms of intrastatutory
federalism. But a statute drafted differently could have given more protection
from interference to federal-exchange states. We can draw from constitutional
law for the sovereignty values we may wish to further but then recognize that
those are being effectuated through Congress’s policy choices in statutory
design. That may make them more or less stable depending on how the statute
defines the parameters of the state-federal relationship.
B. Under-the-Radar Adaptation and Engagement: Hybrid Federalism and
the “Secret Boyfriend Model”
Extraordinary adaptivity also emerged in exchange implementation.
Creative solutions developed in large part from the tension between the
political pressure on state officials to publicly “resist” the ACA342 and the
practical view many of those same officials held that it was not in the longterm interests of the states—their sovereign interests—to cede full control of
their insurance markets to the federal government.
Congress’s initial structural allocation turned out to be more of a starting
point than the endpoint in terms of the exchange designs that emerged. New
structures developed in part because Congress’s initial allocation was far too
simplistic: Congress assumed that state choices would be of the either-or
variety—state or federal. They turned out to be far more complex.
1.

Split exchanges

Some states adapted through a kind of compromise—a purple-state
solution of sorts—choosing to run their own state exchanges in part but
342. See generally Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based

Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 113-18, 161-68 (2010) (describing the political pressures to resist implementation of the ACA and the value in state
officials’ publicly opposing the law).
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relying on the federal government for another part. For instance, Mississippi
and Utah ran their own state-based exchanges for small businesses but carved
out the individual insurance exchanges for the federal government to run.343
This move was mostly political. The ACA’s highly controversial individual
mandate was the focal point of political resistance and was closely associated
with the individual market and its exchange. As a result, states like Utah
refused to take any action that could be seen as supportive of the mandate, even
as those states implemented other parts of the ACA and ceded power to the
federal government in politically resisting the law.344
2.

Hybrid exchanges: federalism born of necessity, federalism in
secret

A more complex category of exchanges—and a salient example of pragmatic administration—comes in the context of the so-called hybrid exchanges,
which blend state and federal management functions and come in many
different forms. The hybrid exchange was a model developed by HHS in a
guidance document early in the ACA’s implementation, with the goal of
attracting more states to engage.345 One high-level federal interviewee told us
that it had become clear that many states did not want the binary choice
Congress had laid out; they wanted to be able to rely on the federal government
for as much as they individually needed but still wanted policy control.346
343. See Jeff Amy, Mississippi to Create Small Business Health Insurance Exchange, INS. J. (Sept. 9,

2013), https://perma.cc/FM5R-ZZDE; Louise Norris, Utah Health Insurance Marketplace:
History and News of the State’s Exchange, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://perma.cc/GPC9-73GG (noting that Utah had been running its own small
business exchange but is now moving to the federal platform).
344. Ironically, Utah was (along with Massachusetts) the state most often invoked as a
“model” for the ACA’s state-based exchanges during the statute’s drafting process before
politics drove its compromise solution. Utah, which had established an “open”
exchange (essentially letting all insurers in without screening) prior to the ACA, was
held up as an example of a state that had conducted a different kind of exchange
experiment than Massachusetts in discussions of how capacious the states’ options
were in exchange design. See Gregg Girvan, Consumer Power: Five Lessons from Utah’s
Health Care Reform, BACKGROUNDER 2 (2010), https://perma.cc/KVH4-467U (“State
lawmakers who want to maintain the independence of their state’s health care system
and fiscal future in the wake of the new federal law should consider Utah’s recent
experience with health care reform.”); Robert Pear, Health Care Overhaul Depends on
States’ Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2010), https://perma.cc/34L2-KYAB (“Massachusetts and Utah provide a glimpse of the future, and they offer radically different models
for other states.”).
345. See Memorandum from Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Affordable Insurance Exchanges Guidance: Guidance on the State
Partnership Exchange 1 (Jan. 3, 2013), https://perma.cc/FZN6-6TD8.
346. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, and 4,
supra note 29.
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Another official told us that some states wanted more control but needed
political cover—a way to keep up appearances that the federal government was
still in charge so as not to appear in betrayal of the red-state resistance.347
The hybrids were thus a type of blended entity born of necessity. Reacting
to the changed landscape after NFIB and concerned that fewer states than
expected were running their own exchanges, HHS helped design federally run
exchanges that were heavily supported by the federal government but still
directed on the policy front by states.348 Seven states took up this hybrid
possibility: Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, and
West Virginia.349 Those states were given a choice under the hybrid model of
whether to conduct their own plan management activities, consumer
assistance, outreach, and education.350 The federal government took on any
remaining supportive and administrative responsibilities.351
To our view, these hybrid exchanges may be the ultimate instantiation of
cooperative federalism: a regime in which the federal government does what it
does best, offering administrative support and maximizing the advantages of
centralization and economies of scale, while giving states a platform to design
and run their own programs. Arkansas switched to a state-based exchange for
2017, and the hybrid model provided the means for that transition to more
state control.352 But the idea of “cooperating” with the federal government in
this way was still politically taboo for many state actors. One puerile problem
was that the hybrid exchanges were called “partnership” exchanges, and some
states did not want to appear to be in “partnership” with the Obama
Administration.353
347. See id.; see also Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1,

supra note 213.
348. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, and 4,

supra note 29.
349. See Letters, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc/A4GU-VN7D

350.
351.
352.

353.

(archived Apr. 23, 2018) (compiling approval letters for states’ exchanges, including
seven that applied to adopt a partnership model).
See Memorandum from Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, supra note 345, at 1.
See id. at 17-18.
See Louise Norris, Arkansas Health Insurance Marketplace: History and News of the State’s
Exchange, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Mar. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/EAP9-CXMT (“For
the first three years of exchange implementation, Arkansas had a partnership exchange
for individuals, but as of 2017 . . . , [it has] a state-based exchange using the federal
enrollment platform . . . .”).
See Monahan, supra note 328, at 423-24; Interview with Former Federal Executive
Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3, and 4, supra note 29; Interview with State Policy
Organization Officers 1, 2, 3, and 4, supra note 213; cf. Leonard, supra note 342, at 162
(“[R]hetorical federalism acknowledges that federalism arguments have political
salience aside from earnest concerns about the federal structure.”).
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Another problem was the intrastate political arena. Some insurance
commissioners and other lower-level state officials wanted to retain control
over state insurance markets, even as governors and legislatures refused to run
their own exchanges out of public resistance.354 For example, another seven
states—Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, and
Virginia—did not opt in to the hybrid model for these political reasons, but
they did not want full-scale federal exchanges either.355 As a result, these states
actually took on significant exchange management functions, but they needed
to keep these decisions relatively secret.
Sometimes state moves were so discreet that it appeared that one arm of
the government was trying to hide its actions from another. Take Kansas as an
example.356 Its state insurance department designed a plan for a hybrid
exchange, desiring to retain control over its insurance markets rather than
cede that power to the federal government.357 However, under HHS’s hybrid
exchange guidance, the governor was required to sign off on a state’s hybrid
exchange “blueprint.”358 Kansas’s governor refused to “partner” with the
Obama Administration, even as the insurance commissioner pressured for that
result.359
In response, HHS adapted again. Less than one week later, HHS announced
a new hybrid option, this time called state “plan management.”360 Plan
management exchanges do not require formal gubernatorial approval but
rather require only informal communications between the federal government
and state insurance commissioners, thereby allowing state commissioners to
get around resistant state capitols.361
Thus, in these seven states, the state commissioners, sometimes at odds
with the political interests of their own governors, were making decisions and
quietly running important aspects of their exchanges even as governors
354. David K. Jones et al., Pascal’s Wager: Health Insurance Exchanges, Obamacare, and the

355.
356.
357.
358.

359.
360.
361.

Republican Dilemma, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 97, 114, 121, 125 (2014) (detailing
conflicts between insurance commissioners and governors in three states).
See Monahan, supra note 328, at 415-16.
This narrative largely is drawn from Christine Monahan’s work. See id. at 415-16, 42324.
See id.
See Blueprint for Approval of Affordable State-Based and State Partnership Insurance
Exchanges—Frequently Asked Questions, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (May 16,
2012), https://perma.cc/6ZLS-E6GE (noting that a state pursuing a partnership
exchange must submit an “Exchange Blueprint” containing an “Exchange Model
Declaration Letter” from the governor).
See Monahan, supra note 328, at 423-24.
See id.
See id.
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continued to publicly pledge their steadfast resistance to cooperating with the
administration of the ACA. While there are a few states in which the insurance
department has refused to implement the ACA, most state insurance
departments are actively engaged, even in states with federally facilitated
exchanges.362
These models raise transparency and accountability concerns, which we
discuss further in Part VI below. One of our federal official interviewees
colorfully dubbed these interactions the “secret boyfriend model”: states that
wanted the assistance the federal government offered but were afraid to admit
it to the public or even to other parts of state government.363 HHS even helped
these states market their supposedly uncooperative exchange efforts to provide
political cover.364
Another type of hybrid emerged to help states that tried to establish their
own marketplaces but failed. Known as “State-Based Marketplace-Federal
Platform” exchanges, these are exchanges in which the states make all of the
policy decisions but rely on the federal government’s HealthCare.gov IT
platform.365 Five states currently have this kind of exchange, including Oregon
and New Mexico, which both had tried to operate fully state-based exchanges
but failed for technical reasons.366 In 2015, this option allowed Arkansas to
transition from a federal exchange to assuming full policy control over its
marketplace without having to assume the risk of setting up a new technical
platform.367 Hawaii, in contrast, transitioned in 2016 from this model to a full
federal exchange.368

362. Only four states have refused to enforce compliance with insurance reform provisions.

See supra Table 3.
363. See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Officials 2, 3 and, 4,

supra note 29 (statement of Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 3).
364. See id.
365. See State-Based Exchanges, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc

/92WD-RVMS (last updated Sept. 15, 2017); State Health Insurance Marketplace Types,
2018, supra note 331. For further discussion of this model, see Christopher Koller,
Supported State-Based Marketplaces: The Point of Convergence?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 11,
2015), https://perma.cc/C8UD-7WUM.
366. See State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, supra note 331 (listing states by
exchange type); see also Rosalie Rayburn, Plans for State-Run Health Exchange Dropped,
ALBUQUERQUE J. (Apr. 8, 2015, 2:26 PM), https://perma.cc/C5WE-6NDC; Gosia
Wozniacka, Oregon Dropping Online Health Exchange for U.S. Site, BELLINGHAM HERALD
(Bellingham, Wash.) (updated Apr. 26, 2014, 12:07 AM), https://perma.cc/X4NQ-2C6K.
367. See State Marketplace Profiles: Arkansas, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2013),
https://perma.cc/E52Q-N55Z.
368. See Louise Norris, Hawaii Health Insurance Marketplace: History and News of the State’s
Exchange, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Mar. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/6KHQ-97WL.
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In short, HHS developed a wide continuum of structural options along the
spectrum from state to federal to engage as many states as possible in
implementation. In most cases the key to state autonomy was the level of
engagement, not the formal structure.
C. Horizontal Federalism in Exchange Implementation: More
Cooperation than Competition
The ACA included in its insurance reforms a formal mechanism for stateto-state cooperation: States could establish “regional” exchanges, combining
insurance pools and regulations into a single market.369 As it turns out, the
ACA’s stated vision of horizontal federalism did not materialize—no states
established regional exchanges.370 But other forms of horizontal federalism
developed on the ground, including robust state networks and an important
role for quasi-official state organizations in coordinating implementation.
Several thought-leader states also emerged and played important roles in
disseminating information and experience to later-moving states.
1.

Interstate cooperation

Interstate cooperation has been a dominant feature of exchange implementation. This is different from the Medicaid story, which has been more
competitive across states.371 Some of this cooperation was facilitated by formal
networks states used to share information and coordinate efforts. These
include the networks of “early innovator” states—states that took the lead in
implementation and so served as a model for others.372 Other interstate
networks were supported by federal entities as well as quasi-governmental
organizations, including the Center for Consumer Information and Insurance
Oversight (CCIIO);373 the Health Care Reform Regulatory Alternatives
Working Group of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners;374
the State Health Exchange Leadership Network of the National Academy for
369. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(f)(1), 124
370.
371.
372.

373.
374.

Stat. 119, 179 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2016)).
See Sarah Dash et al., Health Insurance Exchanges and State Decisions 2 (2013),
https://perma.cc/VK28-U484.
See supra Part IV.
See States Leading the Way on Implementation: HHS Awards “Early Innovator” Grants to
Seven States, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://perma.cc/3EK8-BNWD
(archived Apr. 23, 2018).
See id. (describing a CCIIO grant to “a multi-state consortium led by the University of
Massachusetts Medical School”).
See Health Care Reform Regulatory Alternatives (B) Working Group, NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMMISSIONERS, https://perma.cc/GJ3G-YU4H (archived Apr. 23, 2018).
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State Health Policy;375 the National Governors Association; and the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).376 The ACA empowered and
formalized some of these horizontal networks. The most salient example is
that the ACA explicitly directed HHS to involve the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners in implementation.377
Informal networks also emerged to trade information and coordinate
efforts. These included technical assistance networks facilitated by the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation,378 the network of states that cooperated in the
Enroll UX 2014 project to design user interfaces,379 informal networks of
exchange officials who hired the same consultants and contractors,380 the
informal network of states working in opposition to the ACA supported by the
American Legislative Exchange Council,381 and unofficial relationships that
emerged out of formal networks, conferences, and workshops. One former
federal official we interviewed recalled helping to organize regular meetings
between state officials, so-called “learning collaboratives” facilitated by HHS, to
enable state success in implementing exchanges and to share information
between states for troubleshooting.382
Unlike in the Medicaid context, in creating exchanges, states did band
together to exert leverage on the federal government for collective goals. For
example, Christine Monahan has described how an informal group of states
defaulting to federal exchanges cooperated to retain plan management
functions: “Their collective advocacy ultimately resulted in the creation of the
‘marketplace plan management option’ by which states could conduct plan
management on behalf of the federally run exchange . . . .”383 Similarly, a group
375. See State Health Exchange Leadership Network, NAT’L ACAD. FOR ST. HEALTH POL’Y,

https://perma.cc/3RR9-ESRP (archived Apr. 23, 2018).
376. See Interview with Health Policy Nonprofit Officers 1 (a Former State Official) and 2,

377.

378.
379.
380.
381.

382.
383.

supra note 264 (detailing the support for state coordination from federal and other
entities).
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1311(c)(1)(F),
1321(a)(2), 1333(a), 1341(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 174, 186, 206-07, 209 (2010) (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Monahan, supra note 328, at 409-14 (describing
some of the efforts of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners).
See, e.g., About Us, ST. NETWORK, https://perma.cc/9FYT-J5FB (archived Apr. 23, 2018).
See Who’s Involved, ENROLL UX 2014, https://perma.cc/U3A2-AYDK (archived Apr. 23,
2018).
See infra notes 391-92 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Christie Herrera, Health Care Freedom Makes a Big Impact in 2012, AM. LEGIS.
EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Mar. 26, 2012), https://perma.cc/2P3U-VLGE (describing state
efforts growing out of the organization’s initiative).
See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 5, supra
note 190.
Monahan, supra note 328, at 415-16.
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of partnership exchange states coordinated efforts to persuade the CCIIO not to
require them to enter into formal memoranda of understanding, thereby
avoiding a potential political problem for state officials.384 While our sense
from the interviews is that the advocacy was also coming from the other
direction—from HHS and the White House—this is nevertheless a good
example of how informal horizontal networks can be an effective method of
federalism negotiation.
State networking efforts like these have received some recent attention in
the new federalism literature. For example, political scientist John Nugent has
argued that these organizations are critical players in “safeguarding
federalism”—in the form of helping states leverage and interact with the
federal government—in the context of a national scheme with key potential
state roles.385 Our study lends support to that account.
2.

Thought-leader states

Another dimension of horizontal federalism in the exchange context was
visible in the emergence of thought-leader states. These states served as policy
entrepreneurs and increased efficiency for states that were further behind in
implementation. As in the Medicaid context, thought-leader states in ACA
exchange implementation emerged organically; unlike in some statutes, leader
states were not designated in advance in the ACA.386
Connecticut provides an example in its efforts to market its successful
exchange platform to other states. As one of Connecticut’s entrepreneurial
exchange officials put it: “We realized that we had invented a better
mousetrap . . . . We could package our services and expertise and make them
available to other states, promoting collaboration and avoiding a duplication of
effort.”387 The Connecticut exchange director, Kevin Counihan, even sought to
market the state’s successful exchange platform to other states.388 He promoted

384. Id. at 415.
385. See JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES PROTECT THEIR

INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 31 (2009).
386. A classic example is the Clean Air Act, in which Congress designated California as the
leader state and offered states the option to adopt federal pollution standards or the
higher standards California had developed. See Gluck, supra note 43, at 1756 & n.23; see
also 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2) (2016).
387. Robert Pear, Connecticut Plans to Market Health Exchange Expertise, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24,
2014), https://perma.cc/4MJP-SDNL (quoting Robert E. Scalettar, member of the board
of Access Health CT).
388. See Jeff Cohen, Connecticut Looks to Sell Its Obamacare Exchange to Other States, NPR
(Feb. 28, 2014, 3:31 AM ET), https://perma.cc/V9YN-HDXR.

1774

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270

What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018)

Connecticut’s system as giving other states “the benefits of a state-based
marketplace without the headaches of building or staffing it.”389
At least four other states—including Maryland and Minnesota—used other
states’ exchange platforms as their own.390 In most cases, the sister-state-model
option was an alternative to inviting the federal government to operate a
federal exchange in the wake of a state’s technical failures in operating its own.
Even states that maintained their own exchanges following initial difficulties
leveraged other states’ experiences by using the same consulting firms that had
successfully shepherded other states through similar transitions. Deloitte for
instance was hired by Maryland and Minnesota following its successful
oversight of exchange rollouts in Connecticut, Kentucky, Rhode Island, and
Washington.391 Vermont, on the heels of a botched attempted rollout using the
same contractor as the federal exchange, hired the same consultant, Optum,
that helped Massachusetts recover from a similar hiccup.392

389. Pear, supra note 387 (quoting Kevin Counihan, CEO of Access Health CT).
390. See Jenna Johnson, Maryland Looks to Connecticut for Health Exchange Answers, WASH.

POST (May 31, 2014), https://perma.cc/987K-56C5; MNsure Chooses Deloitte as Lead
Vendor, CBS MINN. (Apr. 16, 2014, 12:50 PM), https://perma.cc/F3PC-HD32.
391. See Johnson, supra note 390; MNsure Chooses Deloitte as Lead Vendor, supra note 390;
Christine Vestal & Michael Ollove, Why Some State Health Exchanges Worked, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 11, 2013), https://perma.cc/Y7VK-577S.
392. Lynnley Browning, Thanks for Nothing: Obamacare Website Bunglers Fired, NEWSWEEK
(Aug. 6, 2014, 10:09 AM), https://perma.cc/MT26-JR8P.
hCentive operates exchanges in Massachusetts, New York, and Colorado. See Dan
Mangan, The “Policy Geek” Picked to Save Massachusetts’ Obamacare Exchange, CNBC
(May 8, 2014, 4:14 PM ET), https://perma.cc/EMY9-99C6. Massachusetts hired
hCentive after a failed rollout by CGI, the original contractor for HealthCare.gov,
explicitly citing hCentive’s record of success in other states. See Felice J. Freyer, Mass.
Sticking with Its Health Insurance Website, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 8, 2014), https://perma.cc
/8QN5-3SCC; Mangan, supra; see also Lydia DePillis, Meet CGI Federal, the Company
Behind the Botched Launch of HealthCare.gov, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Oct. 16, 2013),
https://perma.cc/8J4M-5V6W.
Following difficulties with CGI, Vermont hired Optum, citing the fact that Optum
oversaw the smooth transition for Massachusetts from CGI to hCentive. See Browning,
supra. Optum owns a 24% stake in hCentive. See Mangan, supra.
For additional examples, see Idaho’s Health Insurance Exchange Awards $40.8 Million in
Contracts, BOISE ST. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/5JAV-LK97 (noting
that when Idaho sought to transition from a federally facilitated marketplace model, it
chose the same two companies California used, hiring GetInsured to build the exchange
and Accenture to oversee the project); GetInsured, Corporate Fact Sheet 2 (n.d.),
https://perma.cc/YD4F-3ER3 (noting that GetInsured also built Mississippi’s and New
Mexico’s small business exchanges).
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3.

A middle ground between one and fifty options

In this story of states modeling on and borrowing from one another, we
see a parallel to our account of the hybrid exchanges. In both instances, there is
recognition that a middle ground between fifty separate models and a single
national model might be ideal as a matter of structural allocation. The ACA is
not the first example of this. For instance, in the corporate law context, a few
states’ statutes have emerged as the basis for most states’ choices; there are not
fifty different options, and each state does not reinvent the wheel.393 Likewise,
this middle ground in the ACA emerged organically, rather than as a result of
the ACA’s intentional design by Congress. States themselves may be adapting,
but Congress still appears to be operating with outmoded design options. It
continues to use the old either-or model of structural allocation in drafting.
A middle ground may capture efficiencies and economies of scale and may
advance uniformity in ways inferior to a full national exchange but superior to
fifty different ones. So understood, this horizontal movement, like the
emergence of hybrids, might point toward a federalism sweet spot. As Access
CT’s CEO commented about the various exchange models: “We do not need
fifty of these things, but we might need eight.”394
D. Intrastate Differences, Redux
As we emphasized in the Medicaid discussion, one cannot understand the
ACA’s implementation without discarding the fiction that the states are a
monolithic bloc. Divergences in state law and divergences among the internal
state actors—in other words attributes of the state sovereign apparatuses—are
critical to how federal-law implementation occurs on the ground. This is
another response to those who would argue that what we saw was mere
management or decentralization.395
Beginning with the law, states went into the ACA with different preexisting insurance laws.396 Some states already had generous insurance mandates—
requirements that insurers cover specified services.397 A few states already had
393. See Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for

394.

395.
396.
397.

Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 tbl.1, 216 (2006) (cataloging states’
adoption of statutory innovations in corporate law).
See Email from Kevin Counihan to authors (May 18, 2018) (on file with authors)
(recounting remarks made in February 2014 at the Yale Law School Conference on
Insurance Exchange Implementation).
Cf. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 9, at ix.
See Katherine Swartz et al., How Insurers Competed in the Affordable Care Act’s First
Year 7 exhibit 2, 7-8 (2015), https://perma.cc/D5CA-V8YJ.
See, e.g., Pre-ACA State Mandated Benefits in the Individual Health Insurance Market:
Mandated Coverage in Mental Health, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/DT5L
-ZHEF (archived Apr. 24, 2018); Pre-ACA State Maternity Coverage Mandates: Individual
footnote continued on next page
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community rating requirements—meaning insurers could not price according
to health risk by especially wide margins.398 New York had a particularly
stringent community rating requirement that it continued even after the ACA
was passed with a looser one.399 There is some evidence that having those
preexisting legal structures influenced states to run their own exchanges rather
than defaulting to the federal platform.400
Some states also passed laws to give their insurance commissioners power
to buck federal requirements.401 President Obama’s famous “if you like your
health plan, you can keep it” statement destabilized many exchanges by
allowing healthy customers, expected to join the new insurance pools, to
remain outside them.402 States that bucked the President and decided not to
allow individuals to keep their old plans had healthier exchange markets in the
end, according to at least one study.403
Looking next to differences among internal state actors, as with Medicaid,
we saw governors’ interests diverging from those of their legislatures. Some
states, including Michigan and New Jersey, were unable to create their own
exchanges because of the objections of one of the elected branches necessary to
pass the required implementing legislation.404 Executives in three states—
Kentucky, New York, and Rhode Island—made an end-run around recalcitrant
legislatures by creating state-based exchanges through purely executive

398.

399.

400.

401.
402.
403.

404.

and Small Group Markets, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/T7WZ-92ZN
(archived Apr. 24, 2018).
See Anthony T. Lo Sasso, Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue in the Individual Health
Insurance Market, EXPERT VOICES 1 (2011), https://perma.cc/LL5R-N76B (describing
community rating and state policies before the ACA).
See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3231 (McKinney 2018) (mandating one-to-one community rating);
Obama’s New York Model: How the State Destroyed Its Insurance Market Using ObamaCare
Rules, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2013, 7:28 PM ET), https://perma.cc/X6GF-Q838.
Compare Individual Market Rate Restrictions (Not Applicable to HIPAA Eligible Individuals),
KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/XPM4-F4LD (archived Apr. 24, 2018) (showing
limits on rating by state), with State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, supra
note 331 (showing marketplace type by state). A simpler explanation might be that
these states were largely Democratic and so were sympathetic toward the ACA from
the start.
See Richard Cauchi, State Laws and Actions Challenging Certain Health Reforms, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/VB9L-YKUQ.
See Robb Mandelbaum, How Holdover Health Plans Help Some Businesses but Hurt
Obamacare, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://perma.cc/HSG9-A6AQ.
See Kevin Lucia et al., The Extended “Fix” for Canceled Health Insurance Policies: Latest State
Action, COMMONWEALTH FUND: TO THE POINT (Nov. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/F8N5
-Q4GE; cf. West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 827
F.3d 81, 82, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (rejecting for lack of standing a state challenge to the
transitional policy permitting certain insurers to temporarily continue policies that
did not comply with the ACA), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1614 (2017).
See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 204, at 23, 31.
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authority.405 Four of the seven states that adopted the hybrid partnership
exchange model also used purely executive authority to adopt their
exchanges.406 In at least one state, the fact that a partnership exchange could be
launched by the executive without legislative action was the very reason it was
used.407
We also saw conflicts between insurance commissioners eager to retain
control of state insurance policy and governors in the same states resistant to
engage with the exchanges or appear cooperative with the ACA. These
intrastate struggles played out differently in each state—precisely because each
state is a unique local democracy. Not all of these efforts were successful.
Mississippi’s elected insurance commissioner, for instance, applied to HHS—
unsuccessfully—for approval to create a state-based exchange, without the
approval of either the governor or the legislature.408 But many workarounds
that did emerge succeeded largely because of cooperation between state and
federal insurance officials.
E. “Picket Fence Federalism”
Federalism scholars will undoubtedly see in some of these stories—
especially in the case of the hybrid exchanges—the concept of “picket fence
federalism.” That term is used to describe when administrators across
governments working in the same policy area more closely identify with one
another in furtherance of shared goals than they do with other members of
their own government.409
The formal and informal networks that we have already described among
implementers facilitated these picket fence relationships between state
insurance experts and their federal counterparts. Another contributing factor
was that many key Obama Administration officials were former insurance
405. See id. at 18, 33, 40; see also Kelly, supra note 258; Kevin J. Mooney, Gov. Chafee’s Use of

406.
407.
408.

409.

Executive Orders Is Viewed as Anti-democratic, CURRENT (Aug. 14, 2012), https://perma.cc
/P3SS-7C6V; Casey Seiler, Cuomo Uses Clout to Sidestep GOP on “Obamacare,” TIMES
UNION (Albany, N.Y.) (updated Apr. 12, 2012, 10:10 PM), https://perma.cc/98T9
-NWHZ.
See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 204, at 5, 9, 16, 23.
See State Marketplace Profiles: Michigan, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (updated Nov. 26, 2013),
https://perma.cc/XYG2-83PY.
See Jeffrey Hess, HHS Denies Mississippi’s Bid to Run Its Own Exchange, KAISER HEALTH
NEWS (updated Feb. 8, 2013, 10:15 AM), https://perma.cc/LGD6-7ZFS (reporting that
an HHS spokesman said that “[w]ith the Governor’s refusal to work with us or the
insurance commissioner, there is no way to coordinate strategy with other agencies
that he’s in charge of”).
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2001).
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commissioners or had held similar roles in various states. These included HHS
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Kansas);410 Joel Ario, the first director of the
Office of Health Insurance Exchanges (Oregon and Pennsylvania);411 Teresa
Miller, an acting director of the State Exchanges Group, the Oversight Group,
and the Insurance Programs Group (Oregon and Pennsylvania);412 CCIIO
Director Steve Larsen (Maryland);413 Jay Angoff, the director of HHS’s Office
of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (which became the CCIIO)
(Missouri);414 and Kevin Counihan, the first CEO of HealthCare.gov
(Connecticut).415 States also engaged directly with the federal government in
the ACA implementation process. States actively participated in the notice and
comment rulemaking process and, even more frequently, weighed in through
informal channels.416 All forty-nine states that received any kind of exchange
grant were assigned a designated officer who served as the state’s point person
at HHS and was available to interact “on a daily or weekly basis.”417 State
insurance departments were in regular contact with the CCIIO regarding
technical implementation issues.418 Consistent with their historical roles as the
“intergovernmental lobby,”419 the National Governors Association and the
NCSL also actively engaged with federal officials regarding exchange
implementation.420 The State Health Exchange Leadership Network also
engaged vertically, albeit on a less formal basis than the others.421
410. See Peter Baker & Robert Pear, Kansas Governor Seen as Top Choice in Health Post, N.Y.
411.
412.
413.
414.

415.
416.
417.
418.

419.
420.
421.

TIMES (Feb. 18, 2009), https://perma.cc/9R9L-ZWMP.
See Joel Ario, COMMONWEALTH FUND, https://perma.cc/KTR8-LC2M (archived Apr. 24,
2018).
See Pennsylvania Selects Commissioner Miller to Lead Department of Human Services, INS. J.
(Aug. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/P5ZU-MA7Y.
See Sara Hansard, CCIIO Director Steve Larsen Leaving for UnitedHealth Unit Optum in MidJuly, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 20, 2012), https://perma.cc/GMM9-8SU2.
See Christopher Weaver, HHS Insurance Oversight Office to Become Part of Medicare
Agency, NPR (Jan. 5, 2011, 5:08 PM ET), https://perma.cc/ERN3-CYQA; Executive
Profile: Jay Angoff, BLOOMBERG, https://perma.cc/22FC-W38C (archived Apr. 24, 2018).
See Dan Diamond, Kevin Counihan, the New “Obamacare CEO,” Faces Four Key Challenges,
FORBES (Aug. 26, 2014, 12:25 PM), https://perma.cc/HMT3-TK8W.
See Monahan, supra note 328, at 398-409, 400 tbl.3 (listing the frequency with which
each state submitted a comment).
See id. at 403-04.
See Email from Brian Webb, Assistant Dir., Life & Health Policy & Legislation, Nat’l
Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, to authors (May. 17, 2018) (on file with authors) (confirming that
state regulators have always had and continue to have “regular contact with
CMS/CCIIO staff on a variety of implementation issues”).
NUGENT, supra note 385, at 31.
See Monahan, supra note 328, at 409-14.
See id. at 414-15. State legislatures did not have formal institutional connections to HHS,
making direct vertical connections with legislatures harder to document and assess, but
footnote continued on next page
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F. Deconstructing “Federalism” Attributes
The traditional federalism account contends that certain attributes—
autonomy, sovereignty, local policy variation, and experimentation—are most
attainable for states separate from federal law. That account also argues that
federalism’s attributes produce particular democracy benefits, including
accountability and checks against the federal government. Modern federalism
scholars diminish the importance of some attributes, such as sovereignty, and
find others in centralization rather than separation. Our account pushes back
against both perspectives.
We already have discussed how autonomy and sovereignty in the ACA did
indeed emerge. But they emerged without any separation—and indeed in many
instances independently of the formal state-or-federal exchange design. This
does not mean that these attributes will necessarily emerge from all federal
statutes that include states as implementers; rather, it simply means that they
can if Congress designs a statute to do so.
Local accountability is another federalism value that is muddled by the
exchange story. State involvement—especially when it comes to hybrids and
“secret boyfriends”—obfuscates that democracy value. We return to this point
in Part VI below. Here, we pause to discuss policy variation and experimentation.
Variation and experimentation are two of the most commonly touted
federalism attributes, yet they seem much less linked to federalism structures
than most accounts assume. The variation-in-exchange-implementation story
has two intersecting vectors. On the one hand, the ACA homogenized
insurance law and policy to an important extent. Before the statute was passed,
wide inequities and variation existed across states in the number of uninsured
people and the generosity of insurance plans.422 After the ACA, inequities
decreased in virtually every state, although some interstate differences
remained.423 The ACA also established national network adequacy standards
for the first time.424 Prior to the ACA, almost all states had at least some
measures in place to ensure network adequacy, but states varied widely in their
the potential for such connections exists given how state officials move from one
branch to another somewhat fluidly.
422. See CATHY SCHOEN ET AL., AMERICA’S UNDERINSURED: A STATE-BY-STATE LOOK AT
HEALTH INSURANCE AFFORDABILITY PRIOR TO THE NEW COVERAGE EXPANSIONS, at ix-x,
3-5 (2014), https://perma.cc/923N-SV95 (reporting wide variations between states in
the number of individuals with access to adequate insurance); The Henry J. Kaiser
Family Found., supra note 275, app. A at 8 (reporting uninsurance rates).
423. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 275, app. A at 8.
424. See JANE B. WISHNER & JEREMY MARKS, URBAN INST., ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH
NETWORK ADEQUACY STANDARDS: LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES 4 (2017),
https://perma.cc/W6BJ-FJFP.
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approaches.425 The ACA required the HHS Secretary to ensure that plans
offered on marketplaces had “a sufficient choice of providers . . . and provide[d]
information to enrollees and prospective enrollees on the availability of innetwork and out-of-network providers.”426
On the other hand, we still see significant variation across exchange
models, but those differences do not stem from the choice between state and
federal exchanges. The ACA explicitly leaves to state discretion many of the
important details regarding the structure and operation of the exchanges, and
regulations promulgated under the ACA expand that discretion.427 As Table 3
above illustrates, state discretion under the ACA created the possibility of vast
differences in insurance markets even within exchange types. For example,
some states used their authority to conduct rate review to deviate significantly
from the federal rating standards, limiting insurers’ ability to impose
surcharges for tobacco use or increase premiums based on age.428 Other states
425. See Justin Giovannelli et al., Regulation of Health Plan Provider Networks 3 (2016),

https://perma.cc/6JGQ-X9M5.
426. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311(c)(1)(B), 124

Stat. 119, 174 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(1)(B) (2016)).
427. Most importantly, the regulations gave states a choice of the health insurance policy

that would serve as the benchmark plan to determine the essential health benefits that
must be offered by plans in the individual and small group markets. See Standards
Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg.
12,834, 12,866 (Feb. 25, 2013) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. § 156.100 (2017)); see also
Essential Health Benefit (EHB) Benchmark Plans, 2017, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://perma.cc/AWK2-EMHS (archived May 16, 2018).
For federal-exchange states, CMS did impose quantitative standards, but the standards
varied further by county composition. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & OVERSIGHT, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2017 LETTER TO ISSUERS IN THE FEDERALLYFACILITATED MARKETPLACES 23-24, 24 tbl.2.1 (2016), https://perma.cc/292Y-7NLA
(setting time and distance maximums for different types of providers, such as primary
care physicians).
Federal-exchange states conducting plan management were allowed to accept the
federal standard or implement their own, subject to the time and distance caps. For
example, in a “large” county, a network would have to cover a primary care physician
at most 10 minutes or 5 miles away from 90% of enrollees. See CTR. FOR CONSUMER
INFO. & OVERSIGHT, supra, at 24 & tbl.2.1. In a “rural” county, a network would have to
include a primary care physician at most 40 minutes or 30 miles away for 90% of
enrollees. See id.; see also Timothy Jost, CMS Releases Final 2017 Letter to Issuers in the
Federally Facilitated Marketplaces, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (updated Mar. 3, 2016),
https://perma.cc/R9PY-UEQM.
CMS proposed, but ultimately declined to adopt, quantitative standards for plans in all
states regardless of exchange type. See HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters
for 2017, 81 Fed. Reg. 12,204, 12,205 (Mar. 8, 2016).
428. See Justin Giovannelli et al., Implementing the Affordable Care Act: State Approaches
to Premium Rate Reforms in the Individual Health Insurance Market 2-7 (2014),
https://perma.cc/BV68-84SL; supra Table 3.
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prohibited insurers on their marketplaces from providing coverage for
abortions.429
As is evident, there has been enormous variety—even within a particular
category of exchange model—in how the exchanges look depending on states’
levels of involvement. Critically, although the federal government is
nominally operating exchanges in about three dozen states, not all states’
federally run exchanges look the same—precisely because the federal
government was eager to give states input even within the federal model,
whether through a hybrid structure or just through a federal exchange in
which the state had a voice in directing policy.
In total, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia are making plan
management decisions, including eighteen states using the federal IT platform
(the six partnership states, seven plan management states, and five states with
state-based exchanges using HealthCare.gov’s technology).430 In forty-seven
states and the District of Columbia, the state insurance departments are
managing health plan rate reviews.431 Seventeen states and Guam sought
adjustments to the federal medical loss ratio.432 Forty-six states oversee
compliance with the ACA’s market reform standards.433 The majority of states
have chosen to set their own geographic rating areas, including fifteen states
with federally run exchanges, seven plan management states, six partnership
states, four states with state-based exchanges on the federal IT platform, and all
eleven states (plus the District of Columbia) with fully state-run exchanges.434
For those federalism theorists who embrace federalism for policy variety,
these details should give pause. They offer examples of locally driven
experimentation that comes through a national program with a flexible, statecentered component. Pure separation of state and federal is not necessary—
indeed, perhaps not even ideal—for the states to fulfill their role as policy
“laboratories.” States may not even be necessary! At the same time, the
nationalism in the exchange design did have something of a smoothing effect at
429. See Alina Salganicoff et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Coverage for Abortion

Services and the ACA 4 & fig.1 (2014), https://perma.cc/TS8U-WJWN.
430. See State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, supra note 331.
431. See State Effective Rate Review Programs, supra note 331. Only Oklahoma, Texas, and

Wyoming do not have effective state-run rate review programs. See id.
432. See State Requests for MLR Adjustment, supra note 331. Nine of the states seeking
adjustment had federally run exchanges, two were plan management states, four were
partnership states, and two ran federally supported state-based marketplaces. See State
Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, supra note 331.
433. See Compliance and Enforcement, supra note 331. Only Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and
Wyoming “have notified CMS that they do not have the authority to enforce or are
not otherwise enforcing the Affordable Care Act market reform provisions.” Id.
434. See Market Rating Reforms, supra note 331; State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018,
supra note 331.
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least on the equity front, in the sense that it set a floor that lessened some of the
basic differences in coverage in the individual insurance markets across
states.435 In other words, even where there has been policy autonomy, it has
not been complete.
* * *
Another form of market variation could come in the form of waivers. The
ACA includes a provision—section 1332—that allows a state to seek a waiver
from the statute’s insurance requirements if the state can propose a program
that would provide essentially the same coverage at the same cost.436 The
statute did not permit waivers until 2017, so details about them were not
included in our study. We might expect to see aggressive use of this provision
under the Trump Administration.
Early information on waivers is mixed. In 2017, the Trump Administration approved waivers for Alaska, Minnesota, and Oregon, allowing those
states to take on the healthcare costs of certain higher-cost individuals, taking
them out of the market’s risk pools and thereby lowering premiums overall.437
Ohio, Maine, and Wisconsin now have similar proposals pending, with more
states getting in line with draft proposals.438 At the same time, states have
expressed frustration with the slow pace of review by CMS.439 The
Administration recently also did not act on waiver proposals from two red
states—Iowa and Oklahoma—that included many conservative reforms.440
435. See Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,

436.

437.

438.

439.
440.

https://perma.cc/WHG4-PK6Z (archived Apr. 24, 2018) (to locate, select “View the live
page,” then select “Trend Graph,” and then select all locations and the “Uninsured”
distribution) (showing a trend toward less variation in uninsurance rates across states).
See generally Heather Howard & Galen Benshoof, Health Affairs Blog Post, 1332 Waivers
and the Future of State Health Reform, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 237 (2015)
(explaining the waiver program and its potential).
See Richard Cauchi, State Roles Using 1332 Health Waivers, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/8774-2K3H (summarizing state requests for
section 1332 waivers and their goals). On December 30, 2016, when Obama was still
President, Hawaii received a waiver related to the ACA’s requirement that it operate a
small business insurance marketplace. See id.
See The ACA’s Innovation Waiver Program: A State-by-State Look, COMMONWEALTH FUND
(May 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/XVN5-4F9U; Heather Howard, More States Looking to
Section 1332 Waivers, ST. HEALTH & VALUE STRATEGIES (May 10, 2018), https://perma.cc
/5WNH-C882.
See Susannah Luthi, Senate Republicans in Talks with Verma to Expedite States’ 1332
Waivers, MOD. HEALTHCARE (May 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/8DJQ-ERE9.
See id.; see also Timothy Jost, ACA Round-Up: 1332 Waiver News from Iowa and Minnesota;
Big Blow to Graham Cassidy, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (updated Sept. 24, 2017),
https://perma.cc/TJ8G-KBRA; Leslie Small, Waiver Weirdness: What the Oklahoma and
Iowa Cases Could Mean for Other States Seeking ACA Exemptions, FIERCEHEALTHCARE
(Oct. 10, 2017, 12:52 PM), https://perma.cc/ZUA6-UYL9.
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Some media reports suggested that the Administration, hostile to the law, did
not want to approve any programs that would strengthen healthcare markets in
those states.441 In other words, this may mark a 180-degree turn from the
Medicaid strategy of the Obama Administration, which was generous in
granting waivers the Administration perceived as suboptimal from a policy
perspective to further the long-term goal of entrenching the law in as many
states as possible.
VI. Federalism Values, Old and New
Detailing the ACA’s federalism features in implementation is easier than
evaluating the umbrella concept of “federalism” as a whole in the statute or
devising legal doctrine to effectuate the kind of federalism we describe. Indeed,
one takeaway from our study of the ACA’s implementation is that approaching
federalism as a single package may be an impossible task, not only because
many of the attributes we associate with federalism may not be unique to
federalist structural arrangements but also because, even when it comes to
what we expect from federalism, the concept stands in for so much.
Federalism at times seems advanced as an end in itself—aimed at generating the structural and democracy benefits believed to derive from multiple
layers of government. But federalism also is a tool used by Congress for
improving policy—a means to an end. In the context of the ACA, that end is
good health policy, a concept that is itself ill defined. If federalist structural
arrangements only deliver on some of the things we expect—whether
autonomy, good healthcare outcomes, experimentation, and so on—is it really
federalism? Do courts have a role in protecting it? What, again, is healthcare
federalism for?
A. Federalism and Democracy Goals
If one views federalism as concerned only with keeping the federal
government out of the picture, our study has little to offer. So does healthcare
in general. As our historical account in Part II above details, the federal
government has never been an outsider to healthcare law. The ACA is just a
more extreme version of what came before.
The big question concerns how to think about sovereignty and autonomy
when are we not talking about separate spheres of power. We might say that
the ACA enhanced state sovereignty because the alternative—excluding states
from any role in the federal scheme—would have dramatically reduced state
control over healthcare. But couching an absolute concept like sovereignty in
441. See, e.g., Eric Levitz, Trump Personally Tried to Sabotage Obamacare in Iowa, NEW YORK:

DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 6, 2017, 10:59 AM), https://perma.cc/MDE5-6JWX.
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relative terms is conceptually challenging. It is easier, and maybe more apt, to
talk about control. The ACA did offer states policy control—power that was
enhanced by the ability to leverage the possibility of opting out to extract
concessions from the federal government.
Another way to think about questions of sovereignty and autonomy is to
ask whether the ACA’s implementation helped to strengthen or to diminish
state local democracy. State governments are their own democracies and make
their own state law—and that is indeed a hallmark of being sovereign. Perhaps
counterintuitively, the ACA did not necessarily diminish this aspect of state
sovereignty. The ACA preempts some areas of health law traditionally
considered reserved for states, so by that measure, state sovereignty is lost. But
the statute itself also has generated an enormous amount of new state law. We
found hundreds of state laws and state administrative acts issued in Medicaid
and exchange implementation alone.442 Like any major federal law that relies
on state implementation, the ACA depends on the healthy functioning of the
state sovereign lawmaking apparatus.443 As one of us has argued, this very fact—
the fact that major national schemes rely on functioning state legal and
legislative regimes—also gives these aspects of state sovereign governance
enduring relevance, even in an era dominated by national law.444 Had Congress
designed the ACA with no role for the states, we would not have had any of
these intrastate government debates or this volume of state lawmaking on
health policy. Health policy would be mostly federal all the way down, as in
Medicare.
Accountability is another central democracy value and one often mentioned in the context of federalism. Conservative members of the Court,
including the dissenters in NFIB and going back at least to Justice O’Connor’s
opinion in New York v. United States, have expressed concern that cooperative
federalism schemes obfuscate accountability, leading voters to blame states for
what are actually federal policies.445

442. For a helpful catalog of the vast amounts of state legislative and regulatory action

taken by the end of 2013, see KATIE KEITH & KEVIN W. LUCIA, IMPLEMENTING THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: THE STATE OF THE STATES (2014), https://perma.cc/6BFM
-9M9M.
443. For elaboration of this point, see Gluck, supra note 23, at 1999.
444. See id. at 2000, 2007.
445. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 678 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“When Congress compels the States to do its bidding,
it blurs the lines of political accountability.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
168-69 (1992) (expressing concern that if the federal government could commandeer
states to carry out federal regulatory schemes, then state politicians might bear the
brunt of unpopular policies because voters might be ignorant as to whether policy
choices were made by the state or the federal government).
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On the one hand, the ACA’s story substantiates this concern. The federal
government certainly tried to punt some decisions to the states. One example
comes in the form of the ACA’s essential health benefits—the baseline benefit
package the statute guarantees for all exchange plans. Although the ACA itself
directs federal agencies to determine which benefits should be counted as
essential, this decision proved so controversial that HHS outsourced it to the
states.446 A similar example comes from the more recent Republican repeal
proposals. Those bills nominally would have left the ACA’s essential health
benefits and other generous insurance reforms in place—because they are
politically popular—while at the same time inserting waiver provisions
allowing the states to remove them.447
But our findings also flip some of these accountability concerns on their
heads. The kind of hybrid federalism structures that HHS pursued to facilitate
implementation of the ACA—including the “secret boyfriend model”—helped
state politicians blur responsibility. These structures gave the state actors cover
to participate in a scheme that they viewed as valuable but politically risky.
When the ACA was later successful, some state electorates were largely
unaware that their state was benefiting from cooperating with the federal
administrative scheme.448 Since the 2016 presidential election, we have seen
evidence that the citizenry is deeply confused about the implications of
repealing the ACA, what it accomplished, whether it even exists, and who is
accountable for what.449
446. See Sabrina Corlette et al., Urban Inst., Cross-Cutting Issues: Moving to High Quality,

Adequate Coverage; State Implementation of New Essential Health Benefits Requirements 3-5 (2013), https://perma.cc/3WDS-6KE5 (“[T]he ACA calls for the [HHS]
Secretary . . . to define a set of essential health benefits to be offered by all new fully
insured individual and small-group health plans, beginning January 1, 2014. . . . Rather
than define a uniform, national set of essential health benefits, HHS provided that each
state could choose a benchmark plan on which to base [its] EHB package.”).
447. See Compare Proposals to Replace the Affordable Care Act, supra note 3.
448. See, e.g., Kyle Dropp & Brendan Nyhan, One-Third Don’t Know Obamacare and Affordable
Care Act Are the Same, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/UV9Q-KCM4
(reporting that a survey found that “only 61 percent of adults knew that many people
would lose coverage through Medicaid or subsidies for private health insurance if the
A.C.A. were repealed and no replacement enacted”). But see Sarah Kliff, Why Obamacare
Enrollees Voted for Trump, VOX (Dec. 13, 2016, 8:10 AM EST), https://perma.cc/TXV4
-GDA6 (questioning whether Kentuckians in fact failed to understand what benefits
came from the ACA).
449. See, e.g., Dropp & Nyhan, supra note 448 (“35 percent of respondents said either they
thought Obamacare and the Affordable Care Act were different policies (17 percent) or
didn’t know if they were the same or different (18 percent). . . . When respondents were
asked what would happen if Obamacare were repealed, even more people were
stumped.”); Ilya Somin, Public Ignorance About Obamacare, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 1,
2013, 1:27 PM), https://perma.cc/ZS9S-ZCBR (“42% of Americans are unaware that the
Affordable Care Act is still the law of the land.”).
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The democracy value of accountability was in this context traded off for
policy ends—entrenchment and expansion of the statute. That story itself
instantiates the multitude of values we tend to group under the single
federalism umbrella. The states’ under-the-radar moves allowed the ACA to be
implemented in states where resistance might have otherwise prevented it.
The remaining number of uninsured would be higher but for this adaptive
federalism. Maybe that makes this aspect of the story a more nationalist one,
but federalism enabled it.
B. Federalism and Policy Goals
The political and judicial arenas tend to give more attention to federalism
for federalism’s own sake—for the political and constitutional values it
advances—than for policy goals. That theme has certainly been dominant in
the ACA’s implementation. But this has not always been the case. The
Federalist Papers themselves contain a well-known statement in the other
direction, putting “the public good” above “the sovereignty of the States” in the
event the two were to conflict.450 So understood, federalism is a means to an
end, not the end in itself.451
But even this narrower slice of federalism as means still stands in for many
things. One way to think about federalism as a tool for policy is that it
generates a particular kind of policy solution. As discussed above, local
variation and experimentation are the kinds of policy values typically
associated with federalism. But a different way to think about federalism as a
tool for policy is that federalism may generate the best specific policy outcomes
on a particular substantive question. In the context of the ACA’s drafting, there
were indeed numerous suggestions that health policy is better when it is closer
to the people as justifications for the statute’s state-led structure.
450. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“It is too

early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare
of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of
government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of
this object. Were the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice
would be, Reject the plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public
happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of
the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good
citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter.”).
451. Compare, e.g., Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism, supra note 5, at 1039 (“Gluck sees state
power as an ‘end worth achieving itself.’ . . . I understand both decentralization and
centralization to be means to an end.” (quoting Abbe R. Gluck, Nationalism as the New
Federalism (and Federalism as the New Nationalism): A Complementary Account (and Some
Challenges) to the Nationalist School, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1045, 1050 (2015))), with Gluck,
supra, at 1046-47 (critiquing Gerken’s view of federalism as a means to ends unrelated to
federalism).
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Both categories of federalism as means are more complicated than may
initially appear. With respect to state-centered administration to generate
variation and experimentation, we already have illustrated in detail how these
features sometimes emerged independently of the structural arrangements in
the ACA (for example, state versus federal exchanges). In other words, these
core federalism attributes do not actually seem unique to a traditional federalist
arrangement.
With respect to federalism as a tool for particular health policy outcomes,
that too remains unclear, in large part because, on the health policy side,
outcome goals have not been specifically defined. Access, cost, and quality are
just some of many potential outcome metrics commonly used—and fought
over—in health policy circles. We pause here to offer a brief and oversimplified
snapshot of the kinds of policy analyses that could be undertaken if one had a
clearly articulated system goal.
1.

ACA federalism and Medicaid outcomes

It is almost certain that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion as drafted—which
would have mandated a nationwide expansion—would have increased access to
care simply by covering more than 3 million more lives than were covered
after the Supreme Court in NFIB gave states a choice.452 But that figure is not
the only salient outcome measure for what the state-led model that NFIB
created actually delivered, as it does not take into account other factors that are
constants in any health policy conversation, such as cost and quality of care.
Empirical studies of the ACA’s implementation have begun to document
that especially in Medicaid expansion states, those who have become insured
through the ACA have better access to care.453 Studies also show that access
does not occur at the expense of individuals who were already insured—they
are not being crowded out, as some feared would occur.454 Medicaid
beneficiaries experience better access to care and better health,455 better ability
452. See Kevin Quealy & Margot Sanger-Katz, Who Would Have Health Insurance if Medicaid

Expansion Weren’t Optional, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2014), https://perma.cc/2MZW-N5BF.
453. See, e.g., Stacey McMorrow et al., Medicaid Expansion Increased Coverage, Improved

Affordability, and Reduced Psychological Distress for Low-Income Parents, 36 HEALTH AFF.
808, 812 (2017) (finding “significant increases in access and use among low-income
parents in expansion states,” as well as “strong improvements in almost every
affordability measure examined for parents in expansion states”).
454. See, e.g., Salam Abdus & Steven C. Hill, Growing Insurance Coverage Did Not Reduce Access
to Care for the Continuously Insured, 36 HEALTH AFF. 791, 797 (2017) (“We found no
consistent evidence that increases in insurance coverage rates . . . were associated with
worsened access to care . . . .”).
455. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Changes in Utilization and Health Among Low-Income
Adults After Medicaid Expansion or Expanded Private Insurance, 176 JAMA INTERNAL
footnote continued on next page
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to take medications consistently,456 and less trouble paying medical bills.457
Medicaid coverage is better than uninsurance458 (which sounds like a low
baseline, but the notion that it would not be was a tenacious trope around the
time the ACA was being drafted), for example, in that it increases the
probability that a patient will present earlier with an illness or injury, which
contributes to better management of a medical issue.459
With respect to the cost of healthcare, Medicaid expansion costs both
states and the federal government more than pre-ACA Medicaid.460 Yet studies
show that those states that expanded Medicaid eligibility are better off

456.
457.

458.

459.

460.

MED. 1501, 1507-08 (2016) (“After 2 years of coverage expansion in Kentucky and
Arkansas, compared with Texas’s nonexpansion, there were major improvements in
access to primary care and medications, affordability of care, utilization of preventive
services, care for chronic conditions, and self-reported quality of care and health.”).
See Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Health Insurance Coverage and Health—What the Recent
Evidence Tells Us, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 586, 588 (2017).
See DELOITTE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY: MEDICAID EXPANSION REPORT, 2014, at
35-36 (2015), https://perma.cc/3RSK-E485; The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., What’s
at Stake in the Future of the Kentucky Medicaid Expansion? 2 (2016), https://perma.cc
/964T-LXCA; see also Antonisse et al., supra note 215, at 1.
See Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First
Year 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17190, 2011),
https://perma.cc/UQL2-STG2 (“Using a randomized controlled experiment design, we
examined the approximately one year impact of extending access to Medicaid among a
low-income, uninsured adult population. We found evidence of increases in hospital,
outpatient, and drug utilization, increases in compliance with recommended preventive care, and declines in exposure to substantial out-of-pocket medical expenses and
medical debts. There is also evidence of improvement of self-reported mental and
physical health measures, perceived access to and quality of care, and overall wellbeing.”); see also, e.g., Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Three-Year Impacts of the Affordable Care
Act: Improved Medical Care and Health Among Low-Income Adults, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1119,
1124-25, 1125 exhibit 3 (2017) (“Our four years of data indicate that the ACA’s coverage
expansion to low-income adults was associated with significant improvements in
access to primary care and medications, affordability of care, preventive visits,
screening tests, and self-reported health.”). Amy Finkelstein and colleagues found no
statistical difference in emergency room usage. See Finkelstein et al., supra, at 3.
See Andrew P. Loehrer et al., Association of the Affordable Care Act Medical Expansion with
Access to and Quality of Care for Surgical Conditions, JAMA SURGERY E6 (2018),
https://perma.cc/9KAY-ALPR (“In this study of surgical patients in 42 states (including
Washington, DC), the ACA’s Medicaid expansion was associated with higher coverage
rates, earlier presentation, and improved probability of optimal care for common and
serious surgical conditions. Our data reinforce that insurance coverage is an important
contributor to earlier presentation with less severe disease at the time of diagnosis.”).
Research indicates, however, that the newly eligible may experience longer wait times
for appointments with specialists than with primary care providers. See Sommers et al.,
supra note 458, at 1126.
See State and Federal Spending Under the ACA, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS
COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/H74Z-NTFE (archived Apr. 24, 2018).
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economically than states that have not.461 The costs of expansion largely are
borne by the federal government, even when the supermatch phases down to
90%, and states are able to offset costs (such as for uncompensated care) that
were the state’s responsibility before Medicaid expansion.462 Insurance
marketplace premiums are lower in states that expanded Medicaid.463
Hospitals have had fewer uninsured patients requiring treatment in emergency
departments,464 and one study reported that hospitals—especially rural
hospitals—were less likely to close in expansion states.465 Evidence indicates
that people do not leave employment due to Medicaid expansion, countering
fears that Medicaid somehow causes joblessness (a different kind of economic
effect).466
Not much data is available yet to assess the economic impact of demonstration waivers in the ACA’s implementation.467 Section 1115 demonstration
461. See, e.g., Deborah Bachrach et al., State Health Reform Assistance Network, States

462.

463.

464.
465.
466.

467.

Expanding Medicaid See Significant Budget Savings and Revenue Gains 1 (2016),
https://perma.cc/L7Y3-EXN6 (“Data regarding Medicaid expansion in 11 states—
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Washington state, and West Virginia—and the District of Columbia
confirm that states continue to realize savings and revenue gains as a result of
expanding Medicaid.”); Stan Dorn et al., What Is the Result of States Not Expanding
Medicaid? 1 (2014), https://perma.cc/NC9H-6CEC (“A review of state-level fiscal
studies found comprehensive analyses from 16 diverse states. Each analysis concluded
that expansion helps state budgets.”).
See Benjamin D. Sommers & Jonathan Gruber, Federal Funding Insulated State Budgets
from Increased Spending Related to Medicaid Expansion, 36 HEALTH AFF. 938, 941-43 (2017)
(studying the state-federal budgetary balance in Medicaid expansion states and
concluding that costs were borne primarily by the federal government); see also State
and Federal Spending Under the ACA, supra note 460.
See Aditi P. Sen & Thomas DeLeire, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Effect of
Medicaid Expansion on Marketplace Premiums 2 (2016), https://perma.cc/8QQW
-4Q9F (“We estimate that Marketplace premiums are about 7 percent lower in
expansion states, controlling for differences across states . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
See Antonisse et al., supra note 215, at 1, 5-7.
See Richard C. Lindrooth et al., Understanding the Relationship Between Medicaid
Expansions and Hospital Closures, 37 HEALTH. AFF. 111, 117 (2018).
See Antonisse et al., supra note 215, at 11 (“Studies examining employment rates and
other measures such as transitions from employment to non-employment, the rate of
job switches, transitions from full- to part-time employment, labor force participation,
and usual hours worked per week have not found significant effects of Medicaid
expansion.”).
To fill the gap, the Kaiser Family Foundation conducted interviews and focus groups
in Michigan and Indiana to learn about implementation of those states’ waivers. See
MaryBeth Musumeci et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., An Early Look at
Medicaid Expansion Waiver Implementation in Michigan and Indiana 3 (2017),
https://perma.cc/F4Q9-G4WT (noting, among five key findings, some indication that
administration of these states’ programs is costly and complex and that “[h]ealth
accounts can be confusing for beneficiaries”).
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waivers are supposed to be budget neutral to the federal government, but HHS
gauges budget neutrality in a number of ways that facilitate rather than impede
waiver approvals.468 In the Medicaid expansion context, negotiating a waiver
takes time, and HHS’s evaluation and approval of a waiver usually takes
anywhere from several months to more than a year.469 This extended
negotiation and approval process is not cost-free; people who are uninsured
have no consistent means of care and thus are more costly when they arrive in
hospitals that must treat them under federal law, resulting in expensive and
inefficient emergency care.470 In addition, demonstration waivers have specific
timing and reporting that make immediate, quantifiable evaluation tricky;
they were typically approved for five years and renewed for three, though
some provisions had a one-year timeline.471
Historically, waivers’ successes or failures were not evaluated until a state
applied to renew or amend a waiver, and section 1115 waivers have a long
history of implementation without supervision or reflection.472 The ACA
modified the section 1115 waiver process to increase transparency.473
Regulations now require states to report annually, regardless of the duration of
the initial waiver approval.474 Indiana’s HIP 2.0 waiver has been criticized based
on its first interim report, which indicated that enrollment was low due to the
468. See Waivers, supra note 262 (detailing each type of waiver and how states obtain

waivers).
469. See id.
470. This is due to EMTALA, discussed briefly in Part II.A above, which requires hospitals

471.

472.

473.
474.

that have emergency departments to treat or stabilize and transfer all individuals who
present with an emergency condition regardless of their ability to pay. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd(b) (2016); supra text accompanying note 108.
See About Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID.GOV, https://perma.cc/4T2G-ULNZ
(archived Apr. 24, 2018). For examples of one-year section 1115 waivers and extensions,
see Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Florida:
Section 1115 Demonstration Fact Sheet 5 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/PX38-NBMF; and
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Iowa
Wellness Plan Section 1115 Demonstration Fact Sheet 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/99VF
-748U. CMS announced in late 2017 that it would adjust some waiver approval and
renewal features, allowing for “fast track” approval of waiver provisions already
approved in other states and allowing waiver approvals to last longer (ten years, in
some instances). See Neale, supra note 255, at 3-4 (emphasis omitted).
See Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and into the Light: Using Section 1115 Medicaid
Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 213, 214-15 (2015) (discussing “opaque” section 1115 waiver approval
and renewal processes). ACA section 10201(i) created a more robust section 1115 waiver
by adding notice and comment as well as reporting requirements to the application and
renewal processes. See id. at 215; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10201(i), 124 Stat. 119, 922 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(d)).
See Watson, supra note 472, at 214-15.
See 42 C.F.R. § 431.428 (2017).
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exclusionary measures in the state’s waiver.475 Although the waiver was in
effect for only about one year, the commissioned study of its implementation
showed that the state had trouble managing enrollee compliance with rules for
premium payments, wellness programs, and other measures designed to
decrease enrollment in Medicaid.476 Another example comes from Iowa, which
applied for an extension of a one-year waiver that allowed charging for
nonemergency medical transportation. The little evidence collected indicated
that Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to care was decreased by this “experiment”
(especially for individuals earning less than the FPL).477 Overall, many
elements common in Medicaid expansion waivers are likely to be costlier for
states to administer than traditional Medicaid.478
As a different example, waiver provisions that are designed to prevent
continuous enrollment will decrease costs to the state (and therefore also the
federal government under Medicaid’s matching funding) but will curtail the
extent of coverage. In part to reduce costs, states now are seeking to implement
waivers that will drive the newly eligible population out of Medicaid.
Consider, for example, Kentucky’s section 1115 waiver approved early in 2018,
which is designed to decrease state Medicaid costs through work requirements,
cost sharing, and other features. According to the state’s own evaluation,
enrollment will drop by nearly 100,000.479
475. See, e.g., Letter from Am. Congress of Obstetricians & Gynecologists et al. to Thomas

476.

477.

478.
479.

Price, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 2 (Mar. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc
/FRX6-U2AV (“Findings in the HIP 2.0 interim evaluation report show [that Indiana’s]
policies are affecting participation in the program and making it harder for people to
obtain care . . . .”).
See THE LEWIN GRP., INC., INDIANA HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0: INTERIM EVALUATION
REPORT 3, 20-21 (2016), https://perma.cc/3ZNW-Z237 (revealing that one-third of
“conditionally enrolled” members—individuals who have applied and are eligible for
Medicaid but have not yet started coverage—never complete enrollment because they
fail to make the required premium payments and contributions to their Personal
Wellness and Responsibility (POWER) accounts); see also id. at 3 (noting that only 66%
of enrollees required to make contributions to their POWER accounts reported ever
hearing of the POWER account). HHS required this interim evaluation as well as a final
evaluation at the end of the three-year waiver. See id. at 1.
See Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., to Julie Lovelady, Interim Medicaid Dir., Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs. 1
(Dec. 30, 2014), https://perma.cc/8MDH-8MBE.
See Melissa Burroughs, The High Administrative Costs of Common Medicaid Expansion
Waiver Elements, FAMS. USA (Oct. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/Q77M-LF8N.
See Deborah Yetter, Bevin Unveils Plan to Reshape Medicaid in Ky., COURIER-J. (Louisville,
Ky.) (updated June 22, 2016, 6:26 PM ET), https://perma.cc/XM92-QTFJ (reporting the
waiver application’s indication that Medicaid enrollment will decline by nearly 86,000
people by 2021); see also Jason Bailey, What’s in the Governor’s Proposed Medicaid Changes,
KY. CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y: KY. POL’Y BLOG (June 22, 2016), https://perma.cc/HZ9U
-KMZR. The waiver proposes a number of mechanisms that are likely to block,
discourage, or cause sporadic enrollment; for example, beneficiaries who cannot pay
footnote continued on next page

1792

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128270

What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?
70 STAN. L. REV. 1689 (2018)

As discussed in Part IV above, some states have gone further than the
ACA’s Medicaid expansion, offering more generous coverage. Those efforts
have the predictable effect of costing the federal government more money in
matching payments.
In sum, NFIB’s enhancement of state policy control over Medicaid expansion unquestionably served the structural ends sometimes advanced by
federalists, including state leverage and policy autonomy. So too for federalist
policy ends like variation and experimentation—although section 1115 waivers
would have been possible even within a full nationwide Medicaid expansion
had NFIB never been decided. But it is far less clear that as a tool to improve
health policy outcomes—along the most common metrics of access, cost, and
quality—NFIB’s state-led structure of the Medicaid expansion was successful.
But then, Congress never assumed that it would be, which is why Congress did
not draft the Medicaid expansion that way in the first place.
2.

ACA federalism and exchange outcomes

In contrast, Congress did assume that exchanges would benefit from a
state-led structure. The data thus far are equivocal, and no firm conclusion can
be drawn as to whether the structure of the exchanges, in terms of being state
or federally run, made a difference.480 Most states lost insurers between 2014
and 2018 regardless of exchange type,481 but some of these losses were due to

premiums or who do not meet work requirements would be “locked out” for months.
See Yetter, supra; see also Yetter, supra note 260; supra notes 258-61 and accompanying
text.
480. See, e.g., Sabrina Guilbeault et al., Making the Grade: Evaluating the Performance of State
Health Insurance Marketplaces, COLLABORATIVE (May 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/N6FH
-ZCP3 (finding that federally run exchanges performed as well as or better than statebased exchanges and hybrids); Marketplace Enrollment as a Share of Potential Marketplace
Participation, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/BQ7H-WAEX (archived Apr. 24,
2018) (compiling data on marketplace enrollment as a percentage of total eligible
individuals, with a difference of less than two percentage points between federally
facilitated and state-based exchanges and a difference of less than three percentage
points among all kinds of exchanges, including hybrids).
481. Partnership-model states fared the best, increasing the average number of issuers slightly
from 3.7 in 2014 to 4.3 in 2017, although the bulk of this increase is attributable to New
Hampshire, which went from 1 to 4 issuers while four partnership-model states saw no
change. See Number of Issuers Participating in the Individual Health Insurance Marketplaces,
KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/SF2H-C895 (archived Apr. 24, 2018) (listing the
number of issuers by state, from which we calculated these averages). Other exchange
types lost roughly one or fewer issuers over the three-year period on average. See id.
Federally supported state-based marketplaces fared the worst, losing 1.2 insurers on
average, a drop largely attributable to Oregon, which went from 11 to 6 issuers while
three other states saw no change. See id.
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others’ acts of political resistance482—including the shutting off of critical
insurance stabilization funding by the Republican-controlled Congress.483
Average premiums increased in forty-six states and the District of Columbia from 2016 to 2017, more than doubling in one state, although premium tax
credits have largely insulated consumers from the increases.484 On the other
hand, approximately 16.9 million more Americans received healthcare
coverage in the first two years of the ACA,485 and 11.8 million Americans
received insurance through the exchanges in the most recent open enrollment
period.486
Data from a few years before the ACA’s passage also reveal wide variation
among the number of uninsured people across states.487 The ACA has reduced
that number in each state, but differences across states remain.488
The data are even more equivocal as to whether state-based exchanges
performed better across the typical variables of market penetration, premium
levels, and number of insurers. States with federally run exchanges had lower
enrollment relative to projections than did states with state-based marketplaces.489
482. See Bob Bryan, Insurance Companies Are Freaking Out About Trump’s Obamacare Threats,

483.
484.

485.
486.
487.
488.
489.

BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 28, 2017, 9:28 AM), https://perma.cc/UZG2-7HG2; Olga Khazan,
Why So Many Insurers Are Leaving Obamacare, ATLANTIC (May 11, 2017),
https://perma.cc/3WMW-4K3G.
See Number of Issuers Participating in the Individual Health Insurance Marketplaces, supra
note 481.
See Cynthia Cox et al., 2017 Premium Changes and Insurer Participation in the Affordable
Care Act’s Health Insurance Marketplaces, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (updated Nov. 1, 2016),
https://perma.cc/J29T-PS5Z. For example, the second most expensive silver plan in
Phoenix, Arizona cost $300 more per month in 2017 than in 2016 for a 40-year-old
nonsmoker earning $30,000 per year. See id. After tax subsidies, though, the price
remained steady at $207 per month. See id. Preliminary data from the 2018 open
enrollment period suggest that this trend will continue to hold true. See Rabah Kamal
et al., The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., An Early Look at 2018 Premium Changes and
Insurer Participation on ACA Exchanges 2, 3 tbl.1 (2017), https://perma.cc/KHN2
-M3XN. Some analysts view the rate increases in 2017 as a necessary market correction
as the health profile of the pool of insured individuals became clear. See Ashley
Semanskee & Larry Levitt, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Individual Insurance
Market Performance in Mid 2017, at 5 (2017), https://perma.cc/33GE-PABP.
See Katherine G. Carman et al., Trends in Health Insurance Enrollment, 2013-15, 34 HEALTH
AFF. 1044, 1044, 1046 (2015).
See Total Marketplace Enrollment, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://perma.cc/VMP8-9FGF
(archived Apr. 24, 2018).
See generally John Holahan, Variation in Health Insurance Coverage and Medical Expenditures:
How Much Is Too Much?, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY, supra note 15, at 111.
See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 275, at 2, 4; see also Health Insurance
Coverage of the Total Population, supra note 435.
See Marketplaces Make Significant Progress in 2015, URB. INST. (updated Apr. 8, 2015),
https://perma.cc/99KH-QZJG.
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This trend reversed in 2015, and federally run exchanges had higher
enrollment growth than state-based exchanges.490 The federal government has
doled out billions of dollars in exchange development grants, but states that
have received the most grants have not necessarily been the most successful.491
In terms of both enrollment and cost, at least some data reveal that contrary to
expectations, state-based exchanges did not outperform either federal or
hybrid marketplaces.492
C. Federalism, Regulation, and Law
Our study also has implications for federalism’s doctrinal landscape.493
First and foremost, we need to know what we are talking about to know what
law is protecting or whether law can even protect it. Courts are generally ill
suited to address one important segment of federalism questions: questions
about policy, such as whether federalist structures produce better health
outcomes. We doubt courts are even the appropriate place to address other
federalism attributes, like autonomy, cooperation, experimentation, and
variation, because they are so context-specific and dynamic. Frankly, based on
our findings, we would eliminate those factors entirely as irrelevant to any
deep analysis of federalism.
Courts are far better at policing clear boundaries, which we do not have
here, and at focusing on process, which we do. We can envision, for instance,
courts intervening in cases to be sure that the policy control a statute gives to

490. See id.
491. See Robert B. Hackey & Erika L. May, Viewpoint, Measuring the Performance of Health

Insurance Marketplaces, 314 JAMA 667, 667 (2015) (“Hawaii’s [state-based exchange], the
nation’s most expensive marketplace in terms of per enrollee costs, received more than
$205 million in federal funding, but as of February 2015 had only enrolled 12,625
individuals . . . . In contrast, Florida accepted no federal funding for ACA planning and
implementation, but its [federally facilitated marketplace] enrolled more subscribers
than any other state in 2015 (1,596,296 individuals).”).
492. See id. at 668 (“This is a counter-intuitive outcome because [state-based exchanges]
retained a larger role in regulating insurance premiums. In such states, insurance
commissioners were expected to use their rate review powers to exert downward
pressure on insurers’ premium requests.”). Evidence suggests that insurers in statebased exchanges performed better financially than insurers in federal exchanges. See
Mark A. Hall et al., Financial Performance of Health Insurers: State-Run Versus Federal-Run
Exchanges, MED. CARE RES. & REV. 7 (2017), https://perma.cc/HGM5-W2JG. However,
this effect may be attributable to states’ decisions on Medicaid expansion. See id.
(“[S]tate-run exchange states . . . tended to be the ones that expanded Medicaid, and
doing that takes some of the higher risk people out of the exchange market . . . .”).
493. The arguments in this Subpart benefited tremendously from the thoughts of one of our
initial colleagues in researching the ACA, Dean Ted Ruger at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
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states remains with the states.494 Our study corroborates the focus of much of
the new federalism literature on the role of vertical and interagency bargaining
as the central feature of modern, intrastatutory federalism relationships.495
The former federal officials we interviewed told us that their daily interactions
with each state individually were all-consuming and complex.496 These
vertical negotiations have been the core dynamic of the ACA’s implementation.
We also saw that the federal government exerts power—but not hegemonically. The dance between the federal government and each state is not a zerosum negotiation over policy optimization between a federal executive and state
actors who might disagree on a single dimension. The federal government has
at least two negotiating levers, regulatory policy and budget generosity, and it
can switch between them (or use both) to implement its policy goals.
Extending this two-lever bargaining dynamic is a temporal and vision
mismatch between national and state policy ends. If the Obama Administration
was typical, the federal executive operates on a longer time horizon than most
state officials, a point confirmed by several of our interviewees.497 States likely
care more about Medicaid implementation specifics given their primary role in
delivering healthcare and the budgetary consequences they face every year.
The federal executive tends to aim at a higher level of generality.
These factors combine to give states a lot more leverage than most newer
federalism scholars assume, and we doubt this observation is unique to the
ACA. Much of the new scholarship has portrayed the states as victims in these
negotiations, calling for new legal doctrines as a way to level the bargaining
playing field between states and the federal government.498 Our findings cast
494. Cf. Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1351 (2001)

495.

496.

497.

498.

(“[W]hat judicial review we have should be directed toward maintaining a vital system
of political and institutional checks on federal power, not on policing some absolute
sphere of state autonomy.”).
See, e.g., ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 350 (2011) (recognizing
“the important interpretive roles by political actors in vertical federalism bargaining”);
Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism, supra note 5, at 1010 (discussing states’ powers as
those “of the servant” (quoting Heather K. Gerken, Commentary, Of Sovereigns and
Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633, 2635 (2006))); Gluck, supra note 1, at 570 (discussing
“important vertical and horizontal implementation networks” that arise in the context
of the ACA); Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged Constitution of
American Healthcare, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2012, at 215, 224-26 (emphasizing state leverage under the ACA).
See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1, supra
note 213; Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 5, supra
note 190.
See Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 1, supra
note 213; Interview with Former Federal Executive Branch Healthcare Official 5, supra
note 190; Interview with State Policy Organization Officers 1, 2, 3 and 4, supra note 213.
Cf., e.g., Ilya Somin, Federalism and the Roberts Court, 46 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 441, 442
(2016) (praising the Roberts Court’s “strengthen[ing of] judicial enforcement of limits
footnote continued on next page
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doubt on whether the states need more protection or power at all. At least in
the context of the ACA, states have proved themselves quite adept at
leveraging available options to their benefit.499 We suspect that this leverage
was due to more than just NFIB, although that decision undoubtedly helped.
States still had the lever of refusing to establish their own exchanges. As we
have seen, that was a powerful tool to bring HHS to the table to adapt. The
Medicaid waiver provisions also were available before NFIB.
Central to the negotiating power we observed are several features that
appear not to be limited to the ACA: state choice to implement, a context in
which the federal government does not wish to or lacks capacity to itself
implement a program nationwide, and the executive branch’s commitment to
the program’s success. Of course, other kinds of statutes exist too—including
ones with less political salience—in which an administering agency might be
able to step in more easily or be more willing to stake out firmer negotiating
positions at the expense of entrenching the law.
It also is notable that Congress and federal courts remain largely on the
sidelines when it comes to these intergovernmental negotiations.500 We saw
little of those institutions after Congress set the ACA in motion and the Court
effectively amended it in NFIB. Part of the reason is that almost no legal
doctrine applies to these new vertical interactions, and so courts have had little
role to play.501 As noted, we can imagine doctrines that would recognize the
federalism features within national statutory implementation and seek to
effectuate them. We might, for instance, recognize rights for state implementers
to challenge executive action that undermines a law’s effectiveness—at the
moment, those kinds of challenges are exceedingly difficult to bring.502 We
have mentioned one important legal advance that already has occurred,
perhaps in recognition of the growing importance of bargaining relationships:
the ACA’s amendment of the Medicaid section 1115 waiver process to bring
more transparency to waiver negotiations.503 Waivers were notorious legal

499.
500.

501.

502.
503.

on federal power . . . for the purpose of leaving greater scope for state and local
authority”). See generally Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 24-73
(2011).
See supra Parts IV.A, V.B.
Cf. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 2, at 954 (arguing that Congress has been sidelined
because of polarization, not the lack of legal doctrine, and seeing an enhanced role for
executive negotiations as a result).
See Gluck, supra note 23, at 1997-98 (“This push-pull of nation and state—both from
inside the landscape of federal statutes—is more than just an interesting theoretical
observation. It is a ‘law’ problem. When it comes to legal doctrines to deal with this
new world of statutory federalism, ours is a sorry state of affairs.”).
The Take Care Clause provides a means of suing the executive but imposes an
extraordinarily high hurdle. See Gluck, supra note 333; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See Watson, supra note 472, at 215.
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black boxes across all areas of law, and this new transparency has facilitated
state copying in Medicaid.
Another problem is that current legal doctrine does not recognize and so
cannot capture the blended entities that modern federalism statutes like the
ACA produce.504 These institutions are neither “state” nor “national.” Ask any
health law scholar if an insurance exchange—whether state-run, federally run,
or hybrid—is a state or federal entity, and a variety of conflicting answers will
follow. These are mixed entities of the sort that—because they retain some
features of state sovereignty and yet are the brainchildren of federal law—have
puzzled constitutional and federal courts scholars when it comes to
categorizing them as state or federal.505
In years to come, courts will certainly be asked whether challenges to
aspects of insurance exchange operation are federal or state law questions for
purposes of jurisdiction and applicable law, just as courts have been asked—and
have unevenly answered—such questions regarding state implementation of
the Clean Air Act.506 Questions are also likely to arise concerning the extent to
which Congress can direct state officials in the implementation of federal law.
For instance, the ACA required state insurance commissioners to engage in rate
review that some states did not already allow those officials to perform.507
Courts have not answered whether federal law may authorize this otherwise
ultra vires state-official behavior, or whether state law first must authorize
state officials to act as federal law requires. The Court narrowly skirted this
question in 2011—a Term before it skirted the difficult question of when
individuals can challenge states for lax implementation of federal law.508

504. See generally Gluck, supra note 23 (detailing the lack of doctrine).
505. Cf. id. at 2007, 2027, 2033 (illustrating confusion about similar entities, such as the

implementation tools of the Clean Air Act, a state-led federal statute).
506. See Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign Affairs Removal, and

Complete Preemption, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1775, 1787-88 (2007) (discussing cases evincing
confusion under the Clean Air Act).
507. See Premium Rate Reviews, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2010), https://perma.cc
/875G-NRXZ (“Under federal law, states (usually insurance departments) will review
rates and determine whether they are unreasonable. . . . [Only t]wenty-four states give
the state insurance department or commissioner legal power of prior approval or
disapproval of certain rate changes.”).
508. See Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255, 257-58 (2011); see also
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 610, 616 (2012) (declining to
decide “whether the Ninth Circuit properly recognized a Supremacy Clause action to
enforce” a Medicaid provision against the states). The Court returned to a similar
question in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015). In that case,
the Court held that doctors could not sue state officials for underenforcing federal
Medicaid laws. See id. at 1382, 1384-85, 1387.
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This blurring of state and national contributes to the conceptual difficulties for federalism outlined above. It also undermines the assumptions made by
federalism legal doctrines, which still rest on a separate spheres conception.
D. Federalism and Healthcare
Federalism as a tool of health policy in particular remains theoretically
muddy. On the one hand, an attachment to retaining localism in healthcare
persists and clearly relates to federalism. Nationalization of healthcare has been
something Americans have strongly supported only when circumstances are
dire for a particular group, such as when Medicare was enacted in 1965,509 or
when populations Congress views as especially vulnerable—such as mothers
and children in the case of Medicaid—need help.510 The tradition has been to
place trust in state-run programs to control quality, bring down healthcare
costs, enhance competition, and promote innovation—in other words,
federalism has been assumed to be the means to improve policy outcomes.511
It is well established that healthcare varies across geographic markets.512
Some of this variation is driven by the kinds of differences typically discussed
in federalism literature. Medicine historically has a very local culture, and
provider practices may vary substantially even across communities within the
same state.513 Even Medicare, the national health insurance program for the

509. See STARR, supra note 59, at 368-69; Robert J. Blendon & John M. Benson, Americans’

510.

511.
512.
513.

Views on Health Policy: A Fifty-Year Historical Perspective, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at
33, 34 (“Shortly before Medicare was enacted, 75 percent of the public said that the
federal government should pass a law to provide medical care for seniors.”).
See, e.g., Lisa Shapiro, First Focus, The Children’s Health Insurance Program: Why
CHIP Is Still the Best Deal for Kids 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/B6UD-GRL5 (“The
American people overwhelmingly support CHIP’s continuation. In a May 2014 poll
conducted by American Viewpoint, voters favored extending funding for CHIP by a
74-14% margin, including 66-19% among Republicans.”).
See Holahan et al., supra note 15, at 6-7.
See, e.g., John Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care
Delivery, 182 SCIENCE 1102, 1107 (1973).
See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 872 (Miss. 1985) (“Because of . . . differences in
facilities, equipment, etc., what a physician may reasonably be expected to do in the
treatment of a patient in rural Humphreys County or Greene County may vary from
what a physician in Jackson may be able to do. A physician practicing in Noxubee
County, for example, may hardly be faulted for failure to perform a CAT scan when
the necessary facilities and equipment are not reasonably available.”), superseded in other
part by statute, Act of Mar. 2, 1989, ch. 311, 1989 Miss. Laws 19 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the Mississippi Code), as recognized in Narkeeta Timber Co. v.
Jenkins, 777 So. 2d 39 (Miss. 2000); James N. Weinstein et al., Trends and Geographic
Variations in Major Surgery for Degenerative Diseases of the Hip, Knee, and Spine, 23
HEALTH AFF. VAR-81, VAR-82 (2004) (“In a given region, local physicians tend to apply
their rules of practice consistently, which results in the ‘surgical signature’ phenomefootnote continued on next page
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elderly and disabled, still relies on local coverage determinations.514
Geographic variations in diseases and local health behaviors also drive
differences.515
Other differences are driven by inequality, including disparities when it
comes to local resources and social determinants of health.516 Moral
considerations may outweigh a preference for localism in these circumstances,
depending on whether the policy goal of healthcare federalism is outcomes or
structure. Those moral considerations were part of Congress’s motivation to
nationalize the Medicaid expansion in drafting the ACA.517
In this vein, a particularly fascinating outgrowth of the ACA from a
healthcare federalism perspective is that the threat of its repeal has done more
to advance a nationalized vision of healthcare than ever before. Calls for a fully
national “single payer” system were politically impossible before the Trump
Administration. But the threat to the ACA’s efforts to expand healthcare access
has led many to place moral concerns above structural ones and has brought
arguments for single payer healthcare into the mainstream.518
But whichever side of the line one is on, our key point is that little evidence supports the claim that any of the structural options is best. Little data
exists showing that states acting alone actually achieve better health outcomes
than do states working within federal guidelines. Even less evidence exists
comparing outcomes when states work alone, when states work inside federal
guidelines, and when the federal government acts alone.

514.

515.

516.

517.

518.

non: rates for specific surgical procedures that are idiosyncratic to a region, sometimes
differing dramatically among neighboring regions.”).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(f)(2)(B) (2016) (“For purposes of this section, the term ‘local
coverage determination’ means a determination by a fiscal intermediary or a carrier
under part A or part B, as applicable, respecting whether or not a particular item or
service is covered on an intermediary- or carrier-wide basis under such parts, in
accordance with [42 U.S.C.] § 1395y(a)(1)(A) . . . .”).
See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United
States, 2001-2014, 315 JAMA 1750, 1756 (2016) (describing the importance of local trends
in health behaviors in creating geographic differences in health outcomes).
See Harry J. Heiman & Samantha Artiga, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Beyond
Health Care: The Role of Social Determinants in Promoting Health and Health Equity 2
(2015), https://perma.cc/8X88-3K45; see also, e.g., Jennifer Weisent et al., Socioeconomic
Determinants of Geographic Disparities in Campylobacteriosis Risk: A Comparison of Global
and Local Modeling Approaches, INT’L J. HEALTH GEOGRAPHICS 2 (2012), https://perma.cc
/BN4M-582G (describing the socioeconomic factors influencing rates of campylobacteriosis, a common cause of gastroenteritis).
See Remarks on Signing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 00196, at 3 (Mar. 23, 2010), https://perma.cc/DR5A-LNPY (“And
we have now just enshrined . . . the core principle that everybody should have some
basic security when it comes to their health care.”).
See Abbe Gluck, Obamacare as Superstatute, BALKINIZATION (July 29, 2017, 10:18 AM),
https://perma.cc/25MX-658G.
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The ACA is the ultimate compromise. It retains and strengthens the
preexisting landscape of fragmented and structurally diverse healthcare
programs. It straddles the systemic philosophical options, incorporating
components of both individual responsibility and solidarity/universality into
one statute. And when it comes to federalist structures, the statute embraces a
federalist model with a nationalized baseline, even as the healthcare goals it
aims to accomplish may be better suited to a fully nationalized structure, at
least when it comes to Medicaid. But that is why we can say with more
certainty that the ACA’s implementation structure serves state power than we
can say that the implementation proves that federalism results in the best
health policies.
Some newer federalists might take a third way. Heather Gerken, for
instance, might focus less on state power and more on how the ACA creates a
structure that accommodates policy differences or leads to beneficial policy
churn.519 Even so, saying that healthcare federalism is merely a vehicle to
allow for a variety of policy solutions does not ring completely true to us, in
large part because we have shown that we can have that policy churn without
state-led programs at all. Moreover, even if healthcare federalism is mostly
understood as a vehicle for policy diversity, that does not amount to a
normative defense of it. Either that variety itself produces benefits—such as in
the form of health outcomes—or it should be justified on different terms,
whether in terms of democracy benefits from federalist structures or in terms
of the benefits of such policy diversity even in the face of moral concerns about
unequal access to healthcare across the country.
None of this is to suggest that federalism is not real in healthcare. Our
story makes the salience of the state role, including the importance of state
sovereignty, clear. But federalism’s normative justifications require more
serious clarification and evaluation. More empirical examination of benefits
and drawbacks of different federalist structures across classic health policy
metrics such as coverage, quality, and cost is needed. Additional data could
provide information about whether federalism should be a key policy move. If it
turns out that federalist structures do not make for better policy outcomes in a
particular area, then we need to ask whether there is instead a normative
justification for suboptimal policy choices in exchange for the other structural,
political, or constitutional benefits we think healthcare federalism would offer
as an end unto itself.

519. See Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism, supra note 5, at 1026.
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Conclusion
The ACA’s implementation offers a window into modern American
federalism—and modern American nationalism—in action. The implementation process baked into the statute’s structure, despite being flipped by NFIB
and the ensuing political resistance, invites participation from a wide range of
state and federal actors and extends that iterative process forward through
time. The process is both vertical and horizontal as well as exceedingly
adaptive, as state and federal actors respond not just to federal regulators but
also to internal state dynamics, other states’ experiences, and complex policy
goals. States move back and forth between different structural arrangements
vis-à-vis the federal government, and negotiation with federal counterparts is a
near constant.
The story is not one of separate-spheres federalism. But neither is it one of
states as subservient entities lacking sovereignty. Rather, the ACA’s structure
has given the states a great deal of policy autonomy and leverage. It has relied
on the gears of state sovereign democracy to work and so strengthens those
democracies in the process. At the same time, the state-federal blur that the
ACA produces has sometimes obfuscated accountability—notably by
sometimes masking state cooperation with the federal program when it would
be politically unpopular to engage. The features we detail have endured,
including after the election and arrival of an administration hostile to the law.
In work describing our study at an earlier stage, we labeled our findings
“The New Health Care Federalism.”520 We have moved away from this label
here, in part because we suspect our story is not unique to healthcare. The
ACA’s scale simply makes the features we describe particularly salient.
We also are not certain whether the features we identify mark differences
in kind or in degree from what came before. States have negotiated with the
federal government for decades; internal state politics have always mattered;
Congress has used states as lead implementers of federal law for many years.
But the ACA showcases these features in extreme fashion, and it deconstructs
“federalism” in ways we have not seen before. This does not mean that no other
statute does it; just that the ACA makes it impossible to ignore.
Federalism scholars spend most of their time arguing for a particular
structural arrangement based on prior goals and values. The ACA’s
architecture challenges whether any of these goals and values are unique to
federalism or any particular expression of it. It illustrates how federalism is a
proxy for many ideas and challenges us to ask what we are really fighting over,
or seeking, when we invoke the concept. Underneath it all is a modern system

520. Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 207.
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of governance that blends state and federal in ways legal doctrine has not
recognized.
And when it comes to healthcare, conceptual difficulties multiply, largely
because first principles are wanting. Without settling on the overarching goals
of a healthcare system in the first place, no one can determine whether the
kinds of state-federal arrangements built into the ACA serve those goals. And
without deciding whether structural separation of state and federal is an end in
itself or a means to a policy end—or both—we cannot say much that is
meaningful about it. As a result, we cannot determine whether federalism is
serving its ostensible purposes, how strongly it is entrenched, or how
vigorously it is worth defending.
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